Hi John Mikes 

Once you leave the material world for the ideal one,
all things -- or at least many things-- now become possible.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/19/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: John Mikes 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-18, 17:17:40
Subject: Re: IMHO conscousness is an activity not a thing


Ha ha: so not consciousness is the 'thing', but 'intelligence'? or is this one 
also a function (of the brain towards the self?) who is the self? how does the 
brain 
DO something??
(as a homunculus?) on its own? Any suggestions?
John M???? 


On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 6:07 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

IMHO conscousness is not really anything in itself,
it is what the brain makes of its contents that the self
perceives. The self is intelligence, which is
able to focus all pertinent brain activity to a unified point.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/18/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end."
Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-17, 23:43:08
Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment




On Monday, September 17, 2012 11:02:16 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 6:39 AM, Craig Weinberg ?rote:

> I understand that, but it still assumes that there is a such thing as a set
> of functions which could be identified and reproduced that cause
> consciousness. I don't assume that, because consciousness isn't like
> anything else. It is the source of all functions and appearances, not the
> effect of them. Once you have consciousness in the universe, then it can be
> enhanced and altered in infinite ways, but none of them can replace the
> experience that is your own.

No, the paper does *not* assume that there is a set of functions that
if reproduced will will cause consciousness. It assumes that something
like what you are saying is right.


By assume I mean the implicit assumptions which are unstated in the paper. The 
thought experiment comes out of a paradox arising from assumptions about qualia 
and the brain which are both false in my view. I see the brain as the flattened 
qualia of human experience.



>>> > This is the point of the thought experiment. The limitations of all
>>> > forms of
>>> > measurement and perception preclude all possibility of there ever being
>>> > a
>>> > such thing as an exhaustively complete set of third person behaviors of
>>> > any
>>> > system.
>>> >
>>> > What is it that you don't think I understand?
>>>
>>> What you don't understand is that an exhaustively complete set of
>>> behaviours is not required.
>>
>>
>> Yes, it is. Not for prosthetic enhancements, or repairs to a nervous
>> system, but to replace a nervous system without replacing the person who is
>> using it, yes, there is no set of behaviors which can ever be exhaustive
>> enough in theory to accomplish that. You might be able to do it
>> biologically, but there is no reason to trust it unless and until someone
>> can be walked off of their brain for a few weeks or months and then walked
>> back on.
>>
>>
>> The replacement components need only be within the engineering tolerance
>> of the nervous system components. This is a difficult task but it is
>> achievable in principle.
>
>
> You assume that consciousness can be replaced, but I understand exactly why
> it can't. You can believe that there is no difference between scooping out
> your brain stem and replacing it with a functional equivalent as long as it
> was well engineered, but to me it's a completely misguided notion.
> Consciousness doesn't exist on the outside of us. Engineering only deals
> with exteriors. If the universe were designed by engineers, there could be
> no consciousness.

Yes, that is exactly what the paper assumes. Exactly that!


It still is modeling the experience of qualia as having a quantitative relation 
with the ratio of brain to non-brain. That isn't the only way to model it, and 
I use a different model.


>> I assume that my friends have not been replaced by robots. If they have
>> been then that means the robots can almost perfectly replicate their
>> behaviour, since I (and people in general) am very good at picking up even
>> tiny deviations from normal behaviour. The question then is, if the function
>> of a human can be replicated this closely by a machine does that mean the
>> consciousness can also be replicated? The answer is yes, since otherwise we
>> would have the possibility of a person having radically different
>> experiences but behaving normally and being unaware that their experiences
>> were different.
>
>
> The answer is no. A cartoon of Bugs Bunny has no experiences but behaves
> just like Bugs Bunny would if he had experiences. You are eating the menu.

And if it were possible to replicate the behaviour without the
experiences - i.e. make a zombie - it would be possible to make a
partial zombie, which lacks some experiences but behaves normally and
doesn't realise that it lacks those experiences. Do you agree that
this is the implication? If not, where is the flaw in the reasoning?


The word zombie implies that you have an expectation of consciousness but there 
isn't any. That is a fallacy from the start, since there is not reason to 
expect a simulation to have any experience at all. It's not a zombie, it's a 
puppet.

A partial zombie is just someone who has brain damage, and yes if you tried to 
replace enough of a person's brain with a non-biological material, you would 
get brain damage, dementia, coma, and death.

Craig




--
Stathis Papaioannou

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