On 20 Sep 2012, at 11:45, Roger Clough wrote:




BRUNO: I think that your metaphysics and reading of Leibniz makes sense for me, and comp, but I have to say I don't follow your methodology or teaching method on the religious field, as it contains authoritative arguments.

ROGER:  Everything I write should be prefaced with IMHO.

BRUNO: My feeling is that authoritative argument is the symptom of those who lack faith.

ROGER: That doesn't make sense, because faith= trust. And if you don't trust, nothing is authoritative.

BRUNO: That error is multiplied in the transfinite when an authoritative argument is attributed to God.

ROGER: Sorry, no comprehende.

I can trust entities which provides explanations, not entities threatening with torture in case I do not love them. Humans have attributed to God authoritative arguments, with the result of justifying their own use of it. I can understand such argument in warfare, or when decision must be taken without the time to make a rational decision, but in the religious field, I think that authoritative argument have to fail, they only display the lack of faith of those who use them, or, more often, they display their special terrestrial interests.





BRUNO:  you answer the following question?

How could anyone love a God, or a Goddess, threatening you of eternal torture in case you don't love He or She?

That's bizarre.

How could even just an atom of sincerity reside in that love, with such an explicit horrible threat?

ROGER: That love and all love, comes from God, not from me.

But then why God has to threaten his creature to get love from them? And again, how could that love be sincere?
This does not make sense.

Bruno




BRUNO: I hope you don't mind my frankness and the naivety of my questioning.

Bruno

ROGER:  Not at all, as in my experience most agnosticism or atheism is

is a product of ignorance, if you don't mind my saying that. :-)


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/19/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: John Mikes
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-18, 17:17:40
Subject: Re: IMHO conscousness is an activity not a thing


Ha ha: so not consciousness is the 'thing', but 'intelligence'? or is this one also a function (of the brain towards the self?) who is the self? how does the brain
DO something ?
(as a homunculus?) on its own? Any suggestions?
John M???


On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 6:07 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

IMHO conscousness is not really anything in itself,
it is what the brain makes of its contents that the self
perceives. The self is intelligence, which is
able to focus all pertinent brain activity to a unified point.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/18/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end."
Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-17, 23:43:08
Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment




On Monday, September 17, 2012 11:02:16 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 6:39 AM, Craig Weinberg ?rote:

I understand that, but it still assumes that there is a such thing as a set
of functions which could be identified and reproduced that cause
consciousness. I don't assume that, because consciousness isn't like
anything else. It is the source of all functions and appearances, not the effect of them. Once you have consciousness in the universe, then it can be enhanced and altered in infinite ways, but none of them can replace the
experience that is your own.

No, the paper does *not* assume that there is a set of functions that
if reproduced will will cause consciousness. It assumes that something
like what you are saying is right.


By assume I mean the implicit assumptions which are unstated in the paper. The thought experiment comes out of a paradox arising from assumptions about qualia and the brain which are both false in my view. I see the brain as the flattened qualia of human experience.



This is the point of the thought experiment. The limitations of all
forms of
measurement and perception preclude all possibility of there ever being
a
such thing as an exhaustively complete set of third person behaviors of
any
system.

What is it that you don't think I understand?

What you don't understand is that an exhaustively complete set of
behaviours is not required.


Yes, it is. Not for prosthetic enhancements, or repairs to a nervous
system, but to replace a nervous system without replacing the person who is using it, yes, there is no set of behaviors which can ever be exhaustive
enough in theory to accomplish that. You might be able to do it
biologically, but there is no reason to trust it unless and until someone can be walked off of their brain for a few weeks or months and then walked
back on.


The replacement components need only be within the engineering tolerance
of the nervous system components. This is a difficult task but it is
achievable in principle.


You assume that consciousness can be replaced, but I understand exactly why it can't. You can believe that there is no difference between scooping out your brain stem and replacing it with a functional equivalent as long as it
was well engineered, but to me it's a completely misguided notion.
Consciousness doesn't exist on the outside of us. Engineering only deals with exteriors. If the universe were designed by engineers, there could be
no consciousness.

Yes, that is exactly what the paper assumes. Exactly that!


It still is modeling the experience of qualia as having a quantitative relation with the ratio of brain to non-brain. That isn't the only way to model it, and I use a different model.


I assume that my friends have not been replaced by robots. If they have
been then that means the robots can almost perfectly replicate their
behaviour, since I (and people in general) am very good at picking up even tiny deviations from normal behaviour. The question then is, if the function of a human can be replicated this closely by a machine does that mean the consciousness can also be replicated? The answer is yes, since otherwise we
would have the possibility of a person having radically different
experiences but behaving normally and being unaware that their experiences
were different.


The answer is no. A cartoon of Bugs Bunny has no experiences but behaves just like Bugs Bunny would if he had experiences. You are eating the menu.

And if it were possible to replicate the behaviour without the
experiences - i.e. make a zombie - it would be possible to make a
partial zombie, which lacks some experiences but behaves normally and
doesn't realise that it lacks those experiences. Do you agree that
this is the implication? If not, where is the flaw in the reasoning?


The word zombie implies that you have an expectation of consciousness but there isn't any. That is a fallacy from the start, since there is not reason to expect a simulation to have any experience at all. It's not a zombie, it's a puppet.

A partial zombie is just someone who has brain damage, and yes if you tried to replace enough of a person's brain with a non- biological material, you would get brain damage, dementia, coma, and death.

Craig




--
Stathis Papaioannou

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