On 9/14/2012 4:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Sep 2012, at 20:08, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 9/13/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi benjayk,

This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He does not see several things that are problematic.

1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be reduced.

On the contrary, I insist on this. That's part of the domain of the 1-indeterminacy, all working coding will do their work, if I dare to say. We already know this, and is part of the problem that we try to just formulate clearly.

Dear Bruno,

Oh, right, I missed that implication, but do you see my point as well? The diagonalization applies to everything, even your result.


Dear Bruno,

On the contrary, everything I say depends on the fact that diagonalization does not apply to computability.

Then how do we explain Godel numbering schemes? The ability of one string of numbers to "stand for" some other is the essence of computational universality, no?

The point that I am trying to emphasize is that we can never "be at" the ultimate level,

I can' agree more, given that the "ultimate level" (the one we can mistake with primitive matter) consists in a sum on infinitely many computations (how ever we solve the measure problem).

But this statement implies a contradiction that you do not address! To say that "at some ultimate level there is something, even a "sum on infinitely many computations" is to simultaneously also claim, "and nothing else". At the ultimate level the ability to distinguish "X is true" from "X is false" cannot exist. Thus we cannot make claims of some type of "something", here "computations", at the ultimate level and thus implying that there are no "not-computations" without explaining the means by which they are distinguished from each other. You seems to just saying that there is "nothing except computations" and offer no explanation as to how the "computations" are excluded from the "non-computations" at the ultimate level. You have to invoke a plurality of levels in order to have distinguishability, "difference" itself vanishes at the ultimate level.

we can at best point at it and approximate/represent it.

OK. It is the comp "truncateness".

    Please elaborate!

Any approximation will have dual aspects, one partly logical and abstract and the other concrete an physical.

In our setting "physical" needs to be (re)defined.

    I agree.

The reasoning for this is that meaningfulness is 3p, it is never just 1p (if we assumed that it was 1-p we would get a degeneracy condition and only have a "bet of its truth" and nowhere to cash in if it where true by many other 1-p's). The concept that some people have used for this is the notion of a "witness" in the sense that it is not sufficient for me to know that X is true, X must be true to at least two witnesses that are not under my control. This explanation is very crude still, my apologies.

Yes, it is hard to make sense.

Witnesses have to be, in some way, independent of influence or control; so how would you explain this in your thinking? For example, we claim that "1+1=2" because all possible examples of such are true and discount the false claims as improper coding or reference. This makes a witness something that has in its 1p a model of 1+1=2 and there are many different witnesses that are accessible to us that believe that 1+1=2.

2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless.

This is correct for human perception, but with comp the physical implementations that you need at that level are explained by a non physical (and somehow deeper) phenomenon.

Yes, but I am not considering human perception; I am assuming panprotopsychism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism#Dualism>: "everything" is aware

So you quit comp, here, right?

Yes, but I am still trying to salvage comp as I do not see it as completely inconsistent with panprotopsychism. It is only your rejection of the necessity of physical implementations that causes the divorce, IMHO.

and has a 1-p, my conjecture is that the UD "rides" on the unitary evolution of the QM system and thus each and every QM ssytem is an observer and has some level of awareness. It is for this reason that I am motivated to assume that the universe is quantum and that the classical picture is just an image that the universe generates via our interactions with each other.

You abandon comp to come back to physicalism, but then you lost the comp explanation of both consciousness and matter. Comp gives both a conceptual explanation of the "coupling" matter/consciousness, and a way to test it from the solution of the measure problem (already mathematical for the measure "one" which give already the quantum-like logics).

No, I see comp as a consistent theory of consciousness if the separation claim is dropped.





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