On 8/28/2012 4:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound
This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all
copies are identical and this by the principle of indiscernible are
one and the same mind. There is no plurality generated unless there
is a necessitation of a physical state association to a mind, but
this would contradict comp.
No I it doesn't contradict comp, because the associated physics isn't
ontologically primitive, it's part of what is generated by the UD.
Until there is a precise explanation of what this phrase
"generation by the UD" might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless
combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors.
But I think it is right that there must be an associated physics,
that 'mind' cannot exist independent of a physical world it experiences.
Please explain this to Bruno, as it is that I am complaining about
in his step 8.
Of course whether it must be a physical world exactly like ours or
wildly different is the 'white rabbit' problem.
Have you noticed that I am discussing a solution to the white
rabbit problem using ideas from game theory?
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