Roger,
If the mind were not extended,
then animal intelligence would not depend on brain size.
Richard

On Mon, Aug 27, 2012 at 8:39 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  It has been asked here-- what in fact is the mind-body problem ?
>
> http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/writing/mind-top.html
>
>
> "The Mind Body Problem
>
> What philosophers call the mind body problem originated with Descartes. In
> Descartes' philosophy
> the mind is essentially a thinking thing, while the body is essentially an
> extended thing - something which occupies space.
> Descartes held that there is two way causal interaction between these two
> quite different kinds of substances.
> So, the body effects the mind in perception, and the mind effects the body
> in action. But how is this possible?
> How can an unextended thing effect something in space. How can something
> in space effect an unextended thing?"
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Immediately below I give an account of a man being pricked by a pin
> in Leibniz's world versus such an action in the actual or phenomenal world.
>
> In summary, and in addition,
>
> 1) They amount to the same account, one virtual and one actual or
> phenomenal.
>
> 2) Our so-called free will is only an apparent one.
>
> 3) Because monads overlap (are weakly nonlocal), since space is not a
> property,
> monads can have some limited, unconscious awareness of the rest of the
> universe (including all life).
> This awareness is generally very weak and generally unconscious.
> Still, it means that we are an intimate part of the universe and all that
> happens.
>
> 4) The virtual world of the monad of man strictly portrays men
> as blind, completely passive robots. However, his monad
> is inside of the supreme monad, which is his puppet-master.
> But at the same time, then like as I recall Pinocchio, he
> becomes seemingly alive in the everyday sense that we feel we are alive.
> but through the supreme monad in which he is subordinately enclosed.
>
> 5) There is some bleed-through of future perceptions, so we can have
> some dim awareness of future happenings.
>
>
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
> I will just briefly discuss actions here by man. Each man is entirely
> virtual,
> a monad in the space of thought containing a database of perceptions
> (given to him by God, of all the perceptions of the other monads in the
> universe.
> Some of these (animals) are mindless and others feelingless,
> with only have corporeal functions (plants, rocks) ).
>
> Every monad  has an internal source of energy, plus a pre-programed
> set of virtual perceptions continuously and instantaneously given to him
> by
> the Supreme Monad, and a set of virtual actions the monad is programmed
> to virtually desire or will giving him new perceptions as well as every
> other
> monad in the universe.
>
>  All of these must function as virtual agents or entities according to
> Leibniz's
> principle of preestablished harmony. Only the supreme monad (God) can
> perceive,
> feel, and act.
>
>
> So if God wants you to be pricked by a pain, feel the pain, and react,
> he will cause a virtual monadic pin to virtually prick your sensory monad,
> and then have you virtually feel pain as a monad, but actually to feel
> a real pain in the phenomenal world, and to virtually jump and really
> jump in both world, one virtually and one physically.
>
>
>
> How does this differ
>
>
>
> ==================================================
> A MORE COMPLETE ACCOUNT OF CAUSATION BY MONADS
>
> BPersonally, I am looking at the "how is this possible" aspect,
> first by asking what is possible from the aspect of Leibniz's metaphysics.
>
> What is possible is limited by Leibniz's monadology:
>
> http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/GMR/moneth/monadology.html
>
> The principle issue is Leibniz's theory of causation. One account is given
> at
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-causation/
>
> There seems to be some confusion and differing acounts on how things
> happen,
> but my own understanding is that:
>
> 1). All simple substances are monads, or which there are 3 types,
> those just containing bodily perceptions (rocks, vegetables),
> those containing affective perceptions as well (animals) and those (man)
> which also have mental perceptions (ie all things mental).
>
> 2. Monads can do nothing or perceive anything on their own, but only
> through God
> (the supreme monad) according to our desires, which are actually God's
>
>
> 3) All of the actions of lesser monads and the supreme monad God have been
> scripted
> in the Preestablished Harmony.
>
> 4) Thus causation is virtual, say like in a silent movie. No actual forces
> are involved,
> only virtual forces.
>
> 5)
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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>
>
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>
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <+rclo...@verizon.net>
> 8/27/2012
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
> everything could function."
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: benjayk
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-08-25, 11:16:59
> Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of
> computers
>
>
> I am getting a bit tired of our discussion, so I will just adress the main
> points:
>
>
> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> But let's say we mean "except for memory and unlimited accuracy".
> >> >> This would mean that we are computers, but not that we are ONLY
> >> >> computers.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> > Is this like saying our brains are atoms, but we are more than atoms?
> >> I
> >> > can agree with that, our minds transcend the simple description of
> >> > interacting particles.
> >> >
> >> > But if atoms can serve as a platform for minds and consciousness, is
> >> there
> >> > a reason that computers cannot?
> >> >
> >> Not absolutely. Indeed, I believe mind is all there is, so necessarily
> >> computers are an aspect of mind and are even conscious in a sense
> >> already.
> >>
> >
> > Do you have a meta-theory which could explain why we have the conscious
> > experiences that we do?
> >
> > Saying that mind is all there is, while possibly valid, does not explain
> > very much (without some meta-theory).
> No, I don't even take it to be a theory. In this sense you might say it
> doesn't explain anything on a theoretical level, but this is just because
> reality doesn't work based on any theoretical concepts (though it
> obviously
> is described and incorporates them).
>
>
> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >> >
> >> > Short of adopting some kind of dualism (such as
> >> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism , or the idea
> that
> >> God
> >> > has to put a soul into a computer to make it alive/conscious), I
> don't
> >> see
> >> > how atoms can serve as this platform but computers could not, since
> >> > computers seem capable of emulating everything atoms do.
