Re: Re: How can words be transformed into numbers ?

```Hi Bruno Marchal

OK, so it's not numbers alone (pure numbers),
something else is required. At the very minimum that
something else must be intelligence,
the ability to essentially freely make choices of one's own.```
```
Nothing can be done without intelligence.

But if you can do that, what's special about numbers ?
Geometry, such as created network, would make more sense.
Or natural language. or arithmetic functions.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/10/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-09, 14:26:09
Subject: Re: How can words be transformed into numbers ?

On 09 Nov 2012, at 13:41, Roger Clough wrote:

> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> So how would
>
> "I see a cat."
>
> be transformed into numbers ?
>
> Maybe 63 7 89 ?

I am afraid that will not be enough. "I see a cat", to get put in
number, with the 1-I and 3-I of you, you will need to scan your brain
at the correct comp subst level (which exist by comp assumption), and
this when you are looking at a cat.
Then the real 1-I is not in that number, but in all the computation
going through the state described by that number relatively to our
most probable environment. The number can be used to reimplement you
in some computer, and then you will be able to manifest your seeing a
cat to us.

>
> I could do that if I indexed all of the words in Roget's thesaurus,
> but I don't think the numbers would mean anything besides numbers.
> Because the meanings of words come from context -- not only in where
> they are placed in a text but how they arose from culture.
> Language is culture.

You are right.

>
> And in mandarin, three characters placed together might not
> have anything to do with literal meaning. For example, the
> characters for
>
> I touch flowers in vase
>
> can mean
>
>
> Final touch

No problem with this.

