On 10/25/2012 10:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Oct 2012, at 20:29, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/24/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Oct 2012, at 06:03, Stephen P. King wrote:
What difference does what they refer to matter? Eventually there
has to be some physical process or we would be incapable of even
thinking about them! The resources to perform the computation are
either available or they are not. Seriously, why are you over
complicating the idea?
Let us be clear. For humans to be able to think, not only you need a
physical process, but you need a solar system, a planet, ... many
things, including much resources.
Dear Bruno,
Sure, but that only is about explanations of the physical systems
involved. But let me ask you, given that there is a 1p for each and
every observer, does it not follow that there should be a bundle of
computations for each and one?
That's the case.
Hi Bruno,
OK, do you have something that acts as a primitive unit of action
for the bundles or do you merely use the ordering of integers to imply
an action?
There would be a great deal of overlap between them (as that would be
equivalent to the commonality of the experienciable content of the
observers). The point is that the computation is not of a single
object in a world. We have to consider computational simulations of
entire universes!
If that makes sense, consider them as particular dreams.
Sure, but note that this "dream aspect" makes them strictly 1p. Yes?
Don't forget that computability, and computations, are the only
epistemological, or factual notion admitting a very solid mathematical
definition. "universe" for me is a very vague term, like God, we can't
use it as an explanation. It is what I would like an explanation for.
A universe is the same as is used in set theory, a total and
complete collection that does not leave anything out that might need to
be included.
But, ...
... for the couple [thinking humans===== Earth,
solar-system-physical process-resource] you need only arithmetic.
A bit like in Everett the couple [physician's sad consciousness in
front of a collapsed wave===== a dead Schroedinger cat] you need
only the universal quantum wave.
Just that once we assume comp "enough consciously", if I can say,
the universal wave itself, if correct for observation, has to be
retrieved from a larger statistics, on all computations, going
through our local computational states.
Literally, the laws of physics are invariant from the choice of the
physical basic laws, as long as they are at least Turing universal
(synonym important for AUDA: Sigma_1 complete).
I am not sure what this means: "laws of physics are invariant
from the choice of the physical basic laws". Could you explain this more?
It means that the laws of physics does not depend on the choice of the
theory for the primitive elements. You can take as ontology the
digital plane, and as primitive element the GOL patterns, or just a
universal one, or you can take the numbers with addition and
multiplication, or you can take QM, or you can take the FORTRAN
programs, etc.
Does this not make the "physical laws" very vague? For example,
should we expect some prediction of the type of transformation group
that best represents our conservation laws? Are Lie groups predicted?
With comp, in each case you will have to derive consciousness/physics
from all the relations those primitive elements have, and comp
guaranty you will converge on the same "reality from inside".
If you want with comp, if you choose QM, you are just cheating, as you
copy on the universe, so to speak. And then you lack the qualia. But
comp says that the qunata and tha qualia are in your head, or in the
head of any Universal machine, so that we can program a machine to
look in its head and compare the universe and what the machine finds,
to evaluate comp.
Then just below I give you two choices of TOE:
Literally: very elementary arithmetic is a good TOE:
x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)
x *0 = 0
x*s(y) = x*y + x
It is in *that* theory, that we have now to define the notion of
observers, believers, knowers, experiencers, experimentalists, and
formulate a part of the "measure problem". Mathematically, we can
test the first person limiting observation by the person "incarnated
by the genuine computation" in arithmetic.
Another TOE:
((K, x), y) = x
(((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z))
It operates on the combinators, and the combinators are K or S, or
(x, y) with x and y combinators. So (K, K), (K, (K, S)), ((K, K) K),
etc are combinators.
What they do? They obeys the laws above.
Those defines Turing universal realities, and they will
emulate/define other universal realities, in the same relative
proportions, which will be the observers-universe, a coupled
universal machine (it is another way to view Löbianity (although
technically it is a bit weaker)).
Any universal machine contains in itself a sort of war between *all*
universal machines until they recognize themselves.
Obviously some universal machines get more famous than other,
apparently, like ... well arithmetic, combinators, but also, in
relation with the observable reality, quantum computers.
It makes comp testable, or at least the definition of observer,
believer, knower used in the derivation of physics, and here I
provide only the propositional physical theory (and even some choice
as different quantum logics appears in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*, the logic
of the material hypostases, in Plotinus terms).
All of that is a theoretical explanation, that supposes that
since arithmetic is all that is needed to encode all of the
information and representations, but this is just an explanation,
nothing more.
?
Until we can derive phenomenology that can be tested, we have only a
hypothesis or conjecture.
Of course. That is trivially the case for all theories in science. Up
to now, it is confirmed (and even illustrated, by Everett) and it will
remain like that up to the possible refutation.
I think it is more than an explanation. It is the simplest explanation.
My proposal is that, following Pratt's suggestion, we consider the
arithmetic to be equivalent to a Boolean algebra and its evolution is
"the computation" of the UD. That way we do not have a body problem,
since the dual of the Boolean algebra, the topological space, is the
body whose evolution is physics.
But if you don't have a body problem, how will you ever explains
electron appearances and black hole.
That is for people that understand the math to explain, although I
have a few non-quantitative ideas about black holes...
The body problem is what makes comp interesting, as it provides a
conceptual explanation of the origin of the physical reality. The
solution of the problem is an entire explanation of physics, without
having to postulate matter, observers or gods or substances.
Yes, I agree.
With comp, trying to singularize consciousness with a particular
universal machine (a physical reality), is like a move to select a
branch in a wave of realities, and can be seen as a form of cosmical
solipsism negating consciousness for vast span of arithmetical
truth, just because those realities are only indirectly accessible,
by looking below ours substitution level.
But solipsism is not the absence of consciousness, it is the
inability of one 1p to bet on the existence of the possible content
of other 1p.
Don't confuse the "solipsism" as
-doctrine, which is that others does not exist (and so their
appearances are indeed not conscious, as they don't exist). And as
-mental state. The 1p is practically solipsist as he can be conscious
only of its own state, not of the state of someone else, so the
consciousness of another is a bet. It is a theory, very old, because
it is implemented in hard by known neural pathway (for empathy).
Spiders already have such pathways.
Yes. Solipsism, for me, is the inability to interact with any mind
other than some version of one's own.
I have translated a part of the "philosophical" mind-body problem in
mathematics (and partially solve it).
Sure, but your claims of an immaterial monism worry me. It is as
if you have resurected Berkeley's Idealism in a formal mathematical
model and dismissed the attack by Mr. Johnson (who famously rebounded
his foot from a rock and yelled 'I refute it thus.') as "an
arithmetic body problem".
This is ridiculous. The body problem is given by UDA. If comp is
correct the physical laws do emerge from a statistics on computations.
This has nothing to do with Johnson's attack on Berkeley, which is far
easier to solve (assuming comp) by the fact that rocks can kick back
in dreams.
And comp save all this from idealism, as arithmetic is accepted as
being a set of truth independent of the humans or aliens.
I don't see why you worry as it is a form of neutral monism. But it is
also a scientific theory that you can explain to a 14 years old. I
mean like in any real theory: the cards are all on the table.
Bruno
You seem to not understand the problem as philosopher's see it.
It's OK, you are a formal logician and you think that way. We all see
the world in our own way.
--
Onward!
Stephen
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