On 05 Sep 2012, at 20:28, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 9/5/2012 9:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 Sep 2012, at 17:48, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I don't see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-p point of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really just an
abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.

Hi Bruno,

So do you agree that the 3-p point of view is just an abstraction (a simulation even!) of a 1-p?

This would make the 1p fundamental. This would make vain the search for explanation of mind, so this does not satisfy me.

Dear Bruno,

In the context of a theoretical framework it does, but that is not a contradiction of my claim. We are talking about representations of 1p not the content of the 1p itself. There are situations when the map is not the territory...

The 1p of the machine have no 3p-representations at all. This follows simply from Theaetetus definition of knowledge in arithmetic, with believability played by provability (as we lost Provable("p") -> p), and restrict the interview on ideally correct machine.

With comp mind is the result of the working of a universal number relatively to infinities of other universal number, so we need to start from the numbers (or anything Turing-equivalent).

But you are assuming that numbers can do the "work". I beg to differ! Number can represent anything but can they do work? No, they do not "do" anything at all. There is no "action" in numbers. To represent action we need at least functions to map some object to some other different object.

You forget that a universal number associate to each number an "action" mapping number on number.
As I just recall in another post u(i, x) = phi_i(x).

So the 3p can be abstract, but it is not part of the mind, like "1+1=2" remains true in absence of any thinker.

But does the Truth value have any meaning in a world where it cannot be known in any way?

Its truth is its meaning. It has nothing to do with being known or not by an agent. In logic this is universally accepted for arithmetic, but not for more powerful theories.

I can only make sense of your claim here if I stipulate that you think that the truth of a statement is a proxy for the content of the statement; such that if the statement is "true" then it does not matter at all what the sentence is. I still do not grasp how you go from claim that necessitate instantiations of properties such as the particular property of the sentence "1+1=2" to the truth of the intention of the sentence.

Good. machines already can know that we can't. Bp -> p is not provable for arbitrary sentence. With comp, Truth is only a private hope, somehow.

How is the sentence "#8$<%" not equally true in the absence of any thinker and have the same meaning as "1+1=2"?

"#8$<%" is a sentence, not a proposition.

When I say that "1+1=2" is true, I mean only that 1 + 1 = 2, not that the sentence "1+1=2" is true.

So if you want to know if "#8$<%" is true, just tell me if #8$<% or not. perhaps explain the meaning of it.

You might confuse sentence and proposition. It is obvious that IF "1+1=2" means that Stephen Paul King is 42 km high, it is plausibly false, but that would not change the fact that 1 + 1 is equal to 2.

What is making the difference? You seem to be assuming that there is something above that some how can "see" the truth of "1+1=2" and know that it is a true sentence and that it is completely immaterial and "not a thinker". Plato was a bit more circumspect about assuming such things, I hope!

Just saying that 1+1=2, and that such a fact does not depend on me, you, or the physical universe. To be communicated, yes, you need a physical universe, or a human universe, that is some stable sharable computations with the relevant measure, etc. That's the problem I explain we have to solve.

It seems to me that this would similar to having a model S that is part of a theory T such that T would change its beliefs as X -> X' changes, all while preserving the Bp&p term, p would be a variable of or in X, X', ... .

A model cannot be a part of a theory. I guess you mean a theory which is part of the theory, and then I mainly agree with your sentence.

Does not a true theory require that a model of it exist? Model- less theories? Are they even possible?

In first order logic:
A theory has a model (but not as a term in itself) iff it is consistent (that is; does not prove f).

We can build theories which are part of themselves, like we can make machine which can access any part of their 3p description, by using the Dx=xx method (or Kleene second recursion theorem).

Sure, but that is a separate issue. The 3p description of a machine is, in your sentence here, taken from the intentional stance (or point of view) of another entity (that is not the machine in question), so that makes it bisimilar to the 1p of a separate entity. Where is the contradiction to my claim?

Where is the sense?



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