On 01 Oct 2012, at 19:28, Roger Clough wrote:
BRUNO: OK. But the ability to selct does not require intelligence,
just interaction and some memory.
$$$$$$ ROGER: No, that's where you keep missing the absolutely
critical issue of self.
Choice is exclusive to the autonomous self, and is absolutely
necessary. Self selects A or B or whatever entirely on its own..
That's what intelligence is.
INTELLIGENCE = AUTONOMOUS CHOOSER + CHOICES
When you type a response, YOU choose which letter to type, etc.
That's an intelligent action.
I agree with you on choice. I use the term self-determination in my
defense of free will.
When I was talking about consciousness selection, it has nothing to do
with choice. It was what happen, in the comp theory, when you
duplicate yourself in two different place, like Washington and Moscow.
After that duplication, when you look at you neighborhood, there is a
consciousness or first person selection: you feel to be in W, or you
feel to be in M. You have no choice in that matter.
Choice is something else entirely, and play no role in the origin and
shape of the physical laws, but consciousness selection (which is a
form of Turing-tropism (generalization of anthropism)).
Selection of a quantum path
(collapse or reduction of the jungle of brain wave paths) produces
consciousness, according to Penrose et al. They call it orchestrated
BRUNO: Penrose is hardly convincing on this. Its basic argument
based on G del is invalid, and its theory is quite speculative, like
the wave collapse, which has never make any sense to me.
ROGER: All physical theories (not mathematical theories) are
speculative until validated by data.
No. All theories are speculative. Period. But when I said "quite
speculative", I meant "no evidence at all, and contradictory with all
Yes. Atoms are no "atoms" (in greek t??? means not divisible).
$$$$$$ROGER: The greeks had no means to split the atom, they hadn't
even seen one.
The greeks knew that atoms are not divisible, by definition. They
didn't knew that atoms exists, nor do we.
I use atom in the philosophical sense. The current physical atoms
where believed to be such philo atoms, until the discovery of the
electron and nucleus.
The new physical philosophical atoms are the elementary particles, but
they are no more "philosophical atoms" in string theory.
$$$$$$$ROGER: The monads are just points but not physical objects.
Overlaying them, all of L's reality is just a dimensionless dot.
Like the UD. It is a function from nothing to nothing, and as such 0-
dimensional. But i don't really believe the geometrical image is
useful. With comp it is better to put geometry in the epistemology of
numbers, like analysis, infinities, and physics. Keeping the ontology
minimal assures that we will not risk reifying unnecessary materials.
I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit
into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue,
so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads.
BRUNO: OK. I will interpret your monad by "intensional number".
$$$$$$$$ROGER: Numbers do not associate to corporeal bodies, so that
What do you mean by "corporeal bodies"? With comp + the usual Occam
razor, "corporeal bodies" belongs to the mind of numbers (+ infinities
of numbers relation).
Those less dominant monads are eaten or taken over by the stronger
It's a Darwinian jungle down here. Crap happens.
BRUNO: Crap happens also in arithmetic when viewed from inside.
Contingency is given by selection on the many computational
There are different form of contingencies in arithmetic: one for
each modal box having an arithmetical interpretations.
In modal logic you can read p by p is necessary, or true in all
<>p by p is possible or true in one (accessible) world
~p or <>~p by p is contingent (not necessary)
What will change from one modal logic to another is the accessibility
or the neighborhood relations on the (abstract) worlds.
$$$$$ ROGER: That's correct, I was incorrectly limiting numbers to
OK. Nice. comp reduces the ontology to arithmetic, but it is not a
reductionism at all, it is the discovery that arithmetic has an
unboundable complexity, full of life, crap, and surprises, and super-
exponentially so when seen from inside, where qualitative features
appears, as the numbers/machine already witness in their self-
Another argument against numbers
being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal
#### ROGER: By atttached I mean associated with. The association is
Each monad is an individiaul with individual identity given by the
corporeal body it is
associated with. Its soul. All corporeal bodies are different and
I am OK, in some of the first person perspective. But that is "not
real". The body is an epistemological construct, yet a every stable
one, locally, apparently.
The mind is not attached or associated to a body, but to an infinity
of number relations (and the felt body is a construct of the mind).
$$$$$$ ROGER: To leibniz, matter is not considered to be real, only
ideas or concepts (monads) are real,
but real in a platonic sense.
So we do agree. I would avoid the term corporeal bodies, even virtual
bodies is misleading as the bodies are very complex things to define
in comp. They are related to the way a person manages its infinities
of virtual (arithmetical) "bodies" (Gödel number, codes in the UD,
BRUNO: Men are in Platonia. But their bodies and consciousness are
in the limiting internal view of Platonia from inside.
$$$$$$$ ROGER: No, men are corporeal, extended bodies, so they exist
Once you accept that "bodies" are not real, like above, there is no
contradiction between " men are corporeal, extended bodies, so they
exist in Contingia" and "their bodies and consciousness are in the
limiting internal view of Platonia from inside. ".
