On 9/5/2012 9:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Sep 2012, at 17:48, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful
of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really just an
abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.
So do you agree that the 3-p point of view is just an abstraction
(a simulation even!) of a 1-p?
This would make the 1p fundamental. This would make vain the search
for explanation of mind, so this does not satisfy me.
In the context of a theoretical framework it does, but that is not
a contradiction of my claim. We are talking about representations of 1p
not the content of the 1p itself. There are situations when the map is
not the territory...
With comp mind is the result of the working of a universal number
relatively to infinities of other universal number, so we need to
start from the numbers (or anything Turing-equivalent).
But you are assuming that numbers can do the "work". I beg to
differ! Number can represent anything but can they do work? No, they do
not "do" anything at all. There is no "action" in numbers. To represent
action we need at least functions to map some object to some other
So the 3p can be abstract, but it is not part of the mind, like
"1+1=2" remains true in absence of any thinker.
But does the Truth value have any meaning in a world where it
cannot be known in any way? I can only make sense of your claim here if
I stipulate that you think that the truth of a statement is a proxy for
the content of the statement; such that if the statement is "true" then
it does not matter at all what the sentence is. I still do not grasp how
you go from claim that necessitate instantiations of properties such as
the particular property of the sentence "1+1=2" to the truth of the
intention of the sentence. How is the sentence "#8$<%" not equally true
in the absence of any thinker and have the same meaning as "1+1=2"?
What is making the difference? You seem to be assuming that there
is something above that some how can "see" the truth of "1+1=2" and know
that it is a true sentence and that it is completely immaterial and "not
a thinker". Plato was a bit more circumspect about assuming such things,
It seems to me that this would similar to having a model S that is
part of a theory T such that T would change its beliefs as X -> X'
changes, all while preserving the Bp&p term, p would be a variable of
or in X, X', ... .
A model cannot be a part of a theory. I guess you mean a theory which
is part of the theory, and then I mainly agree with your sentence.
Does not a true theory require that a model of it exist? Model-less
theories? Are they even possible?
We can build theories which are part of themselves, like we can make
machine which can access any part of their 3p description, by using
the Dx=xx method (or Kleene second recursion theorem).
Sure, but that is a separate issue. The 3p description of a machine
is, in your sentence here, taken from the intentional stance (or point
of view) of another entity (that is not the machine in question), so
that makes it bisimilar to the 1p of a separate entity. Where is the
contradiction to my claim?
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at