On 14 Sep 2012, at 16:00, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/14/2012 4:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Sep 2012, at 20:08, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/13/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi benjayk,
This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about.
He does not see several things that are problematic.
1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single
abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot
be reduced.
On the contrary, I insist on this. That's part of the domain of
the 1-indeterminacy, all working coding will do their work, if I
dare to say. We already know this, and is part of the problem
that we try to just formulate clearly.
Dear Bruno,
Oh, right, I missed that implication, but do you see my point
as well? The diagonalization applies to everything, even your
result.
?
Dear Bruno,
On the contrary, everything I say depends on the fact that
diagonalization does not apply to computability.
Then how do we explain Godel numbering schemes? The ability of
one string of numbers to "stand for" some other is the essence of
computational universality, no?
I will explain this on FOAR, soon or later, as I have promised. I have
already explain this two or three times here. All the magic is there:
we can enumerate the computable function, yet we can't diagonalize
against them, as the result does not lead to a contradiction, but to a
non stopping program. Universality requires just to accept that we
have non stopping programs, and no theories to predict in advance
which one stop or not.
The point that I am trying to emphasize is that we can never "be
at" the ultimate level,
I can' agree more, given that the "ultimate level" (the one we can
mistake with primitive matter) consists in a sum on infinitely many
computations (how ever we solve the measure problem).
But this statement implies a contradiction that you do not
address! To say that "at some ultimate level there is something,
even a "sum on infinitely many computations" is to simultaneously
also claim, "and nothing else".
This does not follow.
At the ultimate level the ability to distinguish "X is true" from "X
is false" cannot exist.
?
There is no ultimate level. It was a manner of speaking.
Thus we cannot make claims of some type of "something", here
"computations", at the ultimate level and thus implying that there
are no "not-computations" without explaining the means by which they
are distinguished from each other. You seems to just saying that
there is "nothing except computations" and offer no explanation as
to how the "computations" are excluded from the "non-computations"
at the ultimate level.
There are not. The UD dovetails on the oracle too, from the 1p.
You have to invoke a plurality of levels in order to have
distinguishability, "difference" itself vanishes at the ultimate
level.
?
we can at best point at it and approximate/represent it.
OK. It is the comp "truncateness".
Please elaborate!
The finite description of your brain that the doctor put in his data
folder.
Any approximation will have dual aspects, one partly logical and
abstract and the other concrete an physical.
In our setting "physical" needs to be (re)defined.
I agree.
The reasoning for this is that meaningfulness is 3p, it is never
just 1p (if we assumed that it was 1-p we would get a degeneracy
condition and only have a "bet of its truth" and nowhere to cash
in if it where true by many other 1-p's).
The concept that some people have used for this is the notion
of a "witness" in the sense that it is not sufficient for me to
know that X is true, X must be true to at least two witnesses that
are not under my control. This explanation is very crude still, my
apologies.
Yes, it is hard to make sense.
Witnesses have to be, in some way, independent of influence or
control; so how would you explain this in your thinking? For
example, we claim that "1+1=2" because all possible examples of such
are true
No. Some claims this because they got the idea in:
x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)
x *0 = 0
x*s(y) = x*y + x
and discount the false claims as improper coding or reference. This
makes a witness something that has in its 1p a model of 1+1=2 and
there are many different witnesses that are accessible to us that
believe that 1+1=2.
The reason why believe this are personal, and does not influence the
reasoning.
2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be
abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless.
This is correct for human perception, but with comp the physical
implementations that you need at that level are explained by a
non physical (and somehow deeper) phenomenon.
Yes, but I am not considering human perception; I am assuming
panprotopsychism: "everything" is aware
So you quit comp, here, right?
Yes, but I am still trying to salvage comp as I do not see it as
completely inconsistent with panprotopsychism. It is only your
rejection of the necessity of physical implementations that causes
the divorce, IMHO.
?
and has a 1-p, my conjecture is that the UD "rides" on the unitary
evolution of the QM system and thus each and every QM ssytem is an
observer and has some level of awareness. It is for this reason
that I am motivated to assume that the universe is quantum and
that the classical picture is just an image that the universe
generates via our interactions with each other.
You abandon comp to come back to physicalism, but then you lost the
comp explanation of both consciousness and matter. Comp gives both
a conceptual explanation of the "coupling" matter/consciousness,
and a way to test it from the solution of the measure problem
(already mathematical for the measure "one" which give already the
quantum-like logics).
No, I see comp as a consistent theory of consciousness if the
separation claim is dropped.
The separation claim is the step 8 result. You need to reify a
primitive non Turing emulable, nor Turing recoverable, matter for
this, and you can't say no more "yes" to the doctor, unless he does
the right religious incantations.
Bruno
Bruno
--
Onward!
Stephen
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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