On 02 Nov 2012, at 10:34, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

Thanks. Then the numbers are noit separate but
included in the truth.

Losely speaking, OK. Numbers are objects, truth concerns only propositions.


My feeling is that the truth
then may be the truth(s) of information theory.

Information theory is just a tiny part of computer science. The word "information" is very dangerous and overused, as people will confuse Shannon information with the meaningful information (best handled by model theory in logic).
Note that computer science is essentially a tiny part of arithmetic.
You must understand that after Gödel, we know that arithmetical truth is *very* big, and if we are machine (comp) then we cannot distinguish arithmetical truth from the outer God (the ONE).

Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/2/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-01, 11:36:18
Subject: Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be aproblem ?


On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012
Dear Roger,

I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers
float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an
infinite regress.

Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress
disappear.

They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some
provably, some non provably). No problem.





That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of the One to be
Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator, but if not
it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be distinguishable
from to have individual values. The totality of numbers is an
infinity and thus have the property that their proper parts cannot
be distinguished from their totality. How does the One accomplish
this? It seems to me that we have to assume that the One is
conscious of the numbers and that makes the numbers something
"different" from the One for 1) to work and this is no different
from what a finite mind does. My point here is that a mind cannot be
infinite because it would be incapable of distinguishing it's self
from any of its proper parts - making it the ultimate solipsist. Do
there exist maps between the totality of an infinite set to an
improper part? If yes, what are their necessary properties?

The One is solipsist, as the one is unique and alone. But I don't see
why it should be conscious. It might be, but I see no evidence for this.

Bruno




The idea of 2) seems to be demolished by Dennett's argument
against the homunculus or else the One is strictly a solipsist as I
argued above. I suspect that the mapping between wholes and improper
parts is the same as Bruno's measure problem.

-- Onward!

Stephen


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