On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:48, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/25/2012 10:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 24 Oct 2012, at 20:29, Stephen P. King wrote:On 10/24/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 24 Oct 2012, at 06:03, Stephen P. King wrote:What difference does what they refer to matter? Eventuallythere has to be some physical process or we would be incapableof even thinking about them! The resources to perform thecomputation are either available or they are not. Seriously, whyare you over complicating the idea?Let us be clear. For humans to be able to think, not only youneed a physical process, but you need a solar system, aplanet, ... many things, including much resources.Dear Bruno,Sure, but that only is about explanations of the physicalsystems involved. But let me ask you, given that there is a 1p foreach and every observer, does it not follow that there should be abundle of computations for each and one?That's the case.Hi Bruno,OK, do you have something that acts as a primitive unit ofaction for the bundles or do you merely use the ordering of integersto imply an action?

`The ordering is not enough. I use the entire turing universal`

`machinery, which happens to be given by addition and multiplication.`

There would be a great deal of overlap between them (as that wouldbe equivalent to the commonality of the experienciable content ofthe observers). The point is that the computation is not of asingle object in a world. We have to consider computationalsimulations of entire universes!If that makes sense, consider them as particular dreams.Sure, but note that this "dream aspect" makes them strictly 1p.Yes?

`Yes. But their reason can involves (and do involve) infinities of 3p`

`relations. They are strictly 1p, but still supervening on 3p`

`relations. If this is judged impossible, then there is no more reason`

`to say "yes" to a digitalist doctor.`

Don't forget that computability, and computations, are the onlyepistemological, or factual notion admitting a very solidmathematical definition. "universe" for me is a very vague term,like God, we can't use it as an explanation. It is what I wouldlike an explanation for.A universe is the same as is used in set theory, a total andcomplete collection that does not leave anything out that might needto be included.

`OK? But sets are conceptually richer than computation. Sets are, in`

`comp, already mind constructs by number, to put some light on the`

`complex relations. In fact here you are describing what is a model,`

`and I am OK with the use of them, but not with the idea of putting`

`them in the basic starting ontology.`

But, ...... for the couple [thinking humans===== Earth, solar-system-physical process-resource] you need only arithmetic.A bit like in Everett the couple [physician's sad consciousnessin front of a collapsed wave===== a dead Schroedinger cat] youneed only the universal quantum wave.Just that once we assume comp "enough consciously", if I can say,the universal wave itself, if correct for observation, has to beretrieved from a larger statistics, on all computations, goingthrough our local computational states.Literally, the laws of physics are invariant from the choice ofthe physical basic laws, as long as they are at least Turinguniversal (synonym important for AUDA: Sigma_1 complete).I am not sure what this means: "laws of physics are invariantfrom the choice of the physical basic laws". Could you explainthis more?It means that the laws of physics does not depend on the choice ofthe theory for the primitive elements. You can take as ontology thedigital plane, and as primitive element the GOL patterns, or just auniversal one, or you can take the numbers with addition andmultiplication, or you can take QM, or you can take the FORTRANprograms, etc.Does this not make the "physical laws" very vague? For example,should we expect some prediction of the type of transformation groupthat best represents our conservation laws? Are Lie groups predicted?

