On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 2:32 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> I think you are currently forgetting the first person indeterminacy. You
> seem to forget the fact that if you drop a pen on the ground, it will not
> fall on the ground because you are in a computation which support you and a
> falling pen, but because the pen fall in the majority of the computations
> going through you actual state.
>
> This is what makes physics reducible to machine psychology, and physics is
> not a structure among others: it is a sum on all (comp) structures. That is
> what AUDA translate in math.
> Now, as it might be FALSE that the pen drop in the majority of continuation,
> or even that such a majority does not make sense, the whole thing is
> testable. Comp might really be refuted here (well comp + definition of
> knowledge based on Theaetetus + Gödel-Löb self-reference).
>
> Deutsch criticized Schmidhuber as being trivial: explaining too much, and I
> gree with Deustch. But comp, when we take the first person indeterminacy
> into account makes this explanation not trivial at all, as we have to derive
> physics by extracting a measure on all computation. This is far from done.
> AUDA does show, though, that the measure one exists, and already obeys to
> quantum logic.
>
> Comp, in that way, makes the "everything" idea into an operative theory
> capable of precise predictions. The physical reality is not a mathematical
> structure among possible other: it is the unique (quasi) mathematical
> structure which makes our subjective experience persistent.
>
> Normally this should be clear at the step seven (as some Occam razor,
> stronger than usual but not that much, can be used to avoid step 8).
>
> OK?

OK, so there are multiple computations sustaining my current
experience, not just one, and my future is indeterminate.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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