You always refer to studying some paper, even though the paper actually
doesn't even begin to adress the question. How am I supposed to argue with
that?

There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption about what
the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as
axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them on a
meta-level.

Ther is no point of studying your paper, if all it presents are more
abstractions about points of view, without ever showing how to get from 3-p
descriptions to an actual 1-p of view (of course, since this is
meaningless). You just use fancy words to obfuscate that.
It is like saying  "study the bible for scientific education (you just don't
understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet)". 



>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In which way does one thing substitute another thing if actually  
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> correct
>>>>>> interpretation of the substitution requires the original? It is  
>>>>>> like
>>>>>> saying
>>>>>> "No you don't need the calculator to calculate 24,3^12. You can
>>>>>> substitute
>>>>>> it with pen and pencil, where you write down 24,3^12=X and then
>>>>>> insert the
>>>>>> result of the calculation (using your calculator) as X."
>>>>>> If COMP does imply that interpreting a digital einstein needs a  
>>>>>> real
>>>>>> einstein (or more) than it contradicts itself (because in this  
>>>>>> case
>>>>>> we can't
>>>>>> *always* say YES doctor, because then there would be no original
>>>>>> left to
>>>>>> interpret the emulation).
>>>>>> Really it is quite a simple point. If you substitute the whole
>>>>>> universe with
>>>>>> an emulation (which is possible according to COMP)
>>>>>
>>>>> It is not.
>>>> You are right, it is not, if we take the conclusions of your
>>>> reasoning into
>>>> account. Yet COMP itself strongly seems to suggest it. That's the
>>>> contradiction.
>>>
>>> ? Comp is "it exists a level such that I survive an emulation of it".
>>> Then it makes the whole of the observable reality, including
>>> consciousness not Turing emulable. It might seems weird, but I don't
>>> see a contradiction yet.
>> If observable reality as a whole is not emulable, there can't be a  
>> level at
>> which there is a correct emulation, because we can't even  
>> instantiate an
>> abstract digital emulation into reality (because observable reality  
>> is not
>> digital).
>>
>>
> 
> Contradiction: "... abstract DIGITAL emulation into reality (because  
> observable reality is not
> DIGITAL).
> We can emulate digital features in a non digital reality.
But not purely digitally. We have to connect and instantiate the digital
features in the non-digital reality. And in doing this we necessarily need
something beyond the digital, and thus the reasoning about us being digital
is not valid.
We can't put a digital computer into our brains. But a real computer (and
its requires I/O) is not a digital abstract computer, and thus your
reasoning fails.



>> But
>> not only that, it can't exist, because the notion of digital  
>> substitution is
>> meaningless in a non-digital universe.
> 
> I see no reason for that.
Because every "digital substitution" is bound to be ultimately non-digital.



>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Of course we could engage in stretching the meaning of words and
>>>> argue that
>>>> COMP says "functionally correct substitution", meaning that it also
>>>> has to
>>>> be correctly materially implementened. But in this case we can't
>>>> derive
>>>> anything from this, because a "correct implementation" may actually
>>>> require
>>>> a biological brain or even something more.
>>>
>>> The consequences will go through as long as a level of substitution
>>> exist.
>> But there can't, unless your assumption is taken as a vague statement,
>> meaning "kinda digital substitution".
> 
> ? If I have a MAC in the head, I am 100% digital. If I survive in a  
> virtual environment with it, I am 100% digital.
No. A MAC + your head isn't 100% digital. Both your MAC and the rest of your
head is a physical object, and thus non-digital.
You confuse the notions of "physically digital" and "abstractly digital".



>> In this case the brain substitution might not be digital at all,  
>> except in a
>> very weak sense by using anything that's - practically speaking -  
>> digital
>> (we can already do that), so your reasoning doesn't work.
> 
> You lost me here.
> 
Any actual substitution can't be purely digital, and so the reasoning
doesn't work because it reasons as if the substitution is digital.

benjayk

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