`Everything physical and lawful. I can bet on Lie Group, yes, and the`

`elementary particles or strings, the quantum wave aspects, and the`

`"ultimate hamiltonian" which might plasuibly describe a sort of`

`vaccum, ding some quantum universal dovetaling.`

`The worst is that the prime numbers seems to do already that, and I`

`worry that the number theorists might find the correct theoretical`

`physics before the theologian, as that could mean that we will have to`

`wait for another millennium before getting serious on qualia and`

`afterlife questions.`

With comp, in each case you will have to derive consciousness/physics from all the relations those primitive elements have, andcomp guaranty you will converge on the same "reality from inside".If you want with comp, if you choose QM, you are just cheating, asyou copy on the universe, so to speak. And then you lack thequalia. But comp says that the qunata and tha qualia are in yourhead, or in the head of any Universal machine, so that we canprogram a machine to look in its head and compare the universe andwhat the machine finds, to evaluate comp.Then just below I give you two choices of TOE:Literally: very elementary arithmetic is a good TOE: x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + xIt is in *that* theory, that we have now to define the notion ofobservers, believers, knowers, experiencers, experimentalists,and formulate a part of the "measure problem". Mathematically,we can test the first person limiting observation by the person"incarnated by the genuine computation" in arithmetic.Another TOE: ((K, x), y) = x (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z))It operates on the combinators, and the combinators are K or S,or (x, y) with x and y combinators. So (K, K), (K, (K, S)), ((K,K) K), etc are combinators.What they do? They obeys the laws above.Those defines Turing universal realities, and they will emulate/define other universal realities, in the same relativeproportions, which will be the observers-universe, a coupleduniversal machine (it is another way to view LĂ¶bianity (althoughtechnically it is a bit weaker)).Any universal machine contains in itself a sort of war between*all* universal machines until they recognize themselves.Obviously some universal machines get more famous than other,apparently, like ... well arithmetic, combinators, but also, inrelation with the observable reality, quantum computers.It makes comp testable, or at least the definition of observer,believer, knower used in the derivation of physics, and here Iprovide only the propositional physical theory (and even somechoice as different quantum logics appears in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*,the logic of the material hypostases, in Plotinus terms).All of that is a theoretical explanation, that supposes thatsince arithmetic is all that is needed to encode all of theinformation and representations, but this is just an explanation,nothing more.?Until we can derive phenomenology that can be tested, we have onlya hypothesis or conjecture.Of course. That is trivially the case for all theories in science.Up to now, it is confirmed (and even illustrated, by Everett) andit will remain like that up to the possible refutation.I think it is more than an explanation. It is the simplestexplanation.My proposal is that, following Pratt's suggestion, we consider thearithmetic to be equivalent to a Boolean algebra and its evolutionis "the computation" of the UD. That way we do not have a bodyproblem, since the dual of the Boolean algebra, the topologicalspace, is the body whose evolution is physics.But if you don't have a body problem, how will you ever explainselectron appearances and black hole.That is for people that understand the math to explain, althoughI have a few non-quantitative ideas about black holes...

`Not at all. It is to the philosophers to explain that the math cannot`

`solve the conceptual problem, as explaiend by the UDA. You *have`

`to*explain the body with invoking a body theory. You still miss the`

`main point, I'm afraid, or you get it and then forget it, repeatedly,`

`apparently.`

The body problem is what makes comp interesting, as it provides aconceptual explanation of the origin of the physical reality. Thesolution of the problem is an entire explanation of physics,without having to postulate matter, observers or gods or substances.Yes, I agree.

? As I said. (That is the whole point).

With comp, trying to singularize consciousness with a particularuniversal machine (a physical reality), is like a move to selecta branch in a wave of realities, and can be seen as a form ofcosmical solipsism negating consciousness for vast span ofarithmetical truth, just because those realities are onlyindirectly accessible, by looking below ours substitution level.But solipsism is not the absence of consciousness, it is theinability of one 1p to bet on the existence of the possiblecontent of other 1p.Don't confuse the "solipsism" as-doctrine, which is that others does not exist (and so theirappearances are indeed not conscious, as they don't exist). And as-mental state. The 1p is practically solipsist as he can beconscious only of its own state, not of the state of someone else,so the consciousness of another is a bet. It is a theory, very old,because it is implemented in hard by known neural pathway (forempathy). Spiders already have such pathways.Yes. Solipsism, for me, is the inability to interact with anymind other than some version of one's own.

?

`you can't change the definition. Solipsism is the doctrine that there`

`is only one conscious person: you. It makes me into a zombie. But a`

`solipsist can of course acts with the mind of another person. He just`

`denies that fact.`

I have translated a part of the "philosophical" mind-body problemin mathematics (and partially solve it).Sure, but your claims of an immaterial monism worry me. It isas if you have resurected Berkeley's Idealism in a formalmathematical model and dismissed the attack by Mr. Johnson (whofamously rebounded his foot from a rock and yelled 'I refute itthus.') as "an arithmetic body problem".This is ridiculous. The body problem is given by UDA. If comp iscorrect the physical laws do emerge from a statistics oncomputations. This has nothing to do with Johnson's attack onBerkeley, which is far easier to solve (assuming comp) by the factthat rocks can kick back in dreams.And comp save all this from idealism, as arithmetic is accepted asbeing a set of truth independent of the humans or aliens.I don't see why you worry as it is a form of neutral monism. But itis also a scientific theory that you can explain to a 14 years old.I mean like in any real theory: the cards are all on the table.BrunoYou seem to not understand the problem as philosopher's see it.It's OK, you are a formal logician and you think that way. We allsee the world in our own way.

`That's too easy. Stephen. And non sensical in the interdisciplinary`

`field. It is a way of defending an absence of a theory by a an absence`

`of an argument. That's the sort of trick which makes some scientists`

`despising philosophy. All sub-domain of a field can be explained to`

`any 14 years old (patient and motivated enough).`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.