On Thu, Aug 16, 2012 at 05:06:31PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 16 Aug 2012, at 09:12, Russell Standish wrote: > > >Why would this be any different with random number generators? A coin > >flips, and I do something based on the outcome. It is not my choice > >(except insofar as I chose to follow an external random event). My > >brain makes a random choice based on the chaotic amplification of > >synaptic noise. This is still my brain and my choice. > > > So you identify yourself with a brain, like Searle. With comp I > would say that only a person makes choice, the solid material brain > is already a construct from an infinity of random choice, but none > can be said to mine, like if I found myself in Moscow instead of > Washington after a WM-duplication, I can't say that I have chosen to > be in Moscow. >
Via supervenience, yes. I'm not sure this is particularly Searle's position, though - I disagree with his diagnosis of the Chinese room, and rather follow Dennett in that. ... stuff elided, because we're in agreement ... > >>I don't think free-will (as I defined it of course) has anything to > >>do with determinacy or indeterminacy. The fact that someone else can > >>predict my behavior does not make it less "free". > >> > > > >Um, yes it does. > > Why? > Why would I be less free to eat blueberries in case everybody can > predict that I will eat them. > In the case everybody could predict that, then I would be able to predict it, and I would feel less free as a result. In the case where some super intelligent observer could predict my actions, but I could not, and wasn't aware of the super intelligent observer's predictions, then we have an interesting case. I can't say whether I would feel less free in that situation or not. Alas, its a bit hard to perform the experiment. I don't think Libet-like experiments count - a machine capable of reading my decision before I become aware of my decision still does not evacuate the proposition that I freely made the decision. I do understand its a bit freaky, though... > > > > >>You did not reply my question: take the iterated > >>WM-self-duplication. All the resulting people lives the experience > >>of an random oracle. Why would they be more free than someone > >>outside the duplication boxes? How could they use that random oracle > >>for being more free than someone not using them, as they cannot > >>select the outcome? > >> > > > >In the setup of your teleporters, the source of randomness comes from > >outside of the person, so no, that doesn't have anything to with free > >will. But if you move the source of randomness to inside somehow, then > >sure it might do. > > I don't see what inside and outside have anything to do with the > fact that a choice can't be helped with a random coin. A choice is > driven by many factors like my personality, my culture, my life, my > current appetite, and thousand of parameters. > Sure, and also by completely random factors. If you only made completely random choices, it wouldn't seem like execising free will at all. One can perform this experiment, although curiously, humans make poor random number generators, statistically speaking. > > > >I don't see how my form of free will is non-comp. > > With comp everything is deterministic from the 3p view, like > arithmetical truth is definite. > Then from the 1-view, there are mainly two type of indeterminacy. > The one due to self-multiplication in UD* (alias arithmetical > truth), which, as you agree above can't play a role in free-will. > Then there is the self-indeterminacy based on Turing, which is the > one playing a role in free-will. But in both case, there is no > indeterminacy in the big picture. If free-will necessicate a real > 3p-free will, comp would be false, as we cannot Turing emulate it. Definitely not. Free will is not a 3p (aka syntactic level) concept. To say it is would be a confusion of levels, or a category error, putting it bluntly. > The QM indeterminacy cannot work here, as it is a > self-multiplication like in the first person indeterminacy. > > > > >By contrast, your > >UD argument seems to argue for its necessary appearance. > > Yes. > > > > > >Someone asked why this concept is important. It isn't for me, per se, > >but I would imagine that someone implementing an agent that must > >survive in a messy real world environment (eg an autonomous robot) > >will need to consider this issue, and build something like it into > >their robot. > > Probabilist algorithm can be more efficacious and can solve problem > that deterministic algorithm cannot, but in most case you can use > pseudo-random one in most case. And if consciousness and free will > necessitates a real 3p indeterminacy, then comp is violated, as this > cannot be Turing emulated. > > Best, > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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