# On calculating pi

```Hi Bruno Marchal

BTW how can they know if the calculation of pi is very precise if they
don't really know beforehand what its precise value should be ?```
```

Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/18/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Time: 2012-08-18, 05:59:32
Subject: Re: Reconciling Bruno's Primitives with Multisense

On 17 Aug 2012, at 19:15, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, August 17, 2012 10:48:04 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Craig,

On 15 Aug 2012, at 11:21, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> in case the special characters don't come out...
>
> I was thinking about your primitive of arithmetic truth (numbers, 0,
> +, and *, right?) and then your concept of ‘the dreams of
> numbers’, interviewing Lobian Machines, etc and came up with this.
>
> One single irreducible digit   (Om) which represents a self-
> dividing continuum of infinite perpendicular dialectics between
> eidetic dream states (in which dream~numbers escape their numerical
> identities as immersive qualitative experiences) and entopic non-
> dream states (in which number~dreams escape their dream nature as
> literal algebra-geometries).
>
I use such term more literally. I am not sure I can understand this,
even if there is some genuine analogy.

Think of it like p, except that instead of circumference and diameter, there is
eidetic-figurative and entopic-literal presentation modalities.

Pi = ratio of the length or a circle and its diameter. That is understandable.
"eidetic-figurative and entropic-literal presentation modalities." is not.

The dreaming number are usually very big concrete number. They dream
by encoding computational state of person, relatively to some
universal number, which are encoding universal machine relatively to
some other one, and the initial one can be chosen arbitrary. Those are
not symbolic number, but real encoding number, a bit like the genome
if you want.

Why would that result in a dream?

Because I work in the comp theory where we come to the idea that consciousness
can be manifested by abstract relation between numbers, as they emulate
computation. We have already said "yes" to the doctor.

It seems shrouded in obfuscating self-reference. Why would anything that has
been encoded ever need to be decoded if the machine can fluently process the
encoded form?

To store what we learn. The DNA plays already such a role at the molecular
level. It illustrates also a digital encoding and decoding.

Why would it need any other form - especially if it is all made of numbers?

Nobody needs a universe. Why do we do babies?
The "truth" is that we have them, we cannot really avoid them. It is like the
prime number and the universal machine. Once you have zero and + and *, you get
Platonia, and a lot of mess in Platonia. It is a logical consequence.

What I am saying is that if you are going to invoke a possibility of dreams,
that has to be grounded in the terms that you are laying out as primitive. Why
would dreams leap out of mechanical relations?

It is a logical consequence, once you accept the idea that you might survive
with a digital brain.

Even if there was some purpose for it, how could that actually take place -
what are the dreamings made of?

Ontologically: nothing take place. All the computations are there. Some emulate
self-observing machine and the math explain why they have to be beffudled by
existence and conscience.

My view is that it may be the case that everything that is not matter across
space is experience through time - by definition, ontologically. There is no
other form or content possible in the cosmos. Numbers are experiences as they
must be inferred by computational agents and cannot exist independently of
them. What my formulas do is to propose a precise relation between dream-time
(including logical algebras) and matter-space (including topological
geometries). To do this we need to invoke a continuity between them which is a
perpendicular axis which runs from the literal (tight equivalence; induction is
accomplished through linear arithmetic logic) to the figurative/metaphorical
(loose thematic association; induction is accomplished through linear logic as
well as elliptical cross-context leaps).

I don't believe in time, space, cosmos, matter, ...
I explain their appearance by the dream property of numbers, relatively to
universal numbers.

>
> This continuum f ( (Om)), runs from infinitely solipsistic/private
> first person subjectivity (calling that Aleph  )to infinitely
> discrete/public third person mechanism (calling that Omega O), so
> that at  ,any given dream is experienced as 99.99…9% dream and
> 0.00…1% number and at O (Omega), any given machine or number is
> presented as 99.99…9% number and 0.00…1% dream.
>

?

I'm mapping out this literal to figurative axis, as it modifies the axis of
subject to object presentations. The more an experience extends
figuratively/metaphorically, the less it extends literally/mechanically.

That makes some sense.

