On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote:

I agree different implementations of intelligence have different capabilities and roles, but I think computers are general enough to replicate any intelligence (so long as infinities or true randomness are not required).

And now a subtle point. Perhaps.

The point is that computers are general enough to replicate intelligence EVEN if infinities and true randomness are required for it.

Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example under the form of a some non compressible sequence 11101000011101100011111101010110100001... (say)

Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at my substitution level, because this would make it impossible for the doctor to copy my brain into a finite string. So such sequence operates "outside my brain", and if the doctor copy me at the right comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right "interface" to the oracle, so I will survive and stay conscious, despite my consciousness depends on that oracle.

Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in front of that oracle?

Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs, and in this case, he will generate me successively (with large delays in between) in front of all finite approximation of the oracle, and (key point), the first person indeterminacy will have as domain, by definition of first person, all the UD computation where my virtual brain use the relevant (for my consciousness) part of the oracle.

A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course of a computation requiring oracle, and so everything is fine.

Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step, then comp would be just false, and the brain need an infinite interface.

The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input, even infinite non computable one.



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