Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Put it differently, it is what the variable used in the theory  
> represent. ExP(x) means that there is some number verifying P.
But this makes no sense if you only consider the natural numbers. The just
contain "123456789 + * and =". There is no notion of "veryifying" or
"ExP(x)" or even a function in the numbers.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Epistemological existence is about the memory content of such numbers,  
> resulting from their complex interaction with other numbers. In the  
> math part, they are handle by prefixing modalities, and have shape like
> []Ex[]P(x), or
> []<>Ex []<>P(x)
> and more complex one. Note that those are still arithmetical sentences  
> as all modalities used here admit purely arithmetical intepretations.
No, they don't. You are severely confusing level and meta-level.
Even the notion of arithmetical interpretation doesn't make sense with
regards to numbers. They don't formulate anything regarding interpretations.
They just contain simply number relations.

You may invoke Gödel in that point, saying that they are more than that. But
Gödel is only proving that we can formulate higher level concepts using
numbers. He is not proving anything about numbers as a seperate axiomatic
The proof only makes sense with regards to more powerful systems that use
the numbers.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> For
>> me it seems that it is exactly backwards. We need the 1-p as the  
>> ontology,
>> because it is what necessarily primitively exists from the 1-p view.
> ... from the 1p views.
> But when we search a "scientific theory" we bet on some sharable  
> reality beyond the 1p view, be it a physical universe or an  
> arithmetical one.
If that is want science means, then science is obviously nonsense. There is
no thing "beyond" the 1p view, since everything we have is the 1p view and a
3p view is only an abstraction within it.
Yes, science can allow us to find sharable things beyond our *local
personal* viewpoint. But in your theory 1p describes all the viewpoints, not
one particular viewpoint.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> How is any of it
>> more meaningful than any other abitrary string of symbols?
> T#gtti Hyz# uuuu8P^ii ?
Exactly, this is as meaningful as your statements, in a vacuum.
The point is simply that axioms by themselves are meaningless. We need to
make sense of them, and this itself needs something fundamentally beyond

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Strangely you agree
>>>> for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I
>>>> don't
>>>> see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-
>>>> p point
>>>> of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really just  
>>>> an
>>>> abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.
>>> Yes.
>> If this is true, how does it make sense to think of the abstraction as
>> ontologically real and the non-abstraction as mere empistemology? It  
>> seems
>> like total nonsense to me (sorry).
> Because the abstraction provides a way to make sense of how 3p numbers  
> get 1p views and abstract their own idea of what numbers are.
Unfortunately this just doesn't work. You never show how numbers can
actually have 1p views in the first place. The notion is completely
meaningless. It is like saying that a word has a point of view.

All you do is reflect in the numbers what is already completely beyond the
numbers. But this doesn't make sense of how 3p numbers get 1p view at all.
It just shows that you can interpret pretty much everything into numbers.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their
>>>>> doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs  
>>>>> and
>>>>> computers.
>>>> OK, but in this discussion we can't assume COMP. I understand that
>>>> you take
>>>> it for granted when discussing your paper (because it only makes
>>>> sense in
>>>> that context), but I don't take it for granted, and I don't consider
>>>> it
>>>> plausible, or honestly even meaningful.
>>> Then you have to tell me what is not Turing emulable in the
>>> functioning of the brain.
>> *everything*!
> You point here on their material constitution. That begs the question.

Brains are material objects, but appealing to their material constitution
begs the question?
Just to remind you, even according to COMP brains *are* material,
non-emulable objects.

Given that they are material objects, why would that not matter? I'd say it
is *bound* to matter, because it is what is fundamental about them.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Rather show me *what is* turing emulable in the brain.
> The chemical reactions, the neuronal processing, etc. Anything  
> described in any book on brain.
There has never been a single chemical reaction in a computer. Just
simulated chemical reactions, which just don't do the same as real chemical
reactions (like transforming a certain amount of energy from on form to
another), so they don't perform the same function in the real world.

