On 11/18/2012 4:34 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 08:12:51AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Can you explain, in the simplest layman terms, why this argument can be
thrown out? The details are over my head, but it seems to me that the
argument is simply that in order to make universes separate, you would need
a whole other information architecture (which would also have to be
information-theoretically multiplied) to create and preserve that
separation. For each universe, you would need multiple universes of
overhead outside of all universes. Or if that is not his argument in the
paper, then consider it mine. Why does MWI not in itself require a second
order MW to propagate and maintain the multiplicity? If it needs no
resources, then why not use the same argument for the single universe?
There is no external multiplicity - only a single multiverse (of which
there is a range of opinion as to what that is exactly), which has far
less complexity than any one of the contained universes. The
individual universes, or worlds, multiply within the heads of the
observers, and observers with it, so there is a 1-1 relationship
between world and observer.
There is no issue of preferred basis, as each observer has their own
chosen basis. Observers with incompatible bases can never communicate
with each other - they simply pass by each other unnoticed. Only
observers with compatible bases can share their realities - giving
rise to the "illusion" (as it were) of a single external classical
Hope that helps. I'd say go and read my book, but I'm not convinced I
found the perfect explanation of this in that book either
... :(. Others may have different suggestions.
I agree with this view, especially the part about the compatibility
of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then gives rise to an
illusion of a single classical reality; I just phrase the concepts
differently. My question to you is how 'simple' can an observer be, as a
system? It seems to me that even particles could be considered as
observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for panpsychism.
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