On 9/16/2012 8:42 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, September 15, 2012 6:21:14 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On Sat, Sep 15, 2012 at 2:55 AM, Craig Weinberg
<[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote:
> What you think third party observable behavior means is the set
of all
> properties which are externally discoverable. I am saying that is a
> projection of naive realism, and that in reality, there is no
such set, and
> that in fact the process of discovery of any properties
supervenes on the
> properties of all participants and the methods of their
interaction.
Of course there is a set of all properties that are externally
discoverable, even if you think this set is very small!
No, there isn't. That is what I am telling you. Nothing exists outside
of experience, which is creating new properties all of the time. There
is no set at all. There is no such thing as a generic
externality...each exterior is only a reflection of the interior of
the system which discovers the interior of other systems as exteriors.
Hi Craig!
EXACTLY!
Moreover, this
set has subsets, and we can limit our discussion to these subsets.
For
example, if we are interested only in mass, we can simulate a human
perfectly using the right number of rocks. Even someone who believes
in an immortal soul would agree with this.
No, I don't agree with it at all. You are eating the menu. A quantity
of mass doesn't simulate anything except in your mind. Mass is a
normative abstraction which we apply in comparing physical bodies with
each other. To reduce a human being to a physical body is not a
simulation is it only weighing a bag of organic molecules.
Thus we can realistically claim that the physical world is exactly
and only all things that we (as we truly are) have in common. What must
be understood is that as the number of participating entities increase
to infinity, the number of "things in common" goes to zero. Only for a
large but finite set of entities will there be a semi-large number of
relations that the entities have in common and not have a degeneracy
relation between them.
A black Hole is a nice demonstration of the degeneracy idea. The
effect of gravity is the force of degeneracy, when all the ground states
are forces to normalize and become identical with each other, the
"space" and "delay" (time) that is different between them collapses to
zero and thus we get singularity in the limit of the degeneracy.
> My point of using cats in this thought experiment is to
specifically point
> out our naivete in assuming that instruments which extend our
perception in
> only the most deterministic and easy to control ways are
sufficient to
> define a 'third person'. If we look at the brain with a
microscope, we see
> those parts of the brain that microscopes can see. If we look at
New York
> with a swarm of cats, then we see the parts of New York that
cats can see.
Yes, but there are properties of the brain that may not be
relevant to
behaviour. Which properties are in fact important is determined by
experiment. For example, we may replace the myelin sheath with a
synthetic material that has similar electrical properties and then
test an isolated nerve to see if action potentials propagate in the
same way. If they do, then the next step is to incorporate the nerve
in a network and see if the pattern of firing in the network looks
normal. The step after that is to replace the myelin in the brain
of a
rat to see if the animal's behaviour changes. The modified rats are
compared to unmodified rats by a blinded researcher to see if he can
tell the difference. If no-one can consistently tell the difference
then it is announced that the synthetic myelin appears to be a
functionally identical substitute for natural myelin.
Craig point here is that if we are going to perform a substitution
then the artificial component must be capable of reproducing *all* of
the functions of the neuron unless we are going to ignore the fact that
neurons are not *just transistors*. We cannot fail to recognize that a
neuron is not just one thing to each other and to the rest of the body
and environment beyond it. We need to drop the idea that the universe is
made up of gears and levers and springs and understand that it is not
uniquely decomposable into isolate entities that can somehow retain
their set of unique properties in isolation.
Except it isn't identical. No imitation substance is identical to the
original. Sooner or later the limits of the imitation will be found -
or they could be advantages. Maybe the imitation myelin prevents brain
cancer or heat stroke or something, but it also maybe prevents
sensation in cold weather or maybe certain amino acids now cause
Parkinson's disease. There is no such thing as identical. There is
only 'seems identical from this measure at this time'.
Exactly. If we are going to invoke functional equivalence then we
must invoke all functions that are involved, not just some of them.
As is the nature
of science, another team of researchers may then find some deficit in
the behaviour of the modified rats under conditions the first team
did
not examine. Scientists then make modifications to the formula of the
synthetic myelin and do the experiments again.
Which is great for medicine (although ultimately maybe unsustainably
expensive), but it has nothing to do with the assumption of identical
structure and the hard problem of consciousness. There is no such
thing as identical experience.
Indeed! WE can easily see that the principle of identity of
indiscernibles is involved here. Minds, the "things that are conscious",
do not exist "in space" as physical objects and thus do not have
positions or momenta or spin or duration quantities that can be used to
externally locate them in different places so that the PII can be safely
ignored. OTOH, minds must be implemented or else they are just the
"presupposition of a possible thought". They have to be functionally
implemented "in the flesh" for only the possibility of being able to
interact with each other and thus gain knowledge of themselves and the
world (of other minds).
I have suggested that in fact we can perhaps define consciousness as
that which has never been repeated. It is the antithesis of that which
can be repeated, (hence the experience of "now"), even though
experiences themselves can seem very repetitive. The only seem so from
the vantage point of a completely novel moment of consideration of the
memories of previous iterations.
The postulate of "No Doppelgangers" by Gordon Pask and the "no
cloning" theorem of Kochen & Specker speak to this directly.
> This is the point of the thought experiment. The limitations of
all forms of
> measurement and perception preclude all possibility of there
ever being a
> such thing as an exhaustively complete set of third person
behaviors of any
> system.
>
> What is it that you don't think I understand?
What you don't understand is that an exhaustively complete set of
behaviours is not required.
Yes, it is. Not for prosthetic enhancements, or repairs to a nervous
system, but to replace a nervous system without replacing the person
who is using it, yes, there is no set of behaviors which can ever be
exhaustive enough in theory to accomplish that.
True if and only if the set of behaviors (functions) is truly
infinite. What needs to be understood, is that we can safely ignore all
of the infinity except for a finite subset in our models of
interactions. We must pay a price for doing this and it is the price of
not having a completely deterministic theory.
You might be able to do it biologically, but there is no reason to
trust it unless and until someone can be walked off of their brain for
a few weeks or months and then walked back on.
LOL! Indeed!
I don't access an exhaustively complete
set of behaviours to determine if my friends are the same people from
day to day, and in fact they are *not* the same systems from day to
day, as they change both physically and psychologically. I have in
mind a rather vague set of behavioural behavioural limits and if the
people who I think are my friends deviate significantly from these
limits I will start to worry.
Which is exactly why you would not want to replace your friends with
devices capable only of programmed deviations. Are simulated friends
'good enough'. Will it be good enough when your friends convince you
to be replaced by your simulation?
He want complete predictability, Craig. That is why. TO predict
exactly what something is going to do is to be able to control it. We
humans have this hang up about having to control everything....
Craig
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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Onward!
Stephen
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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