On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:48, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/25/2012 10:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Oct 2012, at 20:29, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/24/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Oct 2012, at 06:03, Stephen P. King wrote:
What difference does what they refer to matter? Eventually
there has to be some physical process or we would be incapable
of even thinking about them! The resources to perform the
computation are either available or they are not. Seriously, why
are you over complicating the idea?
Let us be clear. For humans to be able to think, not only you
need a physical process, but you need a solar system, a
planet, ... many things, including much resources.
Sure, but that only is about explanations of the physical
systems involved. But let me ask you, given that there is a 1p for
each and every observer, does it not follow that there should be a
bundle of computations for each and one?
That's the case.
OK, do you have something that acts as a primitive unit of
action for the bundles or do you merely use the ordering of integers
to imply an action?
The ordering is not enough. I use the entire turing universal
machinery, which happens to be given by addition and multiplication.
There would be a great deal of overlap between them (as that would
be equivalent to the commonality of the experienciable content of
the observers). The point is that the computation is not of a
single object in a world. We have to consider computational
simulations of entire universes!
If that makes sense, consider them as particular dreams.
Sure, but note that this "dream aspect" makes them strictly 1p.
Yes. But their reason can involves (and do involve) infinities of 3p
relations. They are strictly 1p, but still supervening on 3p
relations. If this is judged impossible, then there is no more reason
to say "yes" to a digitalist doctor.
Don't forget that computability, and computations, are the only
epistemological, or factual notion admitting a very solid
mathematical definition. "universe" for me is a very vague term,
like God, we can't use it as an explanation. It is what I would
like an explanation for.
A universe is the same as is used in set theory, a total and
complete collection that does not leave anything out that might need
to be included.
OK? But sets are conceptually richer than computation. Sets are, in
comp, already mind constructs by number, to put some light on the
complex relations. In fact here you are describing what is a model,
and I am OK with the use of them, but not with the idea of putting
them in the basic starting ontology.
... for the couple [thinking humans===== Earth, solar-system-
physical process-resource] you need only arithmetic.
A bit like in Everett the couple [physician's sad consciousness
in front of a collapsed wave===== a dead Schroedinger cat] you
need only the universal quantum wave.
Just that once we assume comp "enough consciously", if I can say,
the universal wave itself, if correct for observation, has to be
retrieved from a larger statistics, on all computations, going
through our local computational states.
Literally, the laws of physics are invariant from the choice of
the physical basic laws, as long as they are at least Turing
universal (synonym important for AUDA: Sigma_1 complete).
I am not sure what this means: "laws of physics are invariant
from the choice of the physical basic laws". Could you explain
It means that the laws of physics does not depend on the choice of
the theory for the primitive elements. You can take as ontology the
digital plane, and as primitive element the GOL patterns, or just a
universal one, or you can take the numbers with addition and
multiplication, or you can take QM, or you can take the FORTRAN
Does this not make the "physical laws" very vague? For example,
should we expect some prediction of the type of transformation group
that best represents our conservation laws? Are Lie groups predicted?
Everything physical and lawful. I can bet on Lie Group, yes, and the
elementary particles or strings, the quantum wave aspects, and the
"ultimate hamiltonian" which might plasuibly describe a sort of
vaccum, ding some quantum universal dovetaling.
The worst is that the prime numbers seems to do already that, and I
worry that the number theorists might find the correct theoretical
physics before the theologian, as that could mean that we will have to
wait for another millennium before getting serious on qualia and
With comp, in each case you will have to derive consciousness/
physics from all the relations those primitive elements have, and
comp guaranty you will converge on the same "reality from inside".
If you want with comp, if you choose QM, you are just cheating, as
you copy on the universe, so to speak. And then you lack the
qualia. But comp says that the qunata and tha qualia are in your
head, or in the head of any Universal machine, so that we can
program a machine to look in its head and compare the universe and
what the machine finds, to evaluate comp.
Then just below I give you two choices of TOE:
Literally: very elementary arithmetic is a good TOE:
x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)
x *0 = 0
x*s(y) = x*y + x
It is in *that* theory, that we have now to define the notion of
observers, believers, knowers, experiencers, experimentalists,
and formulate a part of the "measure problem". Mathematically,
we can test the first person limiting observation by the person
"incarnated by the genuine computation" in arithmetic.
((K, x), y) = x
(((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z))
It operates on the combinators, and the combinators are K or S,
or (x, y) with x and y combinators. So (K, K), (K, (K, S)), ((K,
K) K), etc are combinators.
