# Re: One more nail in comp's coffin.

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On 22 Oct 2012, at 15:50, Roger Clough wrote:```
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```Hi Bruno,

My own subjectivity is 1p.
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OK. By definition.

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```I don't believe a computer can
have consciousness, but suppose we let the computer have
consciousness as well.
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OK. Although it can only be a manner of speaking. If by computer you mean a piece of hardware, then, like a brain, or like a liver, he does not think. It is the person processed by the computer which is the thinker. This is not even just a higher level program, it is a program embedded in a "true" complex arithmetical realization.
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Let a descriptor be 3p. Let my consciousness = 1p

But the computer's consciousness would be different, say 1p'
-- because, let's say, it's less intelligent than I am.
Or it's not travelled around the world as I have.
Or it is only 3 years old. I've only used it for 3 years.
Or it is Christian while I am a pagan.
Or it is a materialist while I follow Leibniz.
Or I am drunk and it is sober.

Then the meaning of the 3p to me = 1p(3p).
The meaning of the 3p to the computer = 1p'(3p).

These obviously aren't  going to be the same.
So comp can't work or work with any reliability.
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You just argue that the computer will process a different person. But if the computer is an imitation at the correct substititution level of your actual drunk brain of a Leinizian pagan having travel a lot, you will be Roger Clough, having just a new digital artificial brain, and you might not even be aware of teh change, as you have not yet see the detail of the bill.
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If 3p = 3p' at the substitution level (which comp assumes to exist) then 1p = 1p'.
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Note that the contrary is false. 1p = 1p' does not entail 3p = 3p'. The 3ps can be different below the substitution level.
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Bruno

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On Monday, October 22, 2012 3:00:29 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg

Good.  But I think either you have to be more specific
about your definitions or else specify more broadly,
like in terms of categories.

http://multisenserealism.com

Also, your definition of thought is a good step, but
I myself  want to know how thinking is done.
What is thinking ?

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Thinking, strictly speaking, doesn't have a what or a how. Thinking has a who and a why. How do you move your arm? How does something funny make you laugh? These are experienced events which can be caused by physiological events or the physiological events can be caused by experience. They are the same thing, only one view is public facing and reduced to objects in space and the other is private facing and lacking certain description. Thinking is a trick which allows us to personally experience what we could otherwise could not personally experience. It is virtual or meta-feeling; an algebraic substitution of feeling: It is the experience of "If there is an experience of X".
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Craig

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/22/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
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----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-21, 10:06:21
Subject: Re: Re: The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver. 2

On Sunday, October 21, 2012 7:19:42 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

CRAIG: Cool Roger,

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It mostly makes sense to me, except I don't understand why I. is associated with objects and substance when it is feeling, perception, and first person quale.
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ROGER: It is not uncommon to find such objective/subjective dyslexia in the literature.
```   This stuff is hard to get a hold of.

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It can be, yeah, although my model makes it really easy. Subject and object are poles on a continuum, with private, proprietary, solipsistic, trans-rational sense qualities on the East (Orienting) end and public, generic, nihilistic, logical realism quantities on the Western end. In the center region between the two poles, subjectivity and objectivity are clearly discernible as inner and outer body/world perception (I call this the mundane fold as it is like a crease which acts as a barrier). In the edge region, the East and West actually meet in the sort of transcendental oblivion of subjective union with the ultimate (nirvana, satori, enlightenment, etc)
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CRAIG: To me, thinking is just as much first person as feeling, and they both are subjective qualia. Thinking is a meta-quale of feeling (which is a meta-quale of awareness>perception>sensation>sense)
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ROGER: Actually I have yet to find a clear or useful definition of thinking (how it works). In fact Wittgenstein at one point said that he does not know what thinking is (!). But I believe you have to think if you compare objects across an equals sign,
```   so comparison (a dyad) seems to me to be a basic type of thinking.

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A think a comparison is a basic type of everything. As luck would have it, I just posted this definition for what a thought is yesterday:
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What exactly is a thought?
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A thought is a private, personal, directly participatory narrative subjective experience which is typically expressed in a verbal- gestural sense modality (as words or feelings easily converted to words by an agency of proprietary interior voice). Thoughts can be discerned from images, awareness, and perception by their potential purposefulness; they serve as the seeds for public action. Generally public actions which are understood to be voluntary are assumed to be the consequence of private thoughts. Behaviors which are ? houghtless? are deemed to be unconscious, subconscious, accidental, or socially impaired.
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CRAIG: That puts the whole subjective enchilada as Firstness and leaves objects and substance to Secondness. This is Self-Body distinction. What you have is like Lower-Self/Higher- Self distinction but with objects kind of shoehorned in there. Once you see matter as a public extension and self as a private intention, then Thirdness arises as the spatiotemporal interaction of formation and information.
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ROGER: Yes, distinction is another form of basic thought. But that requires the ability to compare.
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First you have to be able to distinguish things before you can compare them, otherwise what would you be comparing?
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CRAIG: That outlines one way of slicing the pizza. I don't know if you can see this but here:
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https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Xz8OmKGPEjE/UIL6EtVeBEI/AAAAAAAAAZ4/iBhuMxBj9oU/s1600/trio_sml_entropy.jpg

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That gives a better idea of the syzygy effect of the big picture, how they overlap in different ways and set each other off in a multi- sense way.
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The Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness relate respectively to the respective trios:
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I. Sense, Motive
II. Matter, Energy,
III. Space, Time

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ROGER: I could see it, but couldn't see how to interpret it, but's thats OK. The categories, like Hegel's dialectic, seem to be a basic take on existence, So no doubt there are many approaches to defining them, yours included.
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CRAIG: to get to morality, you have to look at the black and white:

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IV. Signal (escalating significance), Entropy aka Ent ntr rop opy (attenuating significance...
```   fragmentation and redundancy obstructs discernment capacities...
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information entropy generates thermodynamic entropy through sense participation)
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I did a post on this today, but it's pretty intense:
http://s33light.org/post/33951454539

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ROGER: I welcome your thoughts on this. But as for myself, I try to keep things as simple as possible. The truth is that actually I had a serior moment when I wrote "morality".
```   I should have recalled a better term, Ethics. That has to do with
law and doing, both typical of III.

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In my view morality and ethics are manifestation of IV. It is distinct from law because it is not a scripted assumption of compliance, it is an internalized sensitivity to social considerations which drives law from above, rather than a consequence of the existence of a-signifying behavioral constraints. This is actually pretty important as it reveals why COMP is wrong and AGI will fail without biology.
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Craig

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