On Sun, Oct 14, 2012 at 11:10 AM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
> Fading qualia is the only argument of Chalmers' that I disagree with. It's a > natural mistake to make, but I think he goes wrong by assuming a priori that > consciousness is functional, i.e. that personal consciousness is an assembly > of sub-personal parts which can be isolated and reproduced based on exterior > behavior. No, he does NOT assume this. He assumes the opposite: that consciousness is a property of the brain and CANNOT be reproduced by reproducing the behaviour in another substrate. > I don't assume that at all. I suspect the opposite case, that in > fact any level of personal consciousness - be it sub-personal-reflex, > personal-intentional, or super-signifying-synchronistic cannot be modeled by > the impersonal views from third person perspectives. The impersonal (micro, > meso, macrocosm) is based on public extension, space, and quantifiable > lengths, while the personal is based on private intention, time, and > qualitative oscillation. Each layer of the personal relates to all of the > impersonal layers in a different way, so that you can't necessarily replace > a person with a sculpture and expect there to still be a person there - even > if the sculpture seems extremely convincing to us from the outside > appearance. My prediction is that rather than fading qualia, we would simply > see increasing pathology, psychosis, dementia, coma, and death. But since you misunderstand the first assumption you misunderstand the whole argument. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
