It mostly makes sense to me, except I don't understand why I. is associated
with objects and substance when it is feeling, perception, and first person
To me, thinking is just as much first person as feeling, and they both are
subjective qualia. Thinking is a meta-quale of feeling (which is a
meta-quale of awareness>perception>sensation>sense)
That puts the whole subjective enchilada as Firstness and leaves objects
and substance to Secondness. This is Self-Body distinction. What you have
is like Lower-Self/Higher-Self distinction but with objects kind of
shoehorned in there. Once you see matter as a public extension and self as
a private intention, then Thirdness arises as the spatiotemporal
interaction of formation and information.
That outlines one way of slicing the pizza. I don't know if you can see
this but here:
That gives a better idea of the syzygy effect of the big picture, how they
overlap in different ways and set each other off in a multi-sense way.
The Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness relate respectively to the
*I. Sense, Motive
II. Matter, Energy,
III. Space, Time*
to get to morality, you have to look at the black and white:
*IV. Signal *(escalating significance), *Entropy* aka Ent ntr rop opy
(attenuating significance...fragmentation and redundancy obstructs
discernment capacities...information entropy generates thermodynamic
entropy through sense participation)
I did a post on this today, but it's pretty intense:
On Thursday, October 18, 2012 9:18:50 PM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
> Hi Craig
> Thanks very much for your comments Craig. I still need to digest them.
> Meanwhile, a flood of new ideas came to me and I just want to set them
> There are no doubt mistakes, esp. with regard to subjective/objective.
> The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver.2
> I Firstness object substance perception
> (quale) aesthetics beauty 1st person feeling
> II Secondness sign monad
> thought logic truth 2nd person
> thinking subj/obj
> III Thirdness interprant supreme monad expression
> morality goodness 3rd person doing objective
> It appears that Peirce's three categories match the Leibniz monadic
> as follows:
> I. = object = Leibniz substance = quale
> II. Secondness = sign = monad representing that substance.
> In Peirce, the sign is a word for the experience of that object .
> In Leibniz, the monads are mental, which I think means subjective.
> III. Thirdness = interprant (meaning of I and II ) = by the monad of monads.
> In addition to this, Peirce says that his categories are "predicates of
> where the first predicate (dog) is extensive and the second predicate (brown)
> is intensive.
> then the overall object might be animal-->dog-->brown.
> Leibniz says that a monad is a complete concept, meaning all of the possible
> I suggest that the first or extensive predicate (dog) is objective
> and the second predicate (brown) is qualitative or subjective.
> So that the object as per ceived is a quale or Firstness.
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
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