Roger, no matter how hard I tried: here is my reply;
is your "material world" THE reality? I think it is our figment of our
changing levels of a developing mentlity. Do you really believe that all
those additional items we learned over the past millennia are products of
an "ideal"(?) world?
(Btw I left the term 'ideal', because of its positive pointing
 connotations). And "possible"? according to your physix, or faith?

Bruno:  Thanks for you excellent question:
 *"How could anyone love a God, or a Goddess, threatening you of eternal
torture in case you don't love Him or Her?"*
**
JohnM


On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 2:18 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
>  On 19 Sep 2012, at 15:53, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>  Hi John Mikes
>
> Once you leave the material world for the ideal one,
> all things -- or at least many things-- now become possible.
>
>
> Yes. Since always.
>
> But there are many paths, and we can get lost.
>
> Platonia before and after Gödel or Church is not the same. The circle and
> the regular polyhedra keeps their majestuous importance, but now they have
> the company of the Mandelbrot set, and UDs. Shit happens, when seen from
> inside. With comp, heaven and hell are not mechanically separable, nothing
> is easy near the boundaries.
>
> ***
>
> I think that your metaphysics and reading of Leibniz makes sense for me,
> and comp, but I have to say I don't follow your methodology or teaching
> method on the religious field, as it contains authoritative arguments.
>
> My feeling is that authoritative argument is the symptom of those who lack
> faith.
>
> That error is multiplied in the transfinite when an authoritative argument
> is attributed to God.
>
> Can you answer the following question?
>
> How could anyone love a God, or a Goddess, threatening you of eternal
> torture in case you don't love He or She?
>
> That's bizarre.
>
> How could even just an atom of sincerity reside in that love, with such an
> explicit horrible threat?
>
> I hope you don't mind my frankness and the naïvety of my questioning.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 9/19/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-09-18, 17:17:40
> *Subject:* Re: IMHO conscousness is an activity not a thing
>
>   Ha ha: so not consciousness is the 'thing', but 'intelligence'? or is
> this one also a function (of the brain towards the self?) who is the self?
> how does the brain
> *DO **something�*牋
> (as a homunculus?) on its own? Any suggestions?
> John M牋牋牋�
>
> On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 6:07 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>> Hi Craig Weinberg
>>
>> IMHO conscousness is not really anything in itself,
>> it is what the brain makes of its contents that the self
>> perceives. The self is intelligence, which is
>> able to focus all pertinent brain activity to a unified point.
>>
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>> 9/18/2012
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end."
>> Woody Allen
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> From: Craig Weinberg
>> Receiver: everything-list
>> Time: 2012-09-17, 23:43:08
>> Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, September 17, 2012 11:02:16 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>> On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 6:39 AM, Craig Weinberg 爓rote:
>>
>> > I understand that, but it still assumes that there is a such thing as a
>> set
>> > of functions which could be identified and reproduced that cause
>> > consciousness. I don't assume that, because consciousness isn't like
>> > anything else. It is the source of all functions and appearances, not
>> the
>> > effect of them. Once you have consciousness in the universe, then it
>> can be
>> > enhanced and altered in infinite ways, but none of them can replace the
>> > experience that is your own.
>>
>> No, the paper does *not* assume that there is a set of functions that
>> if reproduced will will cause consciousness. It assumes that something
>> like what you are saying is right.
>>
>>
>> By assume I mean the implicit assumptions which are unstated in the
>> paper. The thought experiment comes out of a paradox arising from
>> assumptions about qualia and the brain which are both false in my view. I
>> see the brain as the flattened qualia of human experience.
>>
>>
>>
>> >>> > This is the point of the thought experiment. The limitations of all
>> >>> > forms of
>> >>> > measurement and perception preclude all possibility of there ever
>> being
>> >>> > a
>> >>> > such thing as an exhaustively complete set of third person
>> behaviors of
>> >>> > any
>> >>> > system.
>> >>> >
>> >>> > What is it that you don't think I understand?
>> >>>
>> >>> What you don't understand is that an exhaustively complete set of
>> >>> behaviours is not required.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Yes, it is. Not for prosthetic enhancements, or repairs to a nervous
>> >> system, but to replace a nervous system without replacing the person
>> who is
>> >> using it, yes, there is no set of behaviors which can ever be
>> exhaustive
>> >> enough in theory to accomplish that. You might be able to do it
>> >> biologically, but there is no reason to trust it unless and until
>> someone
>> >> can be walked off of their brain for a few weeks or months and then
>> walked
>> >> back on.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> The replacement components need only be within the engineering
>> tolerance
>> >> of the nervous system components. This is a difficult task but it is
>> >> achievable in principle.
>> >
>> >
>> > You assume that consciousness can be replaced, but I understand exactly
>> why
>> > it can't. You can believe that there is no difference between scooping
>> out
>> > your brain stem and replacing it with a functional equivalent as long
>> as it
>> > was well engineered, but to me it's a completely misguided notion.
>> > Consciousness doesn't exist on the outside of us. Engineering only deals
>> > with exteriors. If the universe were designed by engineers, there could
>> be
>> > no consciousness.
>>
>> Yes, that is exactly what the paper assumes. Exactly that!
>>
>>
>> It still is modeling the experience of qualia as having a quantitative
>> relation with the ratio of brain to non-brain. That isn't the only way to
>> model it, and I use a different model.
>>
>>
>> >> I assume that my friends have not been replaced by robots. If they have
>> >> been then that means the robots can almost perfectly replicate their
>> >> behaviour, since I (and people in general) am very good at picking up
>> even
>> >> tiny deviations from normal behaviour. The question then is, if the
>> function
>> >> of a human can be replicated this closely by a machine does that mean
>> the
>> >> consciousness can also be replicated? The answer is yes, since
>> otherwise we
>> >> would have the possibility of a person having radically different
>> >> experiences but behaving normally and being unaware that their
>> experiences
>> >> were different.
>> >
>> >
>> > The answer is no. A cartoon of Bugs Bunny has no experiences but behaves
>> > just like Bugs Bunny would if he had experiences. You are eating the
>> menu.
>>
>> And if it were possible to replicate the behaviour without the
>> experiences - i.e. make a zombie - it would be possible to make a
>> partial zombie, which lacks some experiences but behaves normally and
>> doesn't realise that it lacks those experiences. Do you agree that
>> this is the implication? If not, where is the flaw in the reasoning?
>>
>>
>> The word zombie implies that you have an expectation of consciousness but
>> there isn't any. That is a fallacy from the start, since there is not
>> reason to expect a simulation to have any experience at all. It's not a
>> zombie, it's a puppet.
>>
>> A partial zombie is just someone who has brain damage, and yes if you
>> tried to replace enough of a person's brain with a non-biological material,
>> you would get brain damage, dementia, coma, and death.
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
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