But anything in platonia is a necessary truth, so it
should also hold in contingia. Thus if a contingent man thinks of a
truth it will appear in his mind, even though it is contingent. Men
access mentally to eternal truths.
BRUNO: With comp Platonia is very simple. It is basically the
structure (N, 0, s, +, *), arithmetic.
But after G del, we know that such a structure is not simple at all.
Indeed, unlike physics, there is just no hope to get a complete
theory about N, + *.
$$$$$ Roger: OK, although I haven't a clue as to what it means.
What I meant is that comp is Pythagorean. Every thing in the being
realm is a number. And there are only tow primitive laws: addition and
multiplication. The rest, from exponentiation to the Hubble galaxies,
to Heaven and Hell, is derivative and belongs to the numbers dreams
(or nightmares, shared or unshared). Important notes: dreams obeys
laws, as they are derived from addition and multiplcation. Physical
realities, are particular sharable deep (long computational histories)
dreams (computations seen from inside).
BRUNO: It looks like you have objects separated from Platonia. In
Plato-Plotinus and comp,
Platonia contains the whole of being. That is why Plotinus says that
the ONE, and the
MATTERs are not being, as they are not *in* Platonia, and with comp
belong properly to Platonia, but are an effect of perspective from
$$$$$ ROGER: OK, I misunderstand comp, it seems to mean something
that is calculated, hence contingent.
OK because Matter is not real if only ideas are real (Leibniz).
Matter is in contingia.
It is a bit more complex than that. Geogrpahy is contingia, but
matter, even if "not realm", is still the same in the epistemology of
numbers. With comp, physics is made the same for all machines, and
there is only one absolute physics, although it can take many shapes,
as some parameters might be geographical (*many* open questions here,
to say the least).
And as I show next [in braces, you can skip], Platonia contains the
whole of Being.
Plotinus, the self-referentially correct universal numbers (CUN), and
me, agree on this.
[ Necessary truths (platonia) are elite forms of contingent truths
(so can also exist in contingia)
But by definition, no contingent truth is necessary.
But some truth are necessarily contingent. If UD-accessible, they will
belong to physics.
So there no restriction on the
domain of necessary truths, but there is a glass ceiling on
So it can be analogously said that God can reach man, but man cannot
reach God. }
However, I consider the One, the All, to be permanent features of
Well, here Plato can agree, but not Plotinus, nor the CUNs. (correct
universal numbers). The All is complex and emanates from the very
BRUNO: But I refute your argument that numbers cannot change, as
change all the time through their arithmetical relations with the
##### ROGER: IMHO By not changing I meant that 1 can never change to
2, it must always be 1.
But I, in some context (added to 3, for example) can be said to be
changed or to produces 4.
$$$$ ROGER: Fine.
(previously) that numbers as numbers cannot change. However....
IMHO Different numbers can be generated by different calculations,
different inputs, or at some different time, but the resulting
numbers are particulars to that
particular calculation. And to my mind at least, members of, or
Contingia in some fashion.
BRUNO: Yes, exactly. In two very different ways: as being an input,
and as being a machine, with respect to some universal numbers.
$$$ ROGER: OK.
While numbers and ideas cannot be monads, they have to
be are entities in the mind, feelings, and bodily aspects
Numbers get the two role, at least from the pov of the universal
numbers. That's the beauty of it.
##### ROGER: ?
BRUNO: Let phi_i an enumeration of all computable functions. In
phi_i(j), the number i has a role of dynamical machine, and j of
ROGERS: OK. That's a much more elegant way to say what a calculation
is, if I understand you
from way down here in contingia.
For Leibniz refers to the "intellect" of human
BRUNO: I refer to the "intellect" (terrestrial and divine) of the
numbers, among mainly the L bian one (as the other are a bit too much
mute on the interesting question).
ROGER: IMHO Again let me refer to
a) Numbers themselves. numbers as numbers themselves, and these do
3 is always 3.
OK. (Let us hope!)
b) Calculated numbers. But numbers resulting from calculations
differ and change, depending on the type of calculation and varying
BRUNO: OK. As input. But they can also be machine---he one who get
the input, like i in phi_i.
$$$$$$ROGER: OK. I overlooked that.
(previously) And> similarly, numbers and ideas must be used
in the "fictional" construction of matter-- in the bodily
aspect of material monads, as well as the construction
of our bodies and brains.
BRUNO: OK. But even truer at another level made possible by comp. As
I try to
illustrate. Arithmetic is full of life and dreams.
ROGER: I suppose that calculations, being in contingia, and hence
can do all sorts of weird things.
For the best, or the worst, in contingia. yes.
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