On Saturday, October 13, 2012 9:05:58 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 14, 2012 at 11:10 AM, Craig Weinberg
> > Fading qualia is the only argument of Chalmers' that I disagree with.
> It's a
> > natural mistake to make, but I think he goes wrong by assuming a priori
> > consciousness is functional, i.e. that personal consciousness is an
> > of sub-personal parts which can be isolated and reproduced based on
> > behavior.
> No, he does NOT assume this. He assumes the opposite: that
> consciousness is a property of the brain and CANNOT be reproduced by
> reproducing the behaviour in another substrate.
I'm not talking about what the structure of the thought experiment assumes,
I am talking about what David Chalmers himself assumed before coming up
with the paper. We have been over this before. I'm not saying I disagree
with the reasoning of the thought experiment, I am saying that I see a
mistake in the initial assumptions which invalidate the thought experiment
in the first place.
> > I don't assume that at all. I suspect the opposite case, that in
> > fact any level of personal consciousness - be it sub-personal-reflex,
> > personal-intentional, or super-signifying-synchronistic cannot be
> modeled by
> > the impersonal views from third person perspectives. The impersonal
> > meso, macrocosm) is based on public extension, space, and quantifiable
> > lengths, while the personal is based on private intention, time, and
> > qualitative oscillation. Each layer of the personal relates to all of
> > impersonal layers in a different way, so that you can't necessarily
> > a person with a sculpture and expect there to still be a person there -
> > if the sculpture seems extremely convincing to us from the outside
> > appearance. My prediction is that rather than fading qualia, we would
> > see increasing pathology, psychosis, dementia, coma, and death.
> But since you misunderstand the first assumption you misunderstand the
> whole argument.
Nope. You misunderstand my argument completely.
> Stathis Papaioannou
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