On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
> Hi Craig Weinberg 
> The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take 
> them too seriously. 
> But keep in mind: 
> IMHO all of those dualist positions are not logically valid. 
> Instead, they are phoney attempts to get around the unresolveable 
> issue that mind and body are completely contrary substances, 
> and calling them a dualism is just a handy cover-up of the problem. 
> Only Leibniz can claim philosophical verity by treating boith 
> body and mind as mind (idealism). Materialist monists 
> hold that mind is physical, which is nonsense, 
> and the dualist coverup doesn't solve that absurdity. 

My model solves that. Leibniz (and his philosophy isn't the only form of 
idealism) was on the right track, but I take it further to say that what we 
call mind is descended from lesser forms of sensitivity and greater forms 
of intuition, and that in fact the symmetry itself between private time and 
public space is the dual aspect neutral monism (I call sense, or signal) 
which gives rise to both. This establishes that dualism is a shorthand 
reduction of what is actually an involuted monism (like a Mobius strip) 
which extends ever deeper into literal public surfaces and private 
figurative depths.

Dualism doesn't go far enough. It should not only be taken seriously, it 
should be taken as the supreme absolute. The capacity for discernment is 
what the cosmos is made of. It is subject and object. It is what feels and 
thinks as well as what is felt and thought about.


> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:> 
> 11/5/2012   
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> ----- Receiving the following content -----   
> From: Craig Weinberg   
> Receiver: everything-list   
> Time: 2012-11-02, 08:05:41 
> Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p 
> On Friday, November 2, 2012 8:18:29 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: 
> On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 2:51 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 
> But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it.   
> So what? I can't shoot a gun unless the trigger works. Does that mean I'm 
> not shooting the gun by pulling the trigger? 
> You are external to the gun, but you are not external to your brain unless 
> substance dualism is true. 
> The problem with substance dualism is that it is redundant and has an 
> infinite regress problem connecting the two substances. With dual aspect 
> monism, you don't have those issues so that I can be internal to my brain 
> in some senses, external to my brain in some senses, both internal and 
> external in some senses, and neither internal and external in some senses. 
> Regardless though, even if we said that the sense in which you are 
> literally internal to the brain of this moment also necessarily means that 
> your brain is identical to you. It has to be a two way street.   
> It is completely arbitrary to privilege the spatial-object description of 
> the phenomenon and marginalize the temporal-subject description. It's like 
> saying that a movie exists entirely because there are pixels changing. It 
> is not true. Movies exist because humans make them to tell stories to each 
> other, and the pixels are there to help tell that storytelling.   
> This is the primordial relation of all nature. It gets complicated, and as 
> human beings we are equal parts personal story sequences and impersonal 
> non-story consequences, but nevertheless, it is ultimately the story which 
> is driving the bus. The coin has two sides, but the heads side is the side 
> of the 'genuine leader'. 
> You can't decide to do anything unless your brain goes into the particular 
> configuration consistent with that decision, and the movement into that 
> configuration is determined by physical factors.   
> The movement of the molecules of your brain *is* your decision. That's 
> what I am telling you but you won't see it. You are only able to see it as 
> a one way street which makes no sense. What you are saying is like 'water 
> is ice but ice is not water'. If I feel something when something happens in 
> my brain, then that means that whatever happens in my brain is also an 
> event in the universe when something is felt. That means molecules feel and 
> see. You could say that groups of molecules feel and see, and that's ok 
> too, but you think it's the 'groupiness' that sees and not the physical 
> reality of the molecules themselves. I am saying that there is no 
> independent groupiness... it is a fantasy. Incorrect.   
> That the movement of the molecules of your brain *is* the decision is 
> eliminative materialism, or perhaps epiphenomenalism.   
> No, your view has it upside down. The mindset which generates that view is 
> so absolutely biased that it cannot conceive of turning this simple picture 
> right side up.   
> If something looks like particles moving on the outside but feels like 
> remembering a fishing trip on the inside, that doesn't mean that the memory 
> is the epiphenomenon. The memory is the whole point of the particles. They 
> have nothing else to do sitting in your skull but to provide the grunt work 
> of organizing your access to your own human experiences.   
> It is not eliminative materialism to say that object and subject are the 
> same thing from different views, it is dual aspect monism. When I say 
> 'there are two sides to this coin', your mind keeps responding 'but coins 
> are tails'. He keeps looking at the universe from an external perspective 
> and then projecting that world of objects-within-objects as some kind of 
> explanation of the subject who he actually is. My view is that it cannot 
> work that way. 
> In any case, the behaviour of the molecules is entirely consistent with 
> chemistry. An ion channel opens because it changes conformation due to 
> neurotransmitters binding to it or the transmembrane voltage. Any 
> subjectivity it may have does not enter into the equation. 
> What this means is that molecules as we see them are not the whole story, 
> just as the brain and its actions are not the whole story. We are the other 
> half of the story and we are not made of neurotransmitters or cells any 
> more than a song we make up is our body. Two different ontological schemas. 
> Two opposite schemas twisted orthogonally by the private time to public 
> space juxtaposition. 
> That may be, but the molecules *entirely* determine the behaviour of the 
> brain.   
> When I say the words "bright blue liquid" I have changed the behavior of 
> the molecules of your brain *entirely*. It was not anything but my 
> intention to write these words to you which made that change. Your brain, 
> it's neurons and molecules dutifully *follow* my commands from across the 
> internet with no biochemistry connecting us whatsoever. The reasoning you 
> are using is circular and disconnected from reality. It makes sense, and 
> again I used to believe what you believe for many years, but I understand 
> clearly now why it fails to describe the ordinary reality we experience. 
> If you know chemistry and you know what molecule is where, you know  what 
> chemical reactions will occur, and if you know that you know how the person 
> is going to move. You don't know about the person's subjectivity, but you 
> do know about his behaviour. 
> Your view can't explain how chemistry knows what "bright blue liquid" 
> means and why it cares. Your view can't explain how or why anything 'means' 
> anything. 
> My phone has a one year guarantee, so that it if it fails and can't be 
> repaired Apple will replace it with an identical phone. Are they opening 
> themselves up to legal challenge if this is ontologically impossible? 
> I would imagine that their legal department has defined 'identical' in a 
> commercially feasible way. They can probably send you a phone with similar 
> but not identical parts even. If you look at the serial numbers in your 
> replacement phone, you will readily see that identical is not to be taken 
> absolutely literally. 'Similar enough for you' is what they mean.   
> That is the sort of identity I am interested in if the phone is to be 
> replaced: if it is different in some way I can't detect in normal use I 
> don't care. Similarly if I were to have parts of my body replaced: if I 
> can't tell any difference after a few days, that's good enough for me. 
> You don't care, but the universe does. You cannot be replaced. Parts of 
> you can be removed and what remains of you can learn to use substitutes, 
> but there has to be enough of you left to use anything. You can't amputate 
> your head and replace it with a mannequin and expect 'you' yourself to 
> survive. 
> Craig 
> --   
> Stathis Papaioannou 
> --   
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group. 
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/_YTMxn06OssJ. 
> To post to this group, send email to 
> everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:>. 
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
> everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. 
> For more options, visit this group at 
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to