2012/10/30 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> > On 10/30/2012 2:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> > >> On 10/30/2012 1:43 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> >> >>> On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>> On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems >>> apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to >>> numbers themselves. >>> >>> >>> Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some >>> machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. >>> >>> >>> So your are agreeing? "Two" has no truth value, but "Two equals one >>> plus one." does. >>> >>> >>> Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. >>> But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that >>> the truth of, say "Two equals one plus one." depend on some numbers or >>> subject having to discover it, or prove it. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> Dear Bruno, >>> >>> My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological >>> primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A >>> statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully >>> to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities >>> that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the >>> ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable >>> of "understanding" the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that >>> the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning >>> and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities >>> capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! >>> You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. >>> >> >> Hmm... but that's what arithmetical realism is all about... If you deny >> meaning to '17 is prime' absent an entity which gives to it its meaning... >> then you're simply negating arithmetical realism and with it >> computationalism (ie: consciousness is emulable qua computatio). >> >> Quentin >> >> Hi Quentin, >> >> Well, therefore I must reject arithmetical realism as "unreal" by >> definition! Individual entities are incapable of "giving meaning" to >> things, be they puppies or prime numbers. It requires an *agreement between >> many entities* to have meaningfulness. I claim that it takes at least three >> entities... >> >> If objects that are proposed to be "real" are not observable by >> anyone then they don't exist! Where am I going off the rails? I think that >> the problem here is that the distinction between "not observable by any >> particular entity" and "not observable by any entity" are being confused. I >> am reminded of Einstein's silly quip about the Moon still existing even if >> he was not looking at it. The poor old fellow neglected to notice that he >> was not the only entity that was capable of being affected by the presence >> or non-presence of the Moon! >> >> You might have seen my definition of Reality. Do you recall it? >> > > > So in your view, no humans (no consciouness) implies... 17 is prime or not > is not meaningful ? Only consciousness gives meaning to thing... yet it > seems absurd that truth value would disappear without consciousness. > > Quentin > > > Unless multiple entities can agree that the sequence of symbols "17 is > prime" is an indicator of some particular mathematical object and one of > its particular properties, then how does "17 is prime" come to mean > anything at all? Can you stop subconsciously assuming an invisible observer > whose sole job is to observe everything from infinity? It seems that you > cannot if what I am writing is mysterious to you! > How is it not absurd that meaningfulness exists in the absence of > anyone that can apprehend it? Please note that I am not considering the > absence of any one entity; I am considering the absence of all possible > entities in the degenerativeness or vanishing of meaningfulness. I am > asking "Why is it OK to think that meaningfulness exists in the absence of > any means to determine it?". > > Well what you're explaining just feels like the egg and the chicken... meaning is an internal view, if computationalism is true, observer and meaning arise through computation... computation would be ontologically real and primitive.
Quentin > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.