On 27 Aug 2012, at 13:07, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi meekerdb
IMHO I don't think that computers can have intelligence
because intelligence consists of at least one ability:
the ability to make autonomous choices (choices completely
of one's own). Computers can do nothing on their own,
they can only do what softward and harfdware tells them to do.
Another, closely related, reason, is that there must be an agent
that does the choosing,
and IMHO the agent has to be separate from the system.
Godel, perhaps, I speculate.
I will never insist on this enough. All the Gödel's stuff shows that
machines are very well suited for autonomy. In a sense, most of
applied computer science is used to help controlling what can really
become uncontrollable and too much autonomous, a bit like children
education.
Computers are not stupid, we work a lot for making them so.
Bruno
Roger Clough, [email protected]
8/27/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: meekerdb
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-26, 14:56:29
Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of
computers
On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>>
>> I agree different implementations of intelligence have different
capabilities and
>> roles, but I think computers are general enough to replicate any
intelligence (so long
>> as infinities or true randomness are not required).
>
> And now a subtle point. Perhaps.
>
> The point is that computers are general enough to replicate
intelligence EVEN if
> infinities and true randomness are required for it.
>
> Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example
under the form of a some
> non compressible sequence
11101000011101100011111101010110100001... (say)
>
> Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at
my substitution level,
> because this would make it impossible for the doctor to copy my
brain into a finite
> string. So such sequence operates "outside my brain", and if the
doctor copy me at the
> right comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right
"interface" to the oracle, so I
> will survive and stay conscious, despite my consciousness depends
on that oracle.
>
> Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in
front of that oracle?
>
> Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs,
and in this case, he
> will generate me successively (with large delays in between) in
front of all finite
> approximation of the oracle, and (key point), the first person
indeterminacy will have
> as domain, by definition of first person, all the UD computation
where my virtual brain
> use the relevant (for my consciousness) part of the oracle.
>
> A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course
of a computation
> requiring oracle, and so everything is fine.
That's how I imagine COMP instantiates the relation between the
physical world and
consciousness; that the physical world acts like the oracle and
provides essential
interactions with consciousness as a computational process. Of
course that doesn't
require that the physical world be an oracle - it may be computable
too.
Brent
>
> Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step,
then comp would be just
> false, and the brain need an infinite interface.
>
> The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input,
even infinite non
> computable one.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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