>
> The halfway point between the   (Aleph) and O (Omega) axis is the
> perpendicular axis f (- (Om)) which is the high and low
> correspondence between the literal dream and figurative number (or
> figurative dream and literal number depending on whether you are
> using the dream-facing epistemology or the number-facing
> epistemology). This axis runs from tight equivalence (“=”
> equality) to broadly elliptical potential set membership (“…”
> ellipsis)
>
> So it looks something like this:
>
> f( )   {  “…” ? “=” O}
>
> function (Om) is superset or equal to the continuum ranging from
> Aleph to ellipsis perpendicular/orthogonal to the inverse range from
> equality to Omega).
>
> To go further, it could be said that at O(Omega),   (Om) expresses
> as 10|O (one, zero, line segment, circle referring to the
> quantitative algebraic and geometric perpendicular primitives) while
> at   (Aleph),   (Om) expresses as
>      (tetragrammaton or yod, hay, vov, hay, or in perhaps more
> familiar metaphor,     (clubs, spades, hearts, diamonds)
>
> where:
>
>   clubs (wands) =Fire, spiritual, tactile
>   spades (swords) = Air, mental, auditory
>   hearts (cups) =Water, emotional, visual
>   diamonds (pentacles/coins) = Earth, physical, olfactory-gustatory
>
> Note that tactile and auditory modalities tune us into ourselves and
> each others sensemaking (selves and minds), while the visual and
> olfactory/gustatory sense modalities are about objectifying realism
> of the world (egos or objectified selves/self-images and bodies). It
> should be obvious that   clubs (wands) and   spades (swords) are
> stereotypically masculine and abstracting forces, while   hearts
> (cups) and   diamonds (pentacles/coins) are stereotypically
> feminine objectified fields.
>
> Sorry for the mumbo jumbo, but it is the only way to be non-
> reductive when approaching the qualitative side.
>
I don't think so. Aristotle invented modal logic to treat in the
quantitative way non reductive qualitative notion.

What I am saying though is that *any quantitative treatment of qualitative
experience is an unrecoverably catastrophic reduction*.

I agree with this. Comp prevents to do such a reduction about what a machine
can be and can be capable of.

Modal logic can make a toy model of experience, by removing all of the
experience and replacing it with a meaningless variable.

Why meaningless?

It is to say 'here, instead of your baby, let's just call it 'consumer of
diapers and milk' and design a nursery based on the statistics derived from
that consumption.

No, it is the complete contrary. I see your point, but it is eaxtly that type
of reduction that is prevented by comp. Even for machine, we can no more reduce
them to their third person description. They do have a soul, even after-life,
etc.

What is needed is a way to reference phenomenological qualities which expresses
not merely non-comp, but explicitly asserts quality and a view of the universe
from the perspective of irreducible quality.

You have to postualte them, and to postulate matter, and to postulate a
relation, and non-comp, and that is neither satisfying, nor working. It
introduces difficulties where there are already enough, imo.

> We can’t pretend to talk about the eidetic, dream like
> perpendicular of number logic while using the purely empirical terms
> of arithmetic reduction. We need symbols that can only refer to
> named qualities rather than enumerated quantities.
>
This is exactly what happen when you define the first person by the
knower. Bp & p, or if you prefer

provable(p) and true(p),

provable and true are not first person qualities, they are epistemological
quantifications. First person would be more like great(p) and superior(p).

?

gives a modality which can provably be shown qualitative, and non
formalizable in arithmetic. It leads to a logic (know as S4Grz) which
describes something which is absolutely impossible to reduce to any
number relations or even anything third person describable notion,
even infinite one.

That doesn't mean it is qualitative, only that it is so obscurely arithmetic
that arithmetic itself cannot quantify it.

But the machine still can refer to it. So I don't see why this would not work.
It would not work if you reduce a machine to its body, but the divergence
between Bp and Bp & p disallow such a reduction.

What quality does this modality have? Is it shiny? Is it spicy? Does it get
tired?

The modality has no quality. It describes qualities. You might do a confusion
of level. It is a bit like the confusion between the string "s(s(0))" and the
number s(s(0)).

You might think I just described it, by Bp & p, or by "provable(p) and
true(p)", but this is not the case, as I use some of your intuition
about truth, which cannot be arithmetized by itself, by a famous
result of G del and Tarski (independently).
It happens that we do have a good intuition of many truth, and machine
can indeed describe better and better approximations of the truth
concept, but the limit of it, used here, cannot be. So by using both
the comp hypothesis, and by studying simple (L bian) machine (simpler
than us) we can develop a formal (quantitative in some sense, at some
level, from some point of view) theory concerning the non formal, and
even non-formalizable-at-all-by-the-machine, qualities that machine
can still refer about. And this can be used to explain why machine are
forced to be befuddled by the subjectively-real apparent gap between
third and first person attributes.

It seems like you are missing the obvious. Awareness is not just about knowing
and navigating a set of logical conditions. That can be accomplished easily
without any awareness. Experienced qualities are orthogonal to knowledge and
procedural evaluation.

I can understand that "navigating a set of logical conditions" can be done
without awareness. Awareness or knowlegde arrives when the navigating embed the
navigator in truth, or in a reality. There is a fixed point, and it is
explained why this is felt as a personal non communicable experience.

> Let the ignoring and insulting begin!
>

We don't need that here, I think, nor anywhere. An insult is almost
always equivalent with "I have no argument".

I agree.

I know. You are wise. And we agree on many things, but we are working in
antipodal theories. I think you have reductionist conception of machine, to be
franc.

