On 10/30/2012 11:22 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/30/2012 2:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2012/10/30 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net 
<mailto:stephe...@charter.net>>

    On 10/30/2012 1:43 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


    2012/10/30 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net 
<mailto:stephe...@charter.net>>

        On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

        On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote:

        On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
        My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply
        only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers
        themselves.

        Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some
        machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense.

        So your are agreeing?  "Two" has no truth value, but "Two equals one 
plus
        one." does.

        Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot.
        But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert 
that the
        truth of, say  "Two equals one plus one." depend on some numbers or 
subject
        having to discover it, or prove it.

        Bruno

        http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>


        Dear Bruno,

            My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological
        primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A
        statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said 
truthfully to
        have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities 
that
        can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the 
ability to
        judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of
        "understanding" the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that 
the
        statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning 
and is
        true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of
        judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness!
           You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow.


    Hmm... but that's what arithmetical realism is all about... If you deny 
meaning to
    '17 is prime' absent an entity which gives to it its meaning... then you're 
simply
    negating arithmetical realism and with it computationalism (ie: 
consciousness is
    emulable qua computatio).

    Quentin

    Hi Quentin,

        Well, therefore I must reject arithmetical realism as "unreal" by 
definition!
    Individual entities are incapable of "giving meaning" to things, be they 
puppies or
    prime numbers. It requires an *agreement between many entities* to have
    meaningfulness. I claim that it takes at least three entities...

         If objects that are proposed to be "real" are not observable by anyone 
then
    they don't exist! Where am I going off the rails? I think that the problem 
here is
    that the distinction between "not observable by any particular entity" and 
"not
    observable by any entity" are being confused. I am reminded of Einstein's 
silly
    quip about the Moon still existing even if he was not looking at it. The 
poor old
    fellow neglected to notice that he was not the only entity that was capable 
of
    being affected by the presence or non-presence of the Moon!

        You might have seen my definition of Reality. Do you recall it?



So in your view, no humans (no consciouness) implies... 17 is prime or not is not meaningful ? Only consciousness gives meaning to thing... yet it seems absurd that truth value would disappear without consciousness.

Quentin

Unless multiple entities can agree that the sequence of symbols "17 is prime" is an indicator of some particular mathematical object and one of its particular properties, then how does "17 is prime" come to mean anything at all?

I agree with that. But you're talking about the tokens "17 is prime" not the concept that 17 is prime. Could not a person who grew up alone on an island realize that 17 has no divisors, and he could even invent a private language in which he could write down Peano's axioms.

Brent

Can you stop subconsciously assuming an invisible observer whose sole job is to observe everything from infinity? It seems that you cannot if what I am writing is mysterious to you! How is it not absurd that meaningfulness exists in the absence of anyone that can apprehend it? Please note that I am not considering the absence of any one entity; I am considering the absence of all possible entities in the degenerativeness or vanishing of meaningfulness. I am asking "Why is it OK to think that meaningfulness exists in the absence of any means to determine it?".


--
Onward!

Stephen
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to