On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:48, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/25/2012 10:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Oct 2012, at 20:29, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/24/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Oct 2012, at 06:03, Stephen P. King wrote:

What difference does what they refer to matter? Eventually there has to be some physical process or we would be incapable of even thinking about them! The resources to perform the computation are either available or they are not. Seriously, why are you over complicating the idea?

Let us be clear. For humans to be able to think, not only you need a physical process, but you need a solar system, a planet, ... many things, including much resources.

Dear Bruno,

Sure, but that only is about explanations of the physical systems involved. But let me ask you, given that there is a 1p for each and every observer, does it not follow that there should be a bundle of computations for each and one?

That's the case.

Hi Bruno,

OK, do you have something that acts as a primitive unit of action for the bundles or do you merely use the ordering of integers to imply an action?

The ordering is not enough. I use the entire turing universal machinery, which happens to be given by addition and multiplication.

There would be a great deal of overlap between them (as that would be equivalent to the commonality of the experienciable content of the observers). The point is that the computation is not of a single object in a world. We have to consider computational simulations of entire universes!

If that makes sense, consider them as particular dreams.

Sure, but note that this "dream aspect" makes them strictly 1p. Yes?

Yes. But their reason can involves (and do involve) infinities of 3p relations. They are strictly 1p, but still supervening on 3p relations. If this is judged impossible, then there is no more reason to say "yes" to a digitalist doctor.

Don't forget that computability, and computations, are the only epistemological, or factual notion admitting a very solid mathematical definition. "universe" for me is a very vague term, like God, we can't use it as an explanation. It is what I would like an explanation for.

A universe is the same as is used in set theory, a total and complete collection that does not leave anything out that might need to be included.

OK? But sets are conceptually richer than computation. Sets are, in comp, already mind constructs by number, to put some light on the complex relations. In fact here you are describing what is a model, and I am OK with the use of them, but not with the idea of putting them in the basic starting ontology.

But, ...

... for the couple [thinking humans===== Earth, solar-system- physical process-resource] you need only arithmetic.

A bit like in Everett the couple [physician's sad consciousness in front of a collapsed wave===== a dead Schroedinger cat] you need only the universal quantum wave.

Just that once we assume comp "enough consciously", if I can say, the universal wave itself, if correct for observation, has to be retrieved from a larger statistics, on all computations, going through our local computational states.

Literally, the laws of physics are invariant from the choice of the physical basic laws, as long as they are at least Turing universal (synonym important for AUDA: Sigma_1 complete).

I am not sure what this means: "laws of physics are invariant from the choice of the physical basic laws". Could you explain this more?

It means that the laws of physics does not depend on the choice of the theory for the primitive elements. You can take as ontology the digital plane, and as primitive element the GOL patterns, or just a universal one, or you can take the numbers with addition and multiplication, or you can take QM, or you can take the FORTRAN programs, etc.

Does this not make the "physical laws" very vague? For example, should we expect some prediction of the type of transformation group that best represents our conservation laws? Are Lie groups predicted?

Everything physical and lawful. I can bet on Lie Group, yes, and the elementary particles or strings, the quantum wave aspects, and the "ultimate hamiltonian" which might plasuibly describe a sort of vaccum, ding some quantum universal dovetaling.

The worst is that the prime numbers seems to do already that, and I worry that the number theorists might find the correct theoretical physics before the theologian, as that could mean that we will have to wait for another millennium before getting serious on qualia and afterlife questions.

With comp, in each case you will have to derive consciousness/ physics from all the relations those primitive elements have, and comp guaranty you will converge on the same "reality from inside".

If you want with comp, if you choose QM, you are just cheating, as you copy on the universe, so to speak. And then you lack the qualia. But comp says that the qunata and tha qualia are in your head, or in the head of any Universal machine, so that we can program a machine to look in its head and compare the universe and what the machine finds, to evaluate comp.

Then just below I give you two choices of TOE:

Literally: very elementary arithmetic is a good TOE:

x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)

 x *0 = 0
 x*s(y) = x*y + x

It is in *that* theory, that we have now to define the notion of observers, believers, knowers, experiencers, experimentalists, and formulate a part of the "measure problem". Mathematically, we can test the first person limiting observation by the person "incarnated by the genuine computation" in arithmetic.

Another TOE:

((K, x), y) = x
(((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z))

It operates on the combinators, and the combinators are K or S, or (x, y) with x and y combinators. So (K, K), (K, (K, S)), ((K, K) K), etc are combinators.