Bruno

On Friday, August 17, 2012 10:48:04 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Craig,

On 15 Aug 2012, at 11:21, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> in case the special characters don't come out...
>
> I was thinking about your primitive of arithmetic truth (numbers, 0,
> +, and *, right?) and then your concept of ‘the dreams of
> numbers’, interviewing Lobian Machines, etc and came up with this.
>
> One single irreducible digit   (Om) which represents a self-
> dividing continuum of infinite perpendicular dialectics between
> eidetic dream states (in which dream~numbers escape their numerical
> identities as immersive qualitative experiences) and entopic non-
> dream states (in which number~dreams escape their dream nature as
> literal algebra-geometries).
>
I use such term more literally. I am not sure I can understand this,
even if there is some genuine analogy.

The dreaming number are usually very big concrete number. They dream
by encoding computational state of person, relatively to some
universal number, which are encoding universal machine relatively to
some other one, and the initial one can be chosen arbitrary. Those are
not symbolic number, but real encoding number, a bit like the genome
if you want.

>
> This continuum f ( (Om)), runs from infinitely solipsistic/private
> first person subjectivity (calling that Aleph  )to infinitely
> discrete/public third person mechanism (calling that Omega O), so
> that at  ,any given dream is experienced as 99.99…9% dream and
> 0.00…1% number and at O (Omega), any given machine or number is
> presented as 99.99…9% number and 0.00…1% dream.
>

?
>
> The halfway point between the   (Aleph) and O (Omega) axis is the
> perpendicular axis f (- (Om)) which is the high and low
> correspondence between the literal dream and figurative number (or
> figurative dream and literal number depending on whether you are
> using the dream-facing epistemology or the number-facing
> epistemology). This axis runs from tight equivalence (“=”
> equality) to broadly elliptical potential set membership (“…”
> ellipsis)
>
> So it looks something like this:
>
> f( )   {  “…” ? “=” O}
>
> function (Om) is superset or equal to the continuum ranging from
> Aleph to ellipsis perpendicular/orthogonal to the inverse range from
> equality to Omega).
>
> To go further, it could be said that at O(Omega),   (Om) expresses
> as 10|O (one, zero, line segment, circle referring to the
> quantitative algebraic and geometric perpendicular primitives) while
> at   (Aleph),   (Om) expresses as
>      (tetragrammaton or yod, hay, vov, hay, or in perhaps more
> familiar metaphor,     (clubs, spades, hearts, diamonds)
>
> where:
>
>   clubs (wands) =Fire, spiritual, tactile
>   spades (swords) = Air, mental, auditory
>   hearts (cups) =Water, emotional, visual
>   diamonds (pentacles/coins) = Earth, physical, olfactory-gustatory
>
> Note that tactile and auditory modalities tune us into ourselves and
> each others sensemaking (selves and minds), while the visual and
> olfactory/gustatory sense modalities are about objectifying realism
> of the world (egos or objectified selves/self-images and bodies). It
> should be obvious that   clubs (wands) and   spades (swords) are
> stereotypically masculine and abstracting forces, while   hearts
> (cups) and   diamonds (pentacles/coins) are stereotypically
> feminine objectified fields.
>
> Sorry for the mumbo jumbo, but it is the only way to be non-
> reductive when approaching the qualitative side.
>
I don't think so. Aristotle invented modal logic to treat in the
quantitative way non reductive qualitative notion.

> We can’t pretend to talk about the eidetic, dream like
> perpendicular of number logic while using the purely empirical terms
> of arithmetic reduction. We need symbols that can only refer to
> named qualities rather than enumerated quantities.
>
This is exactly what happen when you define the first person by the
knower. Bp & p, or if you prefer

provable(p) and true(p),

gives a modality which can provably be shown qualitative, and non
formalizable in arithmetic. It leads to a logic (know as S4Grz) which
describes something which is absolutely impossible to reduce to any
number relations or even anything third person describable notion,
even infinite one.

You might think I just described it, by Bp & p, or by "provable(p) and
true(p)", but this is not the case, as I use some of your intuition
about truth, which cannot be arithmetized by itself, by a famous
result of G del and Tarski (independently).
It happens that we do have a good intuition of many truth, and machine
can indeed describe better and better approximations of the truth
concept, but the limit of it, used here, cannot be. So by using both
the comp hypothesis, and by studying simple (L bian) machine (simpler
than us) we can develop a formal (quantitative in some sense, at some
level, from some point of view) theory concerning the non formal, and
even non-formalizable-at-all-by-the-machine, qualities that machine
can still refer about. And this can be used to explain why machine are
forced to be befuddled by the subjectively-real apparent gap between
third and first person attributes.

> Let the ignoring and insulting begin!
>

We don't need that here, I think, nor anywhere. An insult is almost
always equivalent with "I have no argument".

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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