On Saturday, October 13, 2012 7:54:44 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 14, 2012 at 10:51 AM, Russell Standish
> > I know you don't believe in COMP, but assuming COMP (I am open-minded
> > on the topic), mass and chemical composition are irrelevant to
> > consciousness.
> Chalmers' "fading qualia" argument purports to prove the
> substrate-independence of consciousness.
Fading qualia is the only argument of Chalmers' that I disagree with. It's
a natural mistake to make, but I think he goes wrong by assuming a priori
that consciousness is functional, i.e. that personal consciousness is an
assembly of sub-personal parts which can be isolated and reproduced based
on exterior behavior. I don't assume that at all. I suspect the opposite
case, that in fact any level of personal consciousness - be it
sub-personal-reflex, personal-intentional, or
super-signifying-synchronistic cannot be modeled by the impersonal views
from third person perspectives. The impersonal (micro, meso, macrocosm) is
based on public extension, space, and quantifiable lengths, while the
personal is based on private intention, time, and qualitative oscillation.
Each layer of the personal relates to all of the impersonal layers in a
different way, so that you can't necessarily replace a person with a
sculpture and expect there to still be a person there - even if the
sculpture seems extremely convincing to us from the outside appearance. My
prediction is that rather than fading qualia, we would simply see
increasing pathology, psychosis, dementia, coma, and death.
> Stathis Papaioannou
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