On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 2:32 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> I think you are currently forgetting the first person indeterminacy. You > seem to forget the fact that if you drop a pen on the ground, it will not > fall on the ground because you are in a computation which support you and a > falling pen, but because the pen fall in the majority of the computations > going through you actual state. > > This is what makes physics reducible to machine psychology, and physics is > not a structure among others: it is a sum on all (comp) structures. That is > what AUDA translate in math. > Now, as it might be FALSE that the pen drop in the majority of continuation, > or even that such a majority does not make sense, the whole thing is > testable. Comp might really be refuted here (well comp + definition of > knowledge based on Theaetetus + Gödel-Löb self-reference). > > Deutsch criticized Schmidhuber as being trivial: explaining too much, and I > gree with Deustch. But comp, when we take the first person indeterminacy > into account makes this explanation not trivial at all, as we have to derive > physics by extracting a measure on all computation. This is far from done. > AUDA does show, though, that the measure one exists, and already obeys to > quantum logic. > > Comp, in that way, makes the "everything" idea into an operative theory > capable of precise predictions. The physical reality is not a mathematical > structure among possible other: it is the unique (quasi) mathematical > structure which makes our subjective experience persistent. > > Normally this should be clear at the step seven (as some Occam razor, > stronger than usual but not that much, can be used to avoid step 8). > > OK? OK, so there are multiple computations sustaining my current experience, not just one, and my future is indeterminate. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