Bruno

>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 11/9/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-11-08, 10:36:49
> Subject: Re: Peirce's concept of logical abduction-- a possible
> moneymaker
>
>
> Hi Roger Clough ,
>
> On 08 Nov 2012, at 11:03, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>> Hi Bruno Marchal
>>
>> My principal interest over the years has been to
>> come up with some self-sustaining self-generating
>> method of autopoeisis. That's why I found the I Ching
>> fascinating. It contains sensible links between binary numbers and
>> metaphors.
>>
>> When I look up methods of data mining, all they give is
>> hierarchy diagrams and numbers. How do they link
>> numbers and metaphors or words in general ?
>> Perhaps there is some sort of bayesian scheme to do that.
>>
>> Roget's thesaurus might also be a starting point,
>> since they have words of similar meanings clustered,
>> but where you go from that beats me.
>
> You should perhaps study how works a computer (or a universal number).
> They transforms numbers into words and actions all the time, and this
> in a non metaphorical way. And they can do much more, like referring
> to themselves in the 3p but also in the 1p and other senses. There is
> no more magic than in computer science, imo.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>> 11/8/2012
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> From: Bruno Marchal
>> Receiver: everything-list
>> Time: 2012-11-07, 12:57:14
>> Subject: Re: Peirce's concept of logical abduction-- a possible
>> moneymaker
>>
>>
>> On 07 Nov 2012, at 18:12, Roger Clough wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Bruno Marchal
>>>
>>> Cool. Shows you how little I know.
>>
>>
>>
>> Those things are virtually unknown by most. Computer science is very
>> technical, and the number of publications is explosive, almost an
>> industry. It is also a gold mine, alas, most philosophy curriculum
>> does not have good courses in the field. We separate the human and
>> the
>> exact sciences, which does not help.
>> In science we still kill the diplomats, and this means that science
>> is
>> still run by unconscious (pseudo)-religion, if not simply "the boss
>> is
>> right" theory. Of course the degree of graveness is very variable in
>> time and places.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>>> 11/7/2012
>>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>>
>>>
>>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>>> From: Bruno Marchal
>>> Receiver: everything-list
>>> Time: 2012-11-07, 12:05:11
>>> Subject: Re: Peirce's concept of logical abduction-- a possible
>>> moneymaker
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Hi Roger Clough,
>>>
>>>
>>> Hi Bruno Marchal
>>>
>>> Yes, by new I mean contingent. But Kant, although his examples
>>> are debatable, at least sought a synthetic a priori,
>>> which of course would be a gold mine, or perhaps a stairway
>>> to the divine.
>>>
>>> Pragmatism rejects the idea of there being any
>>> such universals, but I think by abduction strives
>>> to obtain completly new results (if actually new I can't say).
>>> I think that's why Peirce came up with the concept of abduction.
>>> The concept is very seductive to me for its possible
>>> power of discovery of something unknown or new.
>>> If comp could do this, I'd not spend a moment more on
>>> simulating the brain. Such a program might be worth a lot of
>>> money in venues such as AI, the defense industry, medicine
>>> and criminal investigation a la Sherlocki Holmes.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Abduction is just one technic among many to do inductive inference
>>> (predicting theories from fact, synthesizing programs from input-
>>> output sequences, finding explanations from data, etc.).
>>>
>>>
>>> The mathematical theory of inductive inference is a very large
>>> subfield of theoretical computer science and theoretical artificial
>>> Intelligence, or Learning theory. AI is the practice and/or
>>> experimental part of it.
>>>
>>>
>>> Behavioral Comp is the idea that machines can emulate all 3p aspect
>>> of experience and consciousness.
>>> STRONG AI is the thesis that machine can have 1p experience.
>>> COMP is the thesis that *you* are emulable by a computer.
>>>
>>>
>>> Famous theorem in theoretical learning theory:
>>>
>>>
>>> Roughly speaking we measure the "intelligence" (really competence)
>>> by the largeness of the class of computable processes recognized
>>> (explained, inferred) by a machine, or by the number of such classes
>>> (or comobinations).
>>>
>>>
>>> What is *much* more clever than a machine? Answer: two machines. It
>>> is the non union theorem of Blum and Blum. Actually, and in general,
>>> the gap of intelligence is incomputably big.
>>>
>>>
>>> A machine which can change its mind n times is also incomputably
>>> more "clever" than a machine which changes its mind m times, if m <
>>> n. (Case and Smith)
>>>
>>>
>>> A surprising result: a machine which is able to change its mind,
>>> despite he got a correct theory, is again *much more* clever than a
>>> machine which sticks on the correct theory! (Case and Smith).
>>>
>>>
>>> Case & Al. refuted also a form of strict Popperianism. Machines able
>>> to infer irrefutable theories can learn larger classes, and more
>>> classes, of computable process.
>>>
>>>
>>> Most result are, as we could expect, non constructive. No machine
>>> can really construct a machine and prove that such machine is more
>>> clever than herself. But of course machine can do that
>>> serendipitously, and machine can build other hierarchies, close to
>>> form of biological self-extension.
>>>
>>>
>>> References below.
>>>
>>>
>>> Theoretical computer science is a *very* large part of mathematical
>>> logic. With both a deductive and an inference inductive part.
>>>
>>>
>>> Computer are very peculiar objects. They seem close to what you say
>>> about the supreme monads, but the supreme monads are not Gods, they
>>> are only God reflector, or God mirror. God is more like the whole
>>> truth, I mean the whole arithmetical truth, which contains the many
>>> truth concerning many universal numbers and universal relation
>>> between numbers. The monads are windows through which God can take a
>>> look at itself, but the supreme-monads the universal numbers, are
>>> window enough large so that God can begin to "recognize" itself, so
>>> to speak.
>>>
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> BLUM L. & BLUM M., 1975, Toward a Mathematical Theory of Inductive
>>> Inference.
>>> Information and Control 28,.pp. 125-155.
>>>
>>>
>>> CASE J. & SMITH C., 1983, Comparison of Identification Criteria for
>>> Machine Inductive
>>> Inference. In Theoretical Computer Science 25,.pp 193-220.
>>>
>>>
>>> CASE J. & NGO-MANGUELLE S., 1979, Refinements of inductive inference
>>> by Popperian
>>> machines. Tech. Rep., Dept. of Computer Science, State Univ. of New-
>>> York, Buffalo.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abductive_reasoning
>>>
>>>
>>> "Abduction[1] is a form of logical inference that goes from data
>>> description of something to a
>>> hypothesis that accounts for the reliable data and seeks to explain
>>> relevant evidence.
>>> The term was first introduced by the American philosopher Charles
>>> Sanders Peirce (1839?1914) as
>>> "guessing".[2] Peirce said that to abduce a hypothetical explanation
>>> from an observed surprising circumstance
>>> is to surmise that may be true because then would be a matter of
>>> course.[3] Thus, to abduce
>>> from involves determining that is sufficient (or nearly sufficient),
