Roger, no matter how hard I tried: here is my reply; is your "material world" THE reality? I think it is our figment of our changing levels of a developing mentlity. Do you really believe that all those additional items we learned over the past millennia are products of an "ideal"(?) world? (Btw I left the term 'ideal', because of its positive pointing connotations). And "possible"? according to your physix, or faith?
Bruno: Thanks for you excellent question: *"How could anyone love a God, or a Goddess, threatening you of eternal torture in case you don't love Him or Her?"* ** JohnM On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 2:18 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 19 Sep 2012, at 15:53, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi John Mikes > > Once you leave the material world for the ideal one, > all things -- or at least many things-- now become possible. > > > Yes. Since always. > > But there are many paths, and we can get lost. > > Platonia before and after Gödel or Church is not the same. The circle and > the regular polyhedra keeps their majestuous importance, but now they have > the company of the Mandelbrot set, and UDs. Shit happens, when seen from > inside. With comp, heaven and hell are not mechanically separable, nothing > is easy near the boundaries. > > *** > > I think that your metaphysics and reading of Leibniz makes sense for me, > and comp, but I have to say I don't follow your methodology or teaching > method on the religious field, as it contains authoritative arguments. > > My feeling is that authoritative argument is the symptom of those who lack > faith. > > That error is multiplied in the transfinite when an authoritative argument > is attributed to God. > > Can you answer the following question? > > How could anyone love a God, or a Goddess, threatening you of eternal > torture in case you don't love He or She? > > That's bizarre. > > How could even just an atom of sincerity reside in that love, with such an > explicit horrible threat? > > I hope you don't mind my frankness and the naïvety of my questioning. > > Bruno > > > > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > 9/19/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* John Mikes <[email protected]> > *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> > *Time:* 2012-09-18, 17:17:40 > *Subject:* Re: IMHO conscousness is an activity not a thing > > Ha ha: so not consciousness is the 'thing', but 'intelligence'? or is > this one also a function (of the brain towards the self?) who is the self? > how does the brain > *DO **something�*牋 > (as a homunculus?) on its own? Any suggestions? > John M牋牋牋� > > On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 6:07 AM, Roger Clough <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Hi Craig Weinberg >> >> IMHO conscousness is not really anything in itself, >> it is what the brain makes of its contents that the self >> perceives. The self is intelligence, which is >> able to focus all pertinent brain activity to a unified point. >> >> Roger Clough, [email protected] >> 9/18/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." >> Woody Allen >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Craig Weinberg >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-09-17, 23:43:08 >> Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment >> >> >> >> >> On Monday, September 17, 2012 11:02:16 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: >> On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 6:39 AM, Craig Weinberg 爓rote: >> >> > I understand that, but it still assumes that there is a such thing as a >> set >> > of functions which could be identified and reproduced that cause >> > consciousness. I don't assume that, because consciousness isn't like >> > anything else. It is the source of all functions and appearances, not >> the >> > effect of them. Once you have consciousness in the universe, then it >> can be >> > enhanced and altered in infinite ways, but none of them can replace the >> > experience that is your own. >> >> No, the paper does *not* assume that there is a set of functions that >> if reproduced will will cause consciousness. It assumes that something >> like what you are saying is right. >> >> >> By assume I mean the implicit assumptions which are unstated in the >> paper. The thought experiment comes out of a paradox arising from >> assumptions about qualia and the brain which are both false in my view. I >> see the brain as the flattened qualia of human experience. >> >> >> >> >>> > This is the point of the thought experiment. The limitations of all >> >>> > forms of >> >>> > measurement and perception preclude all possibility of there ever >> being >> >>> > a >> >>> > such thing as an exhaustively complete set of third person >> behaviors of >> >>> > any >> >>> > system. >> >>> > >> >>> > What is it that you don't think I understand? >> >>> >> >>> What you don't understand is that an exhaustively complete set of >> >>> behaviours is not required. >> >> >> >> >> >> Yes, it is. Not for prosthetic enhancements, or repairs to a nervous >> >> system, but to replace a nervous system without replacing the person >> who is >> >> using it, yes, there is no set of behaviors which can ever be >> exhaustive >> >> enough in theory to accomplish that. You might be able to do it >> >> biologically, but there is no reason to trust it unless and until >> someone >> >> can be walked off of their brain for a few weeks or months and then >> walked >> >> back on. >> >> >> >> >> >> The replacement components need only be within the engineering >> tolerance >> >> of the nervous system components. This is a difficult task but it is >> >> achievable in principle. >> > >> > >> > You assume that consciousness can be replaced, but I understand exactly >> why >> > it can't. You can believe that there is no difference between scooping >> out >> > your brain stem and replacing it with a functional equivalent as long >> as it >> > was well engineered, but to me it's a completely misguided notion. >> > Consciousness doesn't exist on the outside of us. Engineering only deals >> > with exteriors. If the universe were designed by engineers, there could >> be >> > no consciousness. >> >> Yes, that is exactly what the paper assumes. Exactly that! >> >> >> It still is modeling the experience of qualia as having a quantitative >> relation with the ratio of brain to non-brain. That isn't the only way to >> model it, and I use a different model. >> >> >> >> I assume that my friends have not been replaced by robots. If they have >> >> been then that means the robots can almost perfectly replicate their >> >> behaviour, since I (and people in general) am very good at picking up >> even >> >> tiny deviations from normal behaviour. The question then is, if the >> function >> >> of a human can be replicated this closely by a machine does that mean >> the >> >> consciousness can also be replicated? The answer is yes, since >> otherwise we >> >> would have the possibility of a person having radically different >> >> experiences but behaving normally and being unaware that their >> experiences >> >> were different. >> > >> > >> > The answer is no. A cartoon of Bugs Bunny has no experiences but behaves >> > just like Bugs Bunny would if he had experiences. You are eating the >> menu. >> >> And if it were possible to replicate the behaviour without the >> experiences - i.e. make a zombie - it would be possible to make a >> partial zombie, which lacks some experiences but behaves normally and >> doesn't realise that it lacks those experiences. Do you agree that >> this is the implication? If not, where is the flaw in the reasoning? >> >> >> The word zombie implies that you have an expectation of consciousness but >> there isn't any. That is a fallacy from the start, since there is not >> reason to expect a simulation to have any experience at all. It's not a >> zombie, it's a puppet. >> >> A partial zombie is just someone who has brain damage, and yes if you >> tried to replace enough of a person's brain with a non-biological material, >> you would get brain damage, dementia, coma, and death. >> >> Craig >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/nrqkIqoR6xMJ. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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