On Thu, Nov 29, 2012 at 5:07 PM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> I think of comp as a monitor of what the brain does
> physically, objectively, materialistically, such as, at first
> glance,  produce electrical signals, things a computer
> implant could do and in fact do do.
>
> But the brain also operates biochemically, not
> just electrically, so I suppose one would need a biochemical
> computer.  Could that be done ?
>

The computation medium is not relevant. Any algorithm that can be executed
by the biochemical computer can also be represented in a digital computer.
In fact a lot of people are endeavouring to do just that, namely in the
field of artificial neural networks. The trouble is figuring out what the
algorithm is.


>
>
> Is the computer causally connected to the brain. I don't see how this
> could be possible. It would have to know when a woman's
> period is, and its hormonal changes,  the effects of age,
> etc.
>

Why the dualism? Why not see those things as part of the computation?


>
> It would be so much more plausable if comp only monitored,
> not controlled, the brain's activities.  Causality is much much
> more difficult. That could come later if at all.
>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] <rclo...@verizon.net]>
> 11/29/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-11-22, 09:27:20
> *Subject:* Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]
>
>  Hi Roger,
>
>  On 22 Nov 2012, at 11:25, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>  Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> You say
>
> " OK, but invalid when used to pretend that we are not machine, like
> Penrose and Lucas did."
>
> So basically, whether you believe the Lucas-Penrose theory
>
>
> It is not a theory.
>
> It is an informal argument according to which Gödel's theorem would show
> that we are not machine. The argument has never convinced any logicians and
> can be shown wrong in many different ways.
>
> On the contrary, incompleteness protects the consistency of Church thesis,
> and thus comp.
>
>
>
>
>  depends
> on whether you believe in comp or no.
>
>
> Not at all. The argument show that Gödel's theorem (incompleteness) ==>
> non-comp. This would imply that comp ===> Gödel's theorem is wrong, which
> is absurd.
>
> The most basic error is that Lucas/Penrose believe that a human can know
> that they are sound.
>
> Like Watson can play jeopardy, Gödel already knew that the Löbian machine
> can detect the error made in Penrose and Lucas type of argument. This is
> developed in my long text: "Conscience & Mécanisme". Judson Webb wrote a
> book on this.
>
> In his second book, Penrose correct his mistake, but does not really take
> the correction into account, and thus miss the formal first person
> indeterminacy.
>
>
>
>  I have serious problems
> with comp because the 1ps and hence the 3ps of various
> people and various computer programs will vary.
>
>  I don't
> see how they can all be the same.
>
>
> I don't understand your point.
>
>
>
> Meanwhile, I'll look at the counter-arguments to Lucas and Penrose.
>
>
>
> You need to study Gödel's incompleteness theorem. Most popular account of
> it are non valid. An nice exception is Hofstadter "Gödel, Escher Bach".
>
>
>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] <rclo...@verizon.net]>
> 11/22/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-11-21, 12:23:40
> *Subject:* Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]
>
>
>  On 21 Nov 2012, at 11:32, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>  Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> I'm trying to understand your paper, but a seemingly much simpler
> form of your argument keeps getting in the way. The
> simpler form is the Lucas argument, discussed in  great
> scholarly detail on
>
>  http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/
>
>
> To be franc there is nothing new in that paper, on the contrary it fails
> to mention the work done by Webb (not to talk on mine on Lucas, Benacerraf
> and the Penrose argument).
>
> I have counted more than 50 errors in Lucas paper. Some are uninteresting,
> and some are very interesting. The argument of Lucas and Penrose are
> typically invalid