2012/10/30 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>

>  On 10/30/2012 1:43 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
>
>>  On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>  On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>  On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>  My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply
>> only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers
>> themselves.
>>
>>
>>  Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some
>> machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense.
>>
>>
>> So your are agreeing?  "Two" has no truth value, but "Two equals one plus
>> one." does.
>>
>>
>>  Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot.
>> But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that
>> the truth of, say  "Two equals one plus one." depend on some numbers or
>> subject having to discover it, or prove it.
>>
>>  Bruno
>>
>>    http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>   Dear Bruno,
>>
>>     My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological
>> primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A
>> statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully
>> to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities
>> that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the
>> ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable
>> of "understanding" the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that
>> the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning
>> and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities
>> capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness!
>>    You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow.
>>
>
> Hmm... but that's what arithmetical realism is all about... If you deny
> meaning to '17 is prime' absent an entity which gives to it its meaning...
> then you're simply negating arithmetical realism and with it
> computationalism (ie: consciousness is emulable qua computatio).
>
> Quentin
>
>  Hi Quentin,
>
>     Well, therefore I must reject arithmetical realism as "unreal" by
> definition! Individual entities are incapable of "giving meaning" to
> things, be they puppies or prime numbers. It requires an *agreement between
> many entities* to have meaningfulness. I claim that it takes at least three
> entities...
>
>      If objects that are proposed to be "real" are not observable by
> anyone then they don't exist! Where am I going off the rails? I think that
> the problem here is that the distinction between "not observable by any
> particular entity" and "not observable by any entity" are being confused. I
> am reminded of Einstein's silly quip about the Moon still existing even if
> he was not looking at it. The poor old fellow neglected to notice that he
> was not the only entity that was capable of being affected by the presence
> or non-presence of the Moon!
>
>     You might have seen my definition of Reality. Do you recall it?
>


So in your view, no humans (no consciouness) implies... 17 is prime or not
is not meaningful ? Only consciousness gives meaning to thing... yet it
seems absurd that truth value would disappear without consciousness.

Quentin

> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
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