Hi Bruno Marchal 

Isn't the Godel problem similar or related to saying that the 
subject cannot be part of the predicate ? Then in any system
there will always be at least one subject, and that subject
cannot be part of the rest of the system ?

Which is the same as saying, along with Leibniz, that
in any system (of monads ) there must be at least one
supreme monad, whose subject or identity or soul
cannot be part of anything below it, because it is supreme.

 


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/21/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-20, 11:56:31
Subject: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation




On 20 Nov 2012, at 03:52, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

    I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.


I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.

Hi Russell,

    And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we are 
humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a particular basis that 
some set of "observers with compatible bases can sharing their realities". Is a 
reality something that is 1p in your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll 
put that aside for now.
    That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about the 
distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's catastrophe. It seems to me 
that there is something that is being assumed about consciousness in those 
reasonings, something that is being taken for granted. (For one thing, the 
Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a universal ensemble that is very much 
like Leibniz' pre-established harmony and thus problematic as it is not 
computable. Bruno's rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors 
to work for comp, IMHO.)



Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although "objective", 
concerned the 1p, which might contains actual infinities (at least in some 
sense).

Dear Bruno,

    OK, I need to understand where actual infinities are permitted within 
comp's theoretical structure.



You can see them as useful epistemological fictions to ease the reasoning of 
the L bian machines (like PA) when emulated by the non L bian reality (RA or 
the UD).










    I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is somehow a 
difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that is, as I claim, 
instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a giant Black Cloud and that 
this difference can somehow be remembered and passed along in continuations. It 
is the one complaint that I have with reincarnation theories, the idea that 
some memories that can only be defined with reference to physical bodies can be 
continued. I think that the 'I' is not much different from the center of mass 
of physics. The C.o.M. does not really exist at all as a substance or physical 
object and yet it has causal efficacy in some way...
    Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of substance 
that has persistent existence, like material substances in Parmenidean and 
Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is 'not even wrong'? What happens 
to the center of mass of an aggregate when the members of that aggregate are 
altered? What if consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a 'process' - something 
more like a 'stream'. Computer science has no problem with streams that I know 
of... I am trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK 
with Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!)



Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?

    I do not know how to explain this relation is words at this time. Please 
allow me to refer to some definitions and ask for some thought on your part.

From: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#sectionstreams

"A stream of numbers is an ordered pair whose first coordinate is a number and 
whose second coordinate is again a stream of numbers. The first coordinate is 
called the head, and the second the tail. The tail of a given stream might be 
different from it, but again, it might be the very same stream. For example, 
consider the stream s whose head is 0 and whose tail is s again. Thus the tail 
of the tail of s is s itself. We have s =   0, s  , s =   0,   0, s     , etc. 
This stream s exhibits object circularity. It is natural to “unravel” its 
definition as: 
(0,0,…,0,…)
It is natural to understand the unraveled form is as an infinite sequence; 
standardly, infinite sequences are taken to be functions whose domain is the 
set N of natural numbers. So we can take the unraveled form to be the constant 
function with value 0. Whether we want to take the stream s described above to 
be this function is an issue we want to explore in a general way in this entry. 
Notice that since we defined s to be an ordered pair, it follows from the way 
pairs are constructed in ordinary mathematics that s will not itself be the 
constant sequence 0." 


    A Quine atom is a set that only has itself as a member or "Quine Atom is a 
set Q that satisfies Q={Q}". 

    see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quine_atom and 
http://math.eretrandre.org/mybb/showthread.php?tid=28

    It might be helpful to think of a Quine atom as a labeled transition system 
to understand my point about the relation between Quine atoms and streams. 





OK. All this is really a matter of implementation or representation. The second 
recursion theorem handles this well enough for computer science, but it is OK 
to choose any other system, if you prefer. But then you have to redo a big part 
of the work already done.










Note that the UD dovetails on all programs, with all inputs including all 
streams.





    Yes. This is why I think that your UD idea is very important!



And the UD, and all the finite section of its work exist in arithmetic. The 
gluing of those dreams is not, and belongs to the first person experience of 
the machines, which is independent of the UD-time-steps, so that it looks, and 
is mathematically described by the union of those finite pieces, and that lead 
to complex analytical structure of their stable realities.












    Are you assuming that consciousness is somehow independent of bodies, ala 
Bruno's immaterialism of numbers? Isn't this just an obscure form of Cartesian 
dualism that just argues away the existence of the 'res extensa' as being, as 
per Bruno's argument, something that Occam's razor cuts out of ontology and 
thus are left with a 'arithmetic body problem' where the 'res extensa' used to 
be?



But you need to postulate a small physical universe, and to speculate on a flaw 
in step 8, to get this.

    Why? I am only taking comp seriously and considering that a finite but very 
large plurality of L bian entities can form a defacto 'physical world' by their 
mutual agreements or truths. 


How will you select that finite set from the set of all L bian machines, or L 
bian machines experiences?






This 'physical world' is not to be considered as ontological primitive!



I still have no clue of what is your theory, by which I mean your primitive 
element. 
And I am at loss when you argue that the primitive elements have no properties, 
as I can't see how anything might emerge from that.








I thought for a long time on this list that the step 8 was not needed here, as 
the postulation of a small primitive physical universe cut the benefits of 
everything-like philosophy, which was the starting of this very list. 


    Yes, so why is my idea so difficult for you to grok?



Well, because, now, you seem to invoke a finite set, when the everything idea 
suggests an infinite one.
I grok just when you say that something is not correct in my work or post, and 
fail to say something understandable about that. For most of your posts I 
thought that you are coherent with comp, but then you still invoke the physical 
reality to oppose comp immaterialism, and this despite you do agree that the 
physical reality is not primitive. This does not make a lot of sense.











Also, to be "left with the body problem" is what is intersting in comp, as it 
gives the realm, and the ways, matter can appear and be explained. All the 
other theories assumed matter at the start.

    I know and this is what I wish to overcome, but I which for a model of 
interactions between L bian entities. 



I wish for many things, I wish for deriving the whole of physics from 
arithmetic. My work shows only that the unique way to solve the mind-body 
problem, once assuming comp, and keeping qualia and quanta distinct, consists 
in defining knowledge and observation from the self-reference logics, and that 
the whole physics has to emerge from that, as I did completely illustrate 
already at the physical propositional level.


I know that such a work might seems frustrating for a philosopher, as it shows 
how with comp, the questions are translated into arithmetic, and that the 
solutions might take time to be found, despite somehow the main definitions and 
theorems already exist (cf G del, L b, Solovay, Visser, G and G*).


I thought mathematicians and philosophers would be very pleased by such a 
bridge, but I have learned to be more realist about this, since. Many people in 
universities fight for defending the curriculum statu quo, instead of ideas and 
theories. 


This makes me think that the continental philosophy curriculum, and perhaps a 
part of the anglo-saxon one, might someday fall like Berlin wall, but it will 
take some time, to say the least. 


The fuzziness of the human science is too much an advantage for the politics 
and the manipulations. This strikes the eyes when you study the detail of the 
cannabis scandal, but is obviously clear in most religious or atheist 
institutions. 


Bruno










Bruno




I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
possible observers.

    Is this because of your argument that self-awareness is necessary for 
consciousness? Maybe you are right but thinking of it backwards; could you 
consider that there is a difference between being able to 'know' that one is 
conscious and simply being conscious? I think that Craig is making the case 
that 'sense' or raw 'something that is like being in the world' is not 
separable from the 'being in the world'. What we have is the case where the 
'simulation of the entity' is the entity itself; yet this wording does violence 
to the concept that I have been trying to explain.

    The best explanation that I have to point to is Kaufman and Zuckerman & 
Miranker's Russell operator idea and the Quine atom as a formal mathematical 
concept and its identification of the object with itself. It cannot be 
understood so long as one is embedded in the vision of the universe as being 
well founded and 'regular' - that there are a single set of 'irreducible' parts 
that make it up. It amazes me that the ideas of those Greek guys from 2000 
years ago still carry so much influence over our thinking!







-- 
Onward!

Stephen


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