> >> OK. We have a problem of level here. On some level, computers can
> emulate
> >> everything atoms can do computationally, I'll admit that. But that's
> >> simply
> >> the wrong level, since it is not about what something can do in the
> sense
> >> of
> >> transforming input/output.
> >> It is about what something IS (or is like).
> >>
> >
> > Within the simulation, isn't a simulated atom like a real atom (in our
> > reality)?
> There is no unambiguous answer to this question IMO.
>
> But it only matters that the simulated atom is not like the real atom with
> respect to our reality - the former can't substitute the latter with
> respect
> to reality.
>
>
> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> since this is all that is required for my argument.
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> I (if I take myself to be human) can't be contained in that
> >> >> definition
> >> >> >> >> because a human is not a computer according to the everyday
> >> >> >> >> definition.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > A human may be something a computer can perfectly emulate,
> >> therefore
> >> >> a
> >> >> >> > human could exist with the definition of a computer. Computers
> >> are
> >> >> >> > very powerful and flexible in what they can do.
> >> >> >> That is an assumption that I don't buy into at all.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> > Have you ever done any computer programming? If you have, you
> might
> >> >> > realize that the possibilities for programs goes beyond your
> >> >> imagination.
> >> >> Yes, I studied computer science for one semester, so I have
> programmed
> >> a
> >> >> fair amount.
> >> >> Again, you are misinterpreting me. Of course programs go beyond our
> >> >> imagination. Can you imagine the mandel brot set without computing
> it
> >> on
> >> >> a
> >> >> computer? It is very hard.
> >> >> I never said that they can't.
> >> >>
> >> >> I just said that they lack some capability that we have. For example
> >> they
> >> >> can't fundamentally decide which programs to use and which not and
> >> which
> >> >> axioms to use (they can do this relatively, though). There is no
> >> >> computational way of determining that.
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> > There are experimental ways, which is how we determined which axioms
> to
> >> > use.
> >> Nope, since for the computer no experimental ways exists if we haven't
> >> determined a program first.
> >>
> >>
> > You said computers fundamentally cannot choose which programs or axioms
> to
> > use.
> >
> > We could program a computer with a neural simulation of a human
> > mathematician, and then the computer could have this capability.
> That just would strengthen my point (note the words "we program" meaning
> "we
> choose the program").
>
>
> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >> >
> >> > If the computer program had a concept for desiring novelty/surprises,
> >> it
> >> > would surely find some axiomatic systems more interesting than
> others.
> >> Sure. But he could be programmed to not to have such a concept, and
> there
> >> is
> >> no way of determining whether to use it or not if we haven't already
> >> programmed an algorithm for that (which again had the same problem).
> >>
> >> In effect you get an infinite regress:
> >> How determine which program to use? ->use a program to determine it
> >> But which? ->use a program to determine it
> >> But which? ->use a program to determine it
> >> ....
> >>
> >>
> > Guess and check, with random variation, it worked for evolution.
> But which guessing and checking program to use? ->use a more general
> guessing and checking program to determine it
> But which? ->use an even more more general guessing and checking program
> to
> determine it
> etc....
>
> You still never arrive at a program, in fact your problem just becomes
> more
> difficult each time you ask the question, because the program would have
> to
> be more general.
>
>
> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >
> >> > You're crossing contexts and levels. Certainly, a heart inside a
> >> computer
> >> > simulation of some reality isn't going to do you any good if you
> exist
> >> on
> >> > a
> >> > different level, in a different reality.
> >> So you are actually agreeing with me? - Since this is exactly the point
> I
> >> am
> >> trying to make.
> >> Digital models exist on a different level than what they represent, and
> >> it
> >> doesn't matter how good/accurate they are because that doesn't bridge
> the
> >> gap between model and reality.
> >>
> >
> > But what level something is implemented in does not restrict the
> > intelligence of a process.
> This may be our main disagreement.
> It boils down to the question whether we assume intelligence = (turing)
> computation.
> We could embrace this definition, but I would rather not, since it doesn't
> fit with my own conception of intelligence (which also encompasses
> instantiation and interpretation).
>
> But for the sake of discussion I can embrace this definition and in this
> case I agree with you. Then we might say that computers can become more
> intelligent than humans (and maybe already are), because they manifest
> computations more efficiently than humans.
>
> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >
> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >> >
> >> >> And this seems to be empirically true because there is pretty much
> no
> >> >> other
> >> >> way to explain psi.
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> > What do you mean by psi?
> >> Telepathy, for example.
> >>
> >>
> > Are you aware of any conclusive studies of psi?
> That depends on what you interpret as conclusive. For hard-headed
> skepticists no study will count as conclusive.
>
> There are plenty of studies that show results that are *far* beyond
> chance,
> though.
> Also the so called "anecdotal evidence" is extremely strong.
>
>
> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >> I am not saying that nature is infinite in the way we picture it.
> >> It
> >> >> may
> >> >> >> not
> >> >> >> fit into these categories at all.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Quantum mechanics includes true subjective randomness already, so
> >> by
> >> >> your
> >> >> >> own standards nothing that physically exists can be emulated.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> > The UD also contains subjective randomness, which is at the heart
> of
> >> >> > Bruno's argument.
> >> >> No, it doesn't even contain a subject.
> >> >>
> >> >> Bruno assumes COMP, which I don't buy at all.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> > Okay. What is your theory of mind?
> >> I don't have any. Mind cannot be captured or even by described at the
> >> fundamental level at all.
> >>
> >
> > That doesn't seem like a very useful theory. Does this theory tell
> > you whether or not you should take an artificial brain if it was the
> only
> > way to save your life?
> Of course it is not a useful theory, since it is not a theory in the first
> place.
> To answer your question: No. There is no theoretical way of deciding that.
>
> benjayk
>
> --
> View this message in context: 
> http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34348098.html
>
> Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com.
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