# Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

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On 13 Sep 2012, at 20:08, Stephen P. King wrote:```
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```On 9/13/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote:

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```Hi benjayk,

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This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He does not see several things that are problematic.
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1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be reduced.
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On the contrary, I insist on this. That's part of the domain of the 1-indeterminacy, all working coding will do their work, if I dare to say. We already know this, and is part of the problem that we try to just formulate clearly.
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Dear Bruno,

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Oh, right, I missed that implication, but do you see my point as well? The diagonalization applies to everything, even your result.
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On the contrary, everything I say depends on the fact that diagonalization does not apply to computability.
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The point that I am trying to emphasize is that we can never "be at" the ultimate level,
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I can' agree more, given that the "ultimate level" (the one we can mistake with primitive matter) consists in a sum on infinitely many computations (how ever we solve the measure problem).
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```we can at best point at it and approximate/represent it.
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OK. It is the comp "truncateness".

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Any approximation will have dual aspects, one partly logical and abstract and the other concrete an physical.
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In our setting "physical" needs to be (re)defined.

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The reasoning for this is that meaningfulness is 3p, it is never just 1p (if we assumed that it was 1-p we would get a degeneracy condition and only have a "bet of its truth" and nowhere to cash in if it where true by many other 1-p's). The concept that some people have used for this is the notion of a "witness" in the sense that it is not sufficient for me to know that X is true, X must be true to at least two witnesses that are not under my control. This explanation is very crude still, my apologies.
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Yes, it is hard to make sense.

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2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless.
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This is correct for human perception, but with comp the physical implementations that you need at that level are explained by a non physical (and somehow deeper) phenomenon.
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Yes, but I am not considering human perception; I am assuming panprotopsychism: "everything" is aware
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So you quit comp, here, right?

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and has a 1-p, my conjecture is that the UD "rides" on the unitary evolution of the QM system and thus each and every QM ssytem is an observer and has some level of awareness. It is for this reason that I am motivated to assume that the universe is quantum and that the classical picture is just an image that the universe generates via our interactions with each other.
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You abandon comp to come back to physicalism, but then you lost the comp explanation of both consciousness and matter. Comp gives both a conceptual explanation of the "coupling" matter/consciousness, and a way to test it from the solution of the measure problem (already mathematical for the measure "one" which give already the quantum-like logics).
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Bruno

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Bruno

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Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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