Hi Stathis Papaioannou  

Computation can give you letters on a page. 
Are they conscious ?  

There's no way that I can think of however, to prove or
disprove that objects are conscious or not, only that
they may simulate consciousness. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/8/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Stathis Papaioannou  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-07, 10:45:10 
Subject: Re: On complexity and bottom-up theories and calculations 


On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 1:23 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote: 

>> One theory is that existence of platonic entities such as numbers is 
>> not ontologically distinct from actual existence. In that case, all 
>> possible universes necessarily exist, and the one that has the laws of 
>> physics allowing observers is the one the observers observe. 
> 
> 
> That is "Tegmark error". It cannot work. First it is obvious that numbers 
> have a distinct existence than, say, this table or that chair, and secondly, 
> once you accept comp, whatever meaning you give to the existence of numbers 
> as long as you agree that 2+2=4 is independent of you, the global 
> indeterminacy on arithmetic, or on the UD, has to be taken into account, and 
> physics has to be explained in term of *all* computation. That is what 
> Tegmark and Schmidhuber have missed, and which I have explained when 
> entering on this mailing list. 
> 
> Even in the case one (little program), like DeWitt-Wheeler equation for 
> example, would be correct, so that indeed there would be only one 
> computation allowing consciousness, such a fact has to be justified in term 
> of the measure taken on *all* computation. I thought you did grasp this 
> sometime ago. Step 8 is not really needed here. 

Computation necessarily exists, computation is enough to generate 
consciousness and physics, therefore no need for a separate physical 
reality. Can you explain the subtlety I've missed? 


--  
Stathis Papaioannou 

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