What they do? They obeys the laws above.
Those defines Turing universal realities, and they will emulate/
define other universal realities, in the same relative
proportions, which will be the observers-universe, a coupled
universal machine (it is another way to view Löbianity (although
technically it is a bit weaker)).
Any universal machine contains in itself a sort of war between
*all* universal machines until they recognize themselves.
Obviously some universal machines get more famous than other,
apparently, like ... well arithmetic, combinators, but also, in
relation with the observable reality, quantum computers.
It makes comp testable, or at least the definition of observer,
believer, knower used in the derivation of physics, and here I
provide only the propositional physical theory (and even some
choice as different quantum logics appears in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*,
the logic of the material hypostases, in Plotinus terms).
All of that is a theoretical explanation, that supposes that
since arithmetic is all that is needed to encode all of the
information and representations, but this is just an explanation,
Until we can derive phenomenology that can be tested, we have only
a hypothesis or conjecture.
Of course. That is trivially the case for all theories in science.
Up to now, it is confirmed (and even illustrated, by Everett) and
it will remain like that up to the possible refutation.
I think it is more than an explanation. It is the simplest
My proposal is that, following Pratt's suggestion, we consider the
arithmetic to be equivalent to a Boolean algebra and its evolution
is "the computation" of the UD. That way we do not have a body
problem, since the dual of the Boolean algebra, the topological
space, is the body whose evolution is physics.
But if you don't have a body problem, how will you ever explains
electron appearances and black hole.
That is for people that understand the math to explain, although
I have a few non-quantitative ideas about black holes...
Not at all. It is to the philosophers to explain that the math cannot
solve the conceptual problem, as explaiend by the UDA. You *have
to*explain the body with invoking a body theory. You still miss the
main point, I'm afraid, or you get it and then forget it, repeatedly,
The body problem is what makes comp interesting, as it provides a
conceptual explanation of the origin of the physical reality. The
solution of the problem is an entire explanation of physics,
without having to postulate matter, observers or gods or substances.
Yes, I agree.
As I said. (That is the whole point).
With comp, trying to singularize consciousness with a particular
universal machine (a physical reality), is like a move to select
a branch in a wave of realities, and can be seen as a form of
cosmical solipsism negating consciousness for vast span of
arithmetical truth, just because those realities are only
indirectly accessible, by looking below ours substitution level.
But solipsism is not the absence of consciousness, it is the
inability of one 1p to bet on the existence of the possible
content of other 1p.
Don't confuse the "solipsism" as
-doctrine, which is that others does not exist (and so their
appearances are indeed not conscious, as they don't exist). And as
-mental state. The 1p is practically solipsist as he can be
conscious only of its own state, not of the state of someone else,
so the consciousness of another is a bet. It is a theory, very old,
because it is implemented in hard by known neural pathway (for
empathy). Spiders already have such pathways.
Yes. Solipsism, for me, is the inability to interact with any
mind other than some version of one's own.
you can't change the definition. Solipsism is the doctrine that there
is only one conscious person: you. It makes me into a zombie. But a
solipsist can of course acts with the mind of another person. He just
denies that fact.
You seem to not understand the problem as philosopher's see it.
It's OK, you are a formal logician and you think that way. We all
see the world in our own way.
I have translated a part of the "philosophical" mind-body problem
in mathematics (and partially solve it).
Sure, but your claims of an immaterial monism worry me. It is
as if you have resurected Berkeley's Idealism in a formal
mathematical model and dismissed the attack by Mr. Johnson (who
famously rebounded his foot from a rock and yelled 'I refute it
thus.') as "an arithmetic body problem".
This is ridiculous. The body problem is given by UDA. If comp is
correct the physical laws do emerge from a statistics on
computations. This has nothing to do with Johnson's attack on
Berkeley, which is far easier to solve (assuming comp) by the fact
that rocks can kick back in dreams.
And comp save all this from idealism, as arithmetic is accepted as
being a set of truth independent of the humans or aliens.
I don't see why you worry as it is a form of neutral monism. But it
is also a scientific theory that you can explain to a 14 years old.
I mean like in any real theory: the cards are all on the table.
That's too easy. Stephen. And non sensical in the interdisciplinary
field. It is a way of defending an absence of a theory by a an absence
of an argument. That's the sort of trick which makes some scientists
despising philosophy. All sub-domain of a field can be explained to
any 14 years old (patient and motivated enough).
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