On Thu, Nov 29, 2012 at 5:07 PM, Roger Clough <[email protected]> wrote:
> Hi Bruno Marchal > > I think of comp as a monitor of what the brain does > physically, objectively, materialistically, such as, at first > glance, produce electrical signals, things a computer > implant could do and in fact do do. > > But the brain also operates biochemically, not > just electrically, so I suppose one would need a biochemical > computer. Could that be done ? > The computation medium is not relevant. Any algorithm that can be executed by the biochemical computer can also be represented in a digital computer. In fact a lot of people are endeavouring to do just that, namely in the field of artificial neural networks. The trouble is figuring out what the algorithm is. > > > Is the computer causally connected to the brain. I don't see how this > could be possible. It would have to know when a woman's > period is, and its hormonal changes, the effects of age, > etc. > Why the dualism? Why not see those things as part of the computation? > > It would be so much more plausable if comp only monitored, > not controlled, the brain's activities. Causality is much much > more difficult. That could come later if at all. > > > [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] <[email protected]]> > 11/29/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> > *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> > *Time:* 2012-11-22, 09:27:20 > *Subject:* Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] > > Hi Roger, > > On 22 Nov 2012, at 11:25, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > You say > > " OK, but invalid when used to pretend that we are not machine, like > Penrose and Lucas did." > > So basically, whether you believe the Lucas-Penrose theory > > > It is not a theory. > > It is an informal argument according to which Gödel's theorem would show > that we are not machine. The argument has never convinced any logicians and > can be shown wrong in many different ways. > > On the contrary, incompleteness protects the consistency of Church thesis, > and thus comp. > > > > > depends > on whether you believe in comp or no. > > > Not at all. The argument show that Gödel's theorem (incompleteness) ==> > non-comp. This would imply that comp ===> Gödel's theorem is wrong, which > is absurd. > > The most basic error is that Lucas/Penrose believe that a human can know > that they are sound. > > Like Watson can play jeopardy, Gödel already knew that the Löbian machine > can detect the error made in Penrose and Lucas type of argument. This is > developed in my long text: "Conscience & Mécanisme". Judson Webb wrote a > book on this. > > In his second book, Penrose correct his mistake, but does not really take > the correction into account, and thus miss the formal first person > indeterminacy. > > > > I have serious problems > with comp because the 1ps and hence the 3ps of various > people and various computer programs will vary. > > I don't > see how they can all be the same. > > > I don't understand your point. > > > > Meanwhile, I'll look at the counter-arguments to Lucas and Penrose. > > > > You need to study Gödel's incompleteness theorem. Most popular account of > it are non valid. An nice exception is Hofstadter "Gödel, Escher Bach". > > > > > [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] <[email protected]]> > 11/22/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> > *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> > *Time:* 2012-11-21, 12:23:40 > *Subject:* Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] > > > On 21 Nov 2012, at 11:32, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > I'm trying to understand your paper, but a seemingly much simpler > form of your argument keeps getting in the way. The > simpler form is the Lucas argument, discussed in great > scholarly detail on > > http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/ > > > To be franc there is nothing new in that paper, on the contrary it fails > to mention the work done by Webb (not to talk on mine on Lucas, Benacerraf > and the Penrose argument). > > I have counted more than 50 errors in Lucas paper. Some are uninteresting, > and some are very interesting. The argument of Lucas and Penrose are > typically invalid, but it can be corrected, and it leads to the proposition > according to whioch: > > If I am a machine, then I cannot know which machine I am, and this plays > some role in the formal part of the study of the first person indeterminacy. > > Lucas and Penrose assumes that they are sound, and that they know that > they are sound, but this is already inconsistent, even if the soundness is > restricted to arithmetic. > > In Conscience & Mechanism, I show how all Löbian machines can refute Lucas > and Penrose. Basically they confuse []p (3p beliefs) with []p & p (1p > knowledge).. > > > > > It seems to me to be self-evident that > > 1p cannot be part of 3p > > > > But that is good insight of you. For correct machine, this can be proved, > as the machine cannot prove the true equivalence between []p and []p & p, > as they don't know that they are correct. > > []p can be defined in the language of the universal machine, but []p and p > cannot. By assuming correctness of some other machine, the Löbian one can > prove that for simpler machine than themselves, and