On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/26/2012 5:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Oct 2012, at 07:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/24/2012 9:23 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Or what if we don't care? We don't care about slaughtering
cattle, which are pretty smart
as computers go. We manage not to think about starving children
in Africa, and they *are*
humans. And we ignore the looming disasters of oil depletion,
water pollution, and global
warming which will beset humans who are our children.
Sure, yeah I wouldn't expect mainstream society to care, except
maybe for some people, I am mainly focused on what seems to be
like an astronomically unlikely prospect that we will someday
find it possible to make a person out of a program, but won't be
able to just make the program itself and no person attached.
Right. John McCarthy (inventor of LISP) worried and wrote about
that problem decades ago. He cautioned that we should not make
robots conscious with emotions like humans because then it would
be unethical use them like robots.
I doubt we will have any choice in the matter. I think that
intelligence is a purely emotional state,
I don't know what a 'purely emotional' state would be? One with
affect but not content?
It has an implicit content, like a sort of acceptation to die or be
defeated. Stupidity usually denies this, unconsciously. The emotion
involved is a kind of fear related with the existence/non-existence
apprehension.
Anyone can become intelligent in one second, or stupid in one second,
and intelligence is what can change the competence, there is a sort of
derivative relation between competence and intelligence.
and that we can't separate it from the other emotion. They will be
conscious and have emotions, for economical reasons only. Not human
emotion, but humans' slave emotions.
Isn't that what I said McCarthy warned about. If we make a robot
too intelligent, e.g. human like intelligence, it will necessarily
have feelings that we should ethically take into account.
Yes.
And then there is Minski warning, which is that we must be happy if
the machine will still use us as pets.
I don't think we will be able to control anything about this. Like
with drugs, prohibition will always accelerate the things, with less
control, in the underground.
No reason to worry, it will take some time, in our branches of
histories.
Especially given that we have never made a computer program that
can do anything whatsoever other than reconfigure whatever
materials are able to execute the program, I find it implausible
that there will be a magical line of code which cannot be
executed without an experience happening to someone.
So it's a non-problem for you. You think that only man-born-of-
woman or wetware can be conscious and have qualia. Or are you
concerned that we are inadvertently offending atoms all the time?
No matter how hard we try, we can never just make a drawing of
these functions just to check our math without
invoking the power of life and death. It's really silly. It's not
even good Sci-Fi, it's just too lame.
I think we can, because although I like Bruno's theory I think the
MGA is wrong, or at least incomplete.
OK. Thanks for making this clear. What is missing?
I think the simulated intelligence needs a simulated environment,
essentially another world, in which to *be* intelligent.
But in arithmetic you have all simulation possible. The UD for
example does simulate all the solutions of QM+GR, despite the "real
QM+GR" emerges from all computations. So you have the simulated in
their simulated environment (and we have to explain why something
like GR+QM win the "universal machines battle".
I agree. But the MGA is used in a misleading way to imply that the
environment is merely physics and isn't needed, whereas I think it
actually implies that all (or a lot) of physics is needed and must
be part of the simulation. This related to Saibal's view that the
all the counterfactuals are present in the wf of the universe.
But it is present in arithmetic too, and we have to explain the
apparent physics from that. I am not sure where MGA is misused, as the
whole thing insist that physics must be present, and yet that we
cannot postulate it as far as the goal is to solve the mind body
problem (and not taking vacation in Spain, or doing a cup of coffee).
Bruno
Brent
And that's where your chalk board consciousness fails. It needs
to be able to interact within a chalkboard world. So it's not
just a question of going to a low enough level, it's also a
question of going to a high enough level.
OK (as a rely to Craig's point).
Bruno
Brent
The person I was when I was 3 years old is dead. He died because
too much new information was added to his brain.
-- Saibal Mitra
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-
[email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
