On Sun, Oct 14, 2012 at 11:10 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Fading qualia is the only argument of Chalmers' that I disagree with. It's a
> natural mistake to make, but I think he goes wrong by assuming a priori that
> consciousness is functional, i.e. that personal consciousness is an assembly
> of sub-personal parts which can be isolated and reproduced based on exterior
> behavior.

No, he does NOT assume this. He assumes the opposite: that
consciousness is a property of the brain and CANNOT be reproduced by
reproducing the behaviour in another substrate.

> I don't assume that at all. I suspect the opposite case, that in
> fact any level of personal consciousness - be it sub-personal-reflex,
> personal-intentional, or super-signifying-synchronistic cannot be modeled by
> the impersonal views from third person perspectives. The impersonal (micro,
> meso, macrocosm) is based on public extension, space, and quantifiable
> lengths, while the personal is based on private intention, time, and
> qualitative oscillation. Each layer of the personal relates to all of the
> impersonal layers in a different way, so that you can't necessarily replace
> a person with a sculpture and expect there to still be a person there - even
> if the sculpture seems extremely convincing to us from the outside
> appearance. My prediction is that rather than fading qualia, we would simply
> see increasing pathology, psychosis, dementia, coma, and death.

But since you misunderstand the first assumption you misunderstand the
whole argument.

Stathis Papaioannou

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