>>> but not necessary, for [b, unclear symbol].
>>>
>>> For example, the lawn is wet. But if it rained last night, then it
>>> would be
>>> unsurprising that the lawn is wet. Therefore, by abductive
>>> reasoning, the
>>> possibility that it rained last night is reasonable. (But note that
>>> Peirce did
>>> not remain convinced that a single logical form covers all
>>> abduction.)[4]
>>> Peirce argues that good abductive reasoning from P to Q involves not
>>> simply
>>> a determination that, e.g., Q is sufficient for P, but also that Q
>>> is among the
>>> most economical explanations for P. Simplification and economy are
>>> what call
>>> for the 'leap' of abduction.[5] In abductive reasoning, unlike in
>>> deductive
>>> reasoning, the premises do not guarantee the conclusion. Abductive
>>> reasoning
>>> can be understood as "inference to the best explanation".[6]
>>> There has been renewed interest in the subject of abduction in the
>>> fields of law,[7] computer science, and artificial intelligence
>>> research.[8] "
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>>> 11/7/2012
>>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>>
>>>
>>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>>> From: Bruno Marchal
>>> Receiver: everything-list
>>> Time: 2012-11-07, 09:07:59
>>> Subject: Re: (mathematical) solipsism
>>>
>>>
>>> On 06 Nov 2012, at 15:30, Roger Clough wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi Bruno Marchal
>>>>
>>>> OK. That's analytic uncertainty.
>>>
>>> Yes indeed. Almost the opposite of the comp indeterminacy. With comp
>>> we get many form of indetermlinacies and uncertainties.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> And analytic deduction cannot really tell us anything new,
>>>> it can only give us a fresh perspective.
>>>
>>> Yes. But nor can a God, or a universe. I am not sure what you mean
>>> by
>>> "new".
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> But a new thing can be created with synthesis
>>>> (intuiition,inference, induction, abduction),
>>>> which is the trick that Einstein performed when
>>>> he showed (very simply) that time is relative.
>>>
>>> OK, but this happens in arithmetic too, even without comp. And more
>>> easily shown with comp.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> This was invented I think, entirely new, not deduced.
>>>
>>> So by new, you mean contingent. But arithmetic is full of many
>>> contingencies. Even many type of very different sort of
>>> contingencies.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I suppose this might be construed as a form of nominalism,
>>>> and if so, realism can be expanded with intuition.
>>>
>>> Tell me what you mean by nominalism, as this term is often used
>>> differently by different people.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>>>> 11/6/2012
>>>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>>>> From: Bruno Marchal
>>>> Receiver: everything-list
>>>> Time: 2012-11-06, 07:48:07
>>>> Subject: Re: (mathematical) solipsism
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:48, Roger Clough wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Bruno Marchal
>>>>>
>>>>> Isn't strong AI just an assumption ?
>>>>
>>>> Yes. Comp too. The existence of the moon also.
>>>>
>>>> The fact that I am conscious, can only be an assumption for you,
>>>> and
>>>> vice versa.
>>>>
>>>> The only thing which is not an assumption is private consciousness.
>>>> All the rest are assumptions.
>>>> Strictly speaking.
>>>>
>>>> Science uses only assumption and develop only *relative*
>>>> certainty. A
>>>> difficulty comes from the fact that the brain wired in us already
>>>> many
>>>> assumptions, which we are not conscious of the hypothetical nature.
>>>> for example some birds assumes that the first things they see
>>>> moving
>>>> after birth is their parent, and we tend to do the same. But having
>>>> parent is of the type "theoretical hypotheses".
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>>>>> 11/5/2012
>>>>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>>>>> From: Bruno Marchal
>>>>> Receiver: everything-list
>>>>> Time: 2012-11-04, 09:43:16
>>>>> Subject: Re: (mathematical) solipsism
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 03 Nov 2012, at 13:00, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> [SPK] In the absence of a means to determine some property, it is
>>>>> incoherent and sometimes inconsistent to claim that the property
>>>>> has
>>>>> some particular value and the absence of all other possible
>>>>> values.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In math this is called (mathematical) solipsism.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Dear Bruno,
>>>>>
>>>>> How is it solipsism? Solipsism is: "Solipsism is the
>>>>> philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist. The
>>>>> term comes from the Latin solus (alone) and ipse (self). Solipsism
>>>>> as an epistemological position holds that knowledge of anything
>>>>> outside one's own mind is unsure. The external world and other
>>>>> minds
>>>>> cannot be known, and might not exist outside the mind. As a
>>>>> metaphysical position, solipsism goes further to the conclusion
>>>>> that
>>>>> the world and other minds do not exist."
>>>>>
>>>>> My point is that numbers, by your notion of AR, are solipsistic
>>>>> as there is literally nothing other than the numbers. I reject AR
>>>>> because of this! Numbers alone cannot do what you propose.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Comp entails Strong AI, which attributes consciousness to
>>>>> machines,
>>>>> and thus to others. You argument is not valid because it beg the
>>>>> question that number (related through the laws of + and *)
>>>>> emulated
>>>>> computation to which comp attribute consciousness. So comp is not
>>>>> solipsism.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This post argues similar to my point:
>>>>> http://mathforum.org/kb/message.jspa?messageID=5944965
>>>>>
>>>>> "Conventional solipsism is a logical philosophy whose underlying
>>>>> views
>>>>> apply equally to mathematical philosophies of neopythagoreanism
>>>>> and
>>>>> neoplatonism as well as mathematical realism and empiricism
>>>>> generally.
>>>>>
>>>>> The well established philosophical principle of solipsism is that
>>>>> only
>>>>> the individual is or can be demonstrated to exist. But the problem
>>>>> is
>>>>> that if this principle were actually demonstrably true it would
>>>>> also
>>>>> make it false because the "truth" established would ipso facto
>>>>> make
>>>>> the principle beyond control of any individual.
>>>>>
>>>>> Nobody really thinks solipsism is true. But the difficulty is no
>>>>> one
>>>>> can prove or disprove the concept because no one can prove the
>>>>> foundations of truth in absolute, necessary, and universal terms."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This article
>>>>> http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=philo
>>>>>
>>>>> argues against the claim that Intuitionism is solipsistic. I
>>>>> reject
>>>>> Intuitionism as a singular coherent theory of mathematics, but I
>>>>> do
>>>>> accept it as a member of the pantheon of "interpretations" of
>>>>> mathematics.
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Onward!
>>>>>
>>>>> Stephen
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
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>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>>>
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>>>>
>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>>
>>>>
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