On 07 Oct 2012, at 18:05, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 2:32 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

I think you are currently forgetting the first person indeterminacy. You seem to forget the fact that if you drop a pen on the ground, it will not fall on the ground because you are in a computation which support you and a falling pen, but because the pen fall in the majority of the computations
going through you actual state.

This is what makes physics reducible to machine psychology, and physics is not a structure among others: it is a sum on all (comp) structures. That is
what AUDA translate in math.
Now, as it might be FALSE that the pen drop in the majority of continuation,
or even that such a majority does not make sense, the whole thing is
testable. Comp might really be refuted here (well comp + definition of
knowledge based on Theaetetus + Gödel-Löb self-reference).

Deutsch criticized Schmidhuber as being trivial: explaining too much, and I gree with Deustch. But comp, when we take the first person indeterminacy into account makes this explanation not trivial at all, as we have to derive physics by extracting a measure on all computation. This is far from done. AUDA does show, though, that the measure one exists, and already obeys to
quantum logic.

Comp, in that way, makes the "everything" idea into an operative theory capable of precise predictions. The physical reality is not a mathematical
structure among possible other: it is the unique (quasi) mathematical
structure which makes our subjective experience persistent.

Normally this should be clear at the step seven (as some Occam razor,
stronger than usual but not that much, can be used to avoid step 8).


OK, so there are multiple computations sustaining my current
experience, not just one, and my future is indeterminate.

Yes. And physics is what evaluate that indetermination, and makes (hopefully) possible the sharing of very similar computations between different universal beings, in a testable way.



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