On 24 Oct 2012, at 20:29, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/24/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 24 Oct 2012, at 06:03, Stephen P. King wrote:What difference does what they refer to matter? Eventuallythere has to be some physical process or we would be incapable ofeven thinking about them! The resources to perform the computationare either available or they are not. Seriously, why are you overcomplicating the idea?Let us be clear. For humans to be able to think, not only you needa physical process, but you need a solar system, a planet, ... manythings, including much resources.Dear Bruno,Sure, but that only is about explanations of the physicalsystems involved. But let me ask you, given that there is a 1p foreach and every observer, does it not follow that there should be abundle of computations for each and one?

That's the case.

There would be a great deal of overlap between them (as that wouldbe equivalent to the commonality of the experienciable content ofthe observers). The point is that the computation is not of a singleobject in a world. We have to consider computational simulations ofentire universes!

`If that makes sense, consider them as particular dreams. Don't forget`

`that computability, and computations, are the only epistemological, or`

`factual notion admitting a very solid mathematical definition.`

`"universe" for me is a very vague term, like God, we can't use it as`

`an explanation. It is what I would like an explanation for.`

But, ...... for the couple [thinking humans===== Earth, solar-system-physical process-resource] you need only arithmetic.A bit like in Everett the couple [physician's sad consciousness infront of a collapsed wave===== a dead Schroedinger cat] you needonly the universal quantum wave.Just that once we assume comp "enough consciously", if I can say,the universal wave itself, if correct for observation, has to beretrieved from a larger statistics, on all computations, goingthrough our local computational states.Literally, the laws of physics are invariant from the choice of thephysical basic laws, as long as they are at least Turing universal(synonym important for AUDA: Sigma_1 complete).I am not sure what this means: "laws of physics are invariantfrom the choice of the physical basic laws". Could you explain thismore?

`It means that the laws of physics does not depend on the choice of the`

`theory for the primitive elements. You can take as ontology the`

`digital plane, and as primitive element the GOL patterns, or just a`

`universal one, or you can take the numbers with addition and`

`multiplication, or you can take QM, or you can take the FORTRAN`

`programs, etc.`

`With comp, in each case you will have to derive consciousness/physics`

`from all the relations those primitive elements have, and comp`

`guaranty you will converge on the same "reality from inside".`

`If you want with comp, if you choose QM, you are just cheating, as you`

`copy on the universe, so to speak. And then you lack the qualia. But`

`comp says that the qunata and tha qualia are in your head, or in the`

`head of any Universal machine, so that we can program a machine to`

`look in its head and compare the universe and what the machine finds,`

`to evaluate comp.`

Then just below I give you two choices of TOE:

Literally: very elementary arithmetic is a good TOE: x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + xIt is in *that* theory, that we have now to define the notion ofobservers, believers, knowers, experiencers, experimentalists, andformulate a part of the "measure problem". Mathematically, we cantest the first person limiting observation by the person"incarnated by the genuine computation" in arithmetic.Another TOE: ((K, x), y) = x (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z))It operates on the combinators, and the combinators are K or S, or(x, y) with x and y combinators. So (K, K), (K, (K, S)), ((K, K)K), etc are combinators.What they do? They obeys the laws above.Those defines Turing universal realities, and they will emulate/define other universal realities, in the same relative proportions,which will be the observers-universe, a coupled universal machine(it is another way to view LĂ¶bianity (although technically it is abit weaker)).Any universal machine contains in itself a sort of war between*all* universal machines until they recognize themselves.Obviously some universal machines get more famous than other,apparently, like ... well arithmetic, combinators, but also, inrelation with the observable reality, quantum computers.It makes comp testable, or at least the definition of observer,believer, knower used in the derivation of physics, and here Iprovide only the propositional physical theory (and even somechoice as different quantum logics appears in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*, thelogic of the material hypostases, in Plotinus terms).All of that is a theoretical explanation, that supposes thatsince arithmetic is all that is needed to encode all of theinformation and representations, but this is just an explanation,nothing more.

?

Until we can derive phenomenology that can be tested, we have only ahypothesis or conjecture.

`Of course. That is trivially the case for all theories in science. Up`

`to now, it is confirmed (and even illustrated, by Everett) and it will`

`remain like that up to the possible refutation.`

I think it is more than an explanation. It is the simplest explanation.

My proposal is that, following Pratt's suggestion, we consider thearithmetic to be equivalent to a Boolean algebra and its evolutionis "the computation" of the UD. That way we do not have a bodyproblem, since the dual of the Boolean algebra, the topologicalspace, is the body whose evolution is physics.

`But if you don't have a body problem, how will you ever explains`

`electron appearances and black hole.`

`The body problem is what makes comp interesting, as it provides a`

`conceptual explanation of the origin of the physical reality. The`

`solution of the problem is an entire explanation of physics, without`

`having to postulate matter, observers or gods or substances.`

With comp, trying to singularize consciousness with a particularuniversal machine (a physical reality), is like a move to select abranch in a wave of realities, and can be seen as a form ofcosmical solipsism negating consciousness for vast span ofarithmetical truth, just because those realities are onlyindirectly accessible, by looking below ours substitution level.But solipsism is not the absence of consciousness, it is theinability of one 1p to bet on the existence of the possible contentof other 1p.

Don't confuse the "solipsism" as

`-doctrine, which is that others does not exist (and so their`

`appearances are indeed not conscious, as they don't exist). And as`

`-mental state. The 1p is practically solipsist as he can be conscious`

`only of its own state, not of the state of someone else, so the`

`consciousness of another is a bet. It is a theory, very old, because`

`it is implemented in hard by known neural pathway (for empathy).`

`Spiders already have such pathways.`

I have translated a part of the "philosophical" mind-body problemin mathematics (and partially solve it).Sure, but your claims of an immaterial monism worry me. It is asif you have resurected Berkeley's Idealism in a formal mathematicalmodel and dismissed the attack by Mr. Johnson (who famouslyrebounded his foot from a rock and yelled 'I refute it thus.') as"an arithmetic body problem".

`This is ridiculous. The body problem is given by UDA. If comp is`

`correct the physical laws do emerge from a statistics on computations.`

`This has nothing to do with Johnson's attack on Berkeley, which is far`

`easier to solve (assuming comp) by the fact that rocks can kick back`

`in dreams.`

`And comp save all this from idealism, as arithmetic is accepted as`

`being a set of truth independent of the humans or aliens.`

`I don't see why you worry as it is a form of neutral monism. But it is`

`also a scientific theory that you can explain to a 14 years old. I`

`mean like in any real theory: the cards are all on the table.`

Bruno

I made a mistake as the mathematicians don't know about the mindbody problem, and the philosophers don't know the math (here:computer science/mathematical logic).Sure, I cannot write it, but I do understand it. I can barelywrite English! It is hard to explain the effects of dyslexia.The physicists, at least those who don't believe in the collapseare closer to get the picture coherent with what can be like aphysics from the persons supported by the combinators reduction (orby the numbers addition and multiplication), as it has to be thecase if we assume comp.When I will have more time I will continue to explain the mathneeded for this.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-- Onward! Stephen --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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