What they do? They obeys the laws above.

Those defines Turing universal realities, and they will emulate/ define other universal realities, in the same relative proportions, which will be the observers-universe, a coupled universal machine (it is another way to view Löbianity (although technically it is a bit weaker)).

Any universal machine contains in itself a sort of war between *all* universal machines until they recognize themselves.

Obviously some universal machines get more famous than other, apparently, like ... well arithmetic, combinators, but also, in relation with the observable reality, quantum computers.

It makes comp testable, or at least the definition of observer, believer, knower used in the derivation of physics, and here I provide only the propositional physical theory (and even some choice as different quantum logics appears in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*, the logic of the material hypostases, in Plotinus terms).

All of that is a theoretical explanation, that supposes that since arithmetic is all that is needed to encode all of the information and representations, but this is just an explanation, nothing more.


Until we can derive phenomenology that can be tested, we have only a hypothesis or conjecture.

Of course. That is trivially the case for all theories in science. Up to now, it is confirmed (and even illustrated, by Everett) and it will remain like that up to the possible refutation. I think it is more than an explanation. It is the simplest explanation.

My proposal is that, following Pratt's suggestion, we consider the arithmetic to be equivalent to a Boolean algebra and its evolution is "the computation" of the UD. That way we do not have a body problem, since the dual of the Boolean algebra, the topological space, is the body whose evolution is physics.

But if you don't have a body problem, how will you ever explains electron appearances and black hole.

That is for people that understand the math to explain, although I have a few non-quantitative ideas about black holes...

Not at all. It is to the philosophers to explain that the math cannot solve the conceptual problem, as explaiend by the UDA. You *have to*explain the body with invoking a body theory. You still miss the main point, I'm afraid, or you get it and then forget it, repeatedly, apparently.

The body problem is what makes comp interesting, as it provides a conceptual explanation of the origin of the physical reality. The solution of the problem is an entire explanation of physics, without having to postulate matter, observers or gods or substances.

    Yes, I agree.

As I said. (That is the whole point).

With comp, trying to singularize consciousness with a particular universal machine (a physical reality), is like a move to select a branch in a wave of realities, and can be seen as a form of cosmical solipsism negating consciousness for vast span of arithmetical truth, just because those realities are only indirectly accessible, by looking below ours substitution level.

But solipsism is not the absence of consciousness, it is the inability of one 1p to bet on the existence of the possible content of other 1p.

Don't confuse the "solipsism" as

-doctrine, which is that others does not exist (and so their appearances are indeed not conscious, as they don't exist). And as

-mental state. The 1p is practically solipsist as he can be conscious only of its own state, not of the state of someone else, so the consciousness of another is a bet. It is a theory, very old, because it is implemented in hard by known neural pathway (for empathy). Spiders already have such pathways.

Yes. Solipsism, for me, is the inability to interact with any mind other than some version of one's own.

you can't change the definition. Solipsism is the doctrine that there is only one conscious person: you. It makes me into a zombie. But a solipsist can of course acts with the mind of another person. He just denies that fact.

I have translated a part of the "philosophical" mind-body problem in mathematics (and partially solve it).

Sure, but your claims of an immaterial monism worry me. It is as if you have resurected Berkeley's Idealism in a formal mathematical model and dismissed the attack by Mr. Johnson (who famously rebounded his foot from a rock and yelled 'I refute it thus.') as "an arithmetic body problem".

This is ridiculous. The body problem is given by UDA. If comp is correct the physical laws do emerge from a statistics on computations. This has nothing to do with Johnson's attack on Berkeley, which is far easier to solve (assuming comp) by the fact that rocks can kick back in dreams.

And comp save all this from idealism, as arithmetic is accepted as being a set of truth independent of the humans or aliens.

I don't see why you worry as it is a form of neutral monism. But it is also a scientific theory that you can explain to a 14 years old. I mean like in any real theory: the cards are all on the table.


You seem to not understand the problem as philosopher's see it. It's OK, you are a formal logician and you think that way. We all see the world in our own way.

That's too easy. Stephen. And non sensical in the interdisciplinary field. It is a way of defending an absence of a theory by a an absence of an argument. That's the sort of trick which makes some scientists despising philosophy. All sub-domain of a field can be explained to any 14 years old (patient and motivated enough).



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