On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound in
This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all copies are identical
and this by the principle of indiscernible are one and the same mind. There is no
plurality generated unless there is a necessitation of a physical state association to a
mind, but this would contradict comp.
No I it doesn't contradict comp, because the associated physics isn't ontologically
primitive, it's part of what is generated by the UD. But I think it is right that there
must be an associated physics, that 'mind' cannot exist independent of a physical world it
experiences. Of course whether it must be a physical world exactly like ours or wildly
different is the 'white rabbit' problem.
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