Hi Bruno Marchal Thanks. Then the numbers are noit separate but included in the truth. My feeling is that the truth then may be the truth(s) of information theory.
Roger Clough, [email protected] 11/2/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-01, 11:36:18 Subject: Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be aproblem ? On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >> 1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One). >> >> 2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic >> homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind, >> then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that >> other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access >> (the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse >> theories ? >> >> >> Roger Clough,[email protected] 10/31/2012 > Dear Roger, > > I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers > float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an > infinite regress. Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress disappear. They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some provably, some non provably). No problem. > That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of the One to be > Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator, but if not > it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be distinguishable > from to have individual values. The totality of numbers is an > infinity and thus have the property that their proper parts cannot > be distinguished from their totality. How does the One accomplish > this? It seems to me that we have to assume that the One is > conscious of the numbers and that makes the numbers something > "different" from the One for 1) to work and this is no different > from what a finite mind does. My point here is that a mind cannot be > infinite because it would be incapable of distinguishing it's self > from any of its proper parts - making it the ultimate solipsist. Do > there exist maps between the totality of an infinite set to an > improper part? If yes, what are their necessary properties? The One is solipsist, as the one is unique and alone. But I don't see why it should be conscious. It might be, but I see no evidence for this. Bruno > > The idea of 2) seems to be demolished by Dennett's argument > against the homunculus or else the One is strictly a solipsist as I > argued above. I suspect that the mapping between wholes and improper > parts is the same as Bruno's measure problem. > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