Emulation would mean functional equivalence. But we can't use a simulated
chemical reaction in the place of a real chemical reaction, thus they are
not functionally equivalent.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Even
>> according to COMP, nothing is, since the brain is material and  
>> matter is not
>> emulable.
> Right. But that matter exists only in the 1p plural view, not in the  
> ontology.
Your distinction between ontology and epistemology is totally abitrary.
You have never said what distninguishes the assumption that there are
numbers from the fact that we are here to observe anything (regarding
ontological status). If anything, the latter is more primitively real
because we can't get rid of it. We can forget about numbers (like in
meditation), but we can't forget that we are experiencing (there isn't even
anything about it to forget).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> As I see it, the brain as such has nothing to do with emulability.  
>> We can do
>> simulations, sure, but these have little to do with an actual brain,  
>> except
>> that they mirror what we know about it.
>> It seems to me you are simply presuming that everything that's  
>> relevant in
>> the brain is turing emulable, even despite the fact that according  
>> to your
>> own assumption nothing really is turing emulable about the brain.
> ... about the physical constitution of the brain. OK.
So how does it make sense to abitrarily postulate that some aspect of
reality doesn't matter with regards to our brains?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Also, I don't take comp for granted, I assume it. It is quite  
>>> different.
>>> I am mute on my personal beliefs, except they change all the time.
>>> But you seems to believe that comp is inconsistent or meaningless,  
>>> but
>>> you don't make your point.
>> I don't know how to make it more clear. COMP itself leads to the  
>> conclusion
>> that our brains fundamentally can't be emulated, yet it starts with  
>> the
>> assumption that they can be emulated.
> At some level. You forget the key point.
So, at some level. I don't see how that changes anything. I just mean
digitally substituted in any way.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> We can only somehow try to rescue COMPs consistency by postulating  
>> that what
>> the brain is doesn't matter at all, only what an emulation of it  
>> would be
>> like.
> Yes. the brain's constitution does not matter. Comp is functionalism  
> at some level.
But why wouldn't it? It is there, why would it not matter? Why would it even
be there if it didn't matter?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I genuinely can't see the logic behind this at all.
> I think this is due to the identification of mind and brain that you  
> are doing, but with comp the brain is a mental commodities, like the  
> body. It does not create  consciousness, it relativize it in complex  
> context only.
I actually agree (like I have said many times). I don't identifiy brain and
mind *at all*.
The brain is "just" an object within mind, but that doesn't mean that it
somehow doesn't matter to what we experience.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> In which way does one thing substitute another thing if actually the
>>>> correct
>>>> interpretation of the substitution requires the original? It is like
>>>> saying
>>>> "No you don't need the calculator to calculate 24,3^12. You can
>>>> substitute
>>>> it with pen and pencil, where you write down 24,3^12=X and then
>>>> insert the
>>>> result of the calculation (using your calculator) as X."
>>>> If COMP does imply that interpreting a digital einstein needs a real
>>>> einstein (or more) than it contradicts itself (because in this case
>>>> we can't
>>>> *always* say YES doctor, because then there would be no original
>>>> left to
>>>> interpret the emulation).
>>>> Really it is quite a simple point. If you substitute the whole
>>>> universe with
>>>> an emulation (which is possible according to COMP)
>>> It is not.
>> You are right, it is not, if we take the conclusions of your  
>> reasoning into
>> account. Yet COMP itself strongly seems to suggest it. That's the
>> contradiction.
> ? Comp is "it exists a level such that I survive an emulation of it".  
> Then it makes the whole of the observable reality, including  
> consciousness not Turing emulable. It might seems weird, but I don't  
> see a contradiction yet.
If observable reality as a whole is not emulable, there can't be a level at
which there is a correct emulation, because we can't even instantiate an
abstract digital emulation into reality (because observable reality is not

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> If there was something outside the universe
>>>> to interpret the simulation, then this would be the level on which
>>>> we can't
>>>> be substituted (and if this would be substituted, then the level
>>>> used to
>>>> interpret this substitution couldn't be substituted, etc....).
>>>> In any case, there is always a non-computational level, at which no
>>>> digital
>>>> substitution is possible - and we would be wrong to say YES with
>>>> regards to
>>>> that part of us, unless we consider that level "not-me" (and this
>>>> doesn't
>>>> make any sense to me).
>>> Indeed we are not our material body. We are the result of the  
>>> activity
>>> of the program supported by that body. That's comp.
>>> I don't have a clue why you believe this is senseless or  
>>> inconsistent.
>> For one thing, with COMP we postulate that we can substitute a brain  
>> with a
>> digital emulation ("yes doctor"),
> At some level.
>> yet the brain
> The material brain.
>> and every possible
>> substitution can't be purely digital according to your reasoning  
>> (since
>> matter is not digital).
> Change of matter is not important if it preserves the right  
> functionality at some level.
How does that relate to the issue? We have no way of making statements about
the computational functionality of matter (and thus the right level) if
matter is non-digital.
It is ill-defined.

You even say yourself that the correct substitution level is unknowable. But
not only that, it can't exist, because the notion of digital substitution is
meaningless in a non-digital universe.
Sure we can have *relatively* digital substitutions (like a physical
computer). But you can't derive anything from that, because your reasoning
assumes that the substitution is digital (in a very strict sense of allowing
precise copying etc...).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Of course we could engage in stretching the meaning of words and  
>> argue that
>> COMP says "functionally correct substitution", meaning that it also  
>> has to
>> be correctly materially implementened. But in this case we can't  
>> derive
>> anything from this, because a "correct implementation" may actually  
>> require
>> a biological brain or even something more.
> The consequences will go through as long as a level of substitution  
> exist.
But there can't, unless your assumption is taken as a vague statement,
meaning "kinda digital substitution".
In this case the brain substitution might not be digital at all, except in a
very weak sense by using anything that's - practically speaking - digital
(we can already do that), so your reasoning doesn't work.


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