2012/10/30 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> > On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: > > On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply > only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers > themselves. > > > Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some > machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. > > > So your are agreeing? "Two" has no truth value, but "Two equals one plus > one." does. > > > Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. > But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that > the truth of, say "Two equals one plus one." depend on some numbers or > subject having to discover it, or prove it. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > Dear Bruno, > > My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological > primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A > statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully > to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities > that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the > ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable > of "understanding" the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that > the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning > and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities > capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! > You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. >
Hmm... but that's what arithmetical realism is all about... If you deny meaning to '17 is prime' absent an entity which gives to it its meaning... then you're simply negating arithmetical realism and with it computationalism (ie: consciousness is emulable qua computatio). Quentin > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.