Hi Bruno Marchal
My understanding of personal or subjective or 1p filtering
has little to do with where the person is (Washington or Moscow).
it has to do (if I might say it this way) with where the person has been.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Time: 2012-10-02, 05:34:11
Subject: Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable
On 01 Oct 2012, at 19:28, Roger Clough wrote:
BRUNO: OK. But the ability to selct does not require intelligence, just
interaction and some memory.
$$$$$$ ROGER: No, that's where you keep missing the absolutely critical issue
Choice is exclusive to the autonomous self, and is absolutely necessary. Self
selects A or B or whatever entirely on its own..
That's what intelligence is.
INTELLIGENCE = AUTONOMOUS CHOOSER + CHOICES
When you type a response, YOU choose which letter to type, etc.
That's an intelligent action.
I agree with you on choice. I use the term self-determination in my defense of
When I was talking about consciousness selection, it has nothing to do with
choice. It was what happen, in the comp theory, when you duplicate yourself in
two different place, like Washington and Moscow. After that duplication, when
you look at you neighborhood, there is a consciousness or first person
selection: you feel to be in W, or you feel to be in M. You have no choice in
Choice is something else entirely, and play no role in the origin and shape of
the physical laws, but consciousness selection (which is a form of
Turing-tropism (generalization of anthropism)).
Selection of a quantum path
(collapse or reduction of the jungle of brain wave paths) produces
consciousness, according to Penrose et al. They call it orchestrated
BRUNO: Penrose is hardly convincing on this. Its basic argument based on G del
is invalid, and its theory is quite speculative, like the wave collapse, which
has never make any sense to me.
ROGER: All physical theories (not mathematical theories) are speculative until
validated by data.
No. All theories are speculative. Period. But when I said "quite speculative",
I meant "no evidence at all, and contradictory with all current evidences".
Yes. Atoms are no "atoms" (in greek t??? means not divisible).
$$$$$$ROGER: The greeks had no means to split the atom, they hadn't even seen
The greeks knew that atoms are not divisible, by definition. They didn't knew
that atoms exists, nor do we.
I use atom in the philosophical sense. The current physical atoms where
believed to be such philo atoms, until the discovery of the electron and
The new physical philosophical atoms are the elementary particles, but they are
no more "philosophical atoms" in string theory.
$$$$$$$ROGER: The monads are just points but not physical objects.
Overlaying them, all of L's reality is just a dimensionless dot.
Like the UD. It is a function from nothing to nothing, and as such
0-dimensional. But i don't really believe the geometrical image is useful. With
comp it is better to put geometry in the epistemology of numbers, like
analysis, infinities, and physics. Keeping the ontology minimal assures that we
will not risk reifying unnecessary materials.
I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit
into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue,
so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads.
BRUNO: OK. I will interpret your monad by "intensional number".
$$$$$$$$ROGER: Numbers do not associate to corporeal bodies, so that won't
What do you mean by "corporeal bodies"? With comp + the usual Occam razor,
"corporeal bodies" belongs to the mind of numbers (+ infinities of numbers
Those less dominant monads are eaten or taken over by the stronger ones.
It's a Darwinian jungle down here. Crap happens.
BRUNO: Crap happens also in arithmetic when viewed from inside.
Contingency is given by selection on the many computational consistent
There are different form of contingencies in arithmetic: one for each modal box
having an arithmetical interpretations.
In modal logic you can read p by p is necessary, or true in all (accessible)
<>p by p is possible or true in one (accessible) world
~p or <>~p by p is contingent (not necessary)
What will change from one modal logic to another is the accessibility
or the neighborhood relations on the (abstract) worlds.
$$$$$ ROGER: That's correct, I was incorrectly limiting numbers to
OK. Nice. comp reduces the ontology to arithmetic, but it is not a reductionism
at all, it is the discovery that arithmetic has an unboundable complexity, full
of life, crap, and surprises, and super-exponentially so when seen from inside,
where qualitative features appears, as the numbers/machine already witness in
their self-referential discourses.
Another argument against numbers
being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal
#### ROGER: By atttached I mean associated with. The association is permanent.
Each monad is an individiaul with individual identity given by the corporeal
body it is
associated with. Its soul. All corporeal bodies are different and unique.
I am OK, in some of the first person perspective. But that is "not real". The
body is an epistemological construct, yet a every stable one, locally,
The mind is not attached or associated to a body, but to an infinity of number
relations (and the felt body is a construct of the mind).
$$$$$$ ROGER: To leibniz, matter is not considered to be real, only ideas or
concepts (monads) are real,
but real in a platonic sense.
So we do agree. I would avoid the term corporeal bodies, even virtual bodies is
misleading as the bodies are very complex things to define in comp. They are
related to the way a person manages its infinities of virtual (arithmetical)
"bodies" (G?el number, codes in the UD, etc.).
BRUNO: Men are in Platonia. But their bodies and consciousness are in the
limiting internal view of Platonia from inside.
$$$$$$$ ROGER: No, men are corporeal, extended bodies, so they exist in
Once you accept that "bodies" are not real, like above, there is no
contradiction between " men are corporeal, extended bodies, so they exist in
Contingia" and "their bodies and consciousness are in the limiting internal
view of Platonia from inside. ".
But anything in platonia is a necessary truth, so it
should also hold in contingia. Thus if a contingent man thinks of a necessary
truth it will appear in his mind, even though it is contingent. Men have
access mentally to eternal truths.
BRUNO: With comp Platonia is very simple. It is basically the structure (N, 0,
s, +, *), arithmetic.
But after G del, we know that such a structure is not simple at all. Indeed,
unlike physics, there is just no hope to get a complete theory about N, + *.
$$$$$ Roger: OK, although I haven't a clue as to what it means.
What I meant is that comp is Pythagorean. Every thing in the being realm is a
number. And there are only tow primitive laws: addition and multiplication. The
rest, from exponentiation to the Hubble galaxies, to Heaven and Hell, is
derivative and belongs to the numbers dreams (or nightmares, shared or
unshared). Important notes: dreams obeys laws, as they are derived from
addition and multiplcation. Physical realities, are particular sharable deep
(long computational histories) dreams (computations seen from inside).
BRUNO: It looks like you have objects separated from Platonia. In
Plato-Plotinus and comp,
Platonia contains the whole of being. That is why Plotinus says that the ONE,
MATTERs are not being, as they are not *in* Platonia, and with comp they don't
belong properly to Platonia, but are an effect of perspective from inside
$$$$$ ROGER: OK, I misunderstand comp, it seems to mean something that is
calculated, hence contingent.
OK because Matter is not real if only ideas are real (Leibniz). Matter is in
It is a bit more complex than that. Geogrpahy is contingia, but matter, even if
"not realm", is still the same in the epistemology of numbers. With comp,
physics is made the same for all machines, and there is only one absolute
physics, although it can take many shapes, as some parameters might be
geographical (*many* open questions here, to say the least).
And as I show next [in braces, you can skip], Platonia contains the whole of
Plotinus, the self-referentially correct universal numbers (CUN), and me, agree
[ Necessary truths (platonia) are elite forms of contingent truths (so can also
exist in contingia)
But by definition, no contingent truth is necessary.
But some truth are necessarily contingent. If UD-accessible, they will belong
So there no restriction on the
domain of necessary truths, but there is a glass ceiling on contingent truths.
So it can be analogously said that God can reach man, but man cannot
reach God. }
However, I consider the One, the All, to be permanent features of Platonia.
Well, here Plato can agree, but not Plotinus, nor the CUNs. (correct universal
numbers). The All is complex and emanates from the very simple ONE.
BRUNO: But I refute your argument that numbers cannot change, as they do
change all the time through their arithmetical relations with the
##### ROGER: IMHO By not changing I meant that 1 can never change to 2, it must
always be 1.
But I, in some context (added to 3, for example) can be said to be changed or
to produces 4.
$$$$ ROGER: Fine.
(previously) that numbers as numbers cannot change. However....
IMHO Different numbers can be generated by different calculations, using
different inputs, or at some different time, but the resulting numbers are
particulars to that
particular calculation. And to my mind at least, members of, or belonging to,
Contingia in some fashion.
BRUNO: Yes, exactly. In two very different ways: as being an input, and as
being a machine, with respect to some universal numbers.
$$$ ROGER: OK.
While numbers and ideas cannot be monads, they have to
be are entities in the mind, feelings, and bodily aspects
Numbers get the two role, at least from the pov of the universal
numbers. That's the beauty of it.
##### ROGER: ?
BRUNO: Let phi_i an enumeration of all computable functions. In phi_i(j), the
number i has a role of dynamical machine, and j of passive input.
ROGERS: OK. That's a much more elegant way to say what a calculation is, if I
from way down here in contingia.
For Leibniz refers to the "intellect" of human
BRUNO: I refer to the "intellect" (terrestrial and divine) of the universal
numbers, among mainly the L bian one (as the other are a bit too much
mute on the interesting question).
ROGER: IMHO Again let me refer to
a) Numbers themselves. numbers as numbers themselves, and these do not change.
3 is always 3.
OK. (Let us hope!)
b) Calculated numbers. But numbers resulting from calculations obviously can
differ and change, depending on the type of calculation and varying inputs.
BRUNO: OK. As input. But they can also be machine---he one who get the input,
like i in phi_i.
$$$$$$ROGER: OK. I overlooked that.
(previously) And> similarly, numbers and ideas must be used
in the "fictional" construction of matter-- in the bodily
aspect of material monads, as well as the construction
of our bodies and brains.
BRUNO: OK. But even truer at another level made possible by comp. As I try to
illustrate. Arithmetic is full of life and dreams.
ROGER: I suppose that calculations, being in contingia, and hence iomperfect,
can do all sorts of weird things.
For the best, or the worst, in contingia. yes.
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