they can bet on their > correctness and lift that idea at their own level, with the usual > theological risk of this (forgetting the "bet" in the process). > > > > > Which seems to be a equivalent to Godels's theorm. > > > OK, but invalid when used to pretend that we are not machine, like Godel > and Lucas did. > > > > > Or the observer can't be part of what is observed. > Or more generally, the prover cannot be part of the proof. > > > Well, both the observer (3p) and the prover (3p) can do that, without > necessarily knwoing that they do that. > But the knower (1p) cannot. > > To explain the details of this would need more familiarity in logic, and > notably Solovay's theorems, which I might explain someday. > > Bruno > > > > > > [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] <[email protected]]> > 11/21/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> > *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> > *Time:* 2012-11-20, 10:05:13 > *Subject:* Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] > > > On 20 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > > Sorry, where are the steps of UD ? > > > You can find them here: > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > > > You can download the PDF, and also the unique slide with a diagram for > each step, as this can help to remember them. For the step 8, the best > version is in this list in the MGA thread (the Movie Graph Argument). The > seven first steps already explains the reversal physics---/---number's > bio-psycho-theo-logy though. > > Bruno > > > > > > [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] <[email protected]]> > 11/20/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> > *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> > *Time:* 2012-11-19, 09:33:19 > *Subject:* Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] > > > On 19 Nov 2012, at 11:22, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > I thought that comp is exactly opposite to what you say, > that computationalism is the belief that we can simulate > the mind with a computer program-- that the mind is computable. > > > Yes that is correct (if by mind you mean the 3p feature of mind, and not > consciousness per se). > > What I wrote in the quote (below) is that the physical reality is not > completely Turing emulable, once we assume the mind is. > > Comp is just the idea that I can survive with a computer at the place of > the brain. This does NOT mean that a computer create the consciousness. It > means only that the consciousness can only be made manifestable through > relative bodies, but it exists only in Platonia. But then matter too, and > it relies statistically on all computations going through my current comp > states, and the math shows that this will include some continuous/analog > observable. > > I am not sure this can be understood without getting a personal > understanding of at least the first seven step of the UD reasoning. > > Bruno > > > > > [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] <[email protected]]> > 11/19/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> > *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> > *Time:* 2012-11-18, 07:46:20 > *Subject:* Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] > > On 17 Nov 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote: > > > > > > > -------- Original Message -------- > > > >> > >> More In This Article > >> * Overview > >> _Is Quantum Reality Analog after All?_ > >> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all > > >> ) > >> > >> > >> > >> Conventional wisdom says that quantum mechanics is a theory of > >> discreteness, describing a world of irreducible building blocks. > >> It stands to reason > >> that computersÿÿwhich process information in discrete > >> chunksÿÿshould be able > >> to simulate nature fully, at least in principle. But it turns out > >> that > >> certain asymmetries in particle physics cannot be discretized; > >> they are > >> irreducibly continuous. In that case, says David Tong, author of > >> "_Is Quantum > >> Reality Analog after All?_ > >> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all > > >> ) " in the December 2012 issue of > >> Scientific American, the world can never be fully simulated on a > >> computer. > > > That would be a nice confirmation of comp. As I have often insisted > digital physics (the world can be fully be Turing emulated) violated > the consequence of comp which makes necessary the presence of non > computable observable, and even non enumerable spectra. > > Digital physics is self-contradictory. It implies comp, but comp > implies the negation of digital physics, so, with or without comp, > digital physics is contradictory. > > Bruno > > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to > > [email protected].<[email protected].> > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+ > [email protected] <[email protected]> > > . > > For more options, visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > > > . > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > [email protected].<[email protected].> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+ > [email protected]. <[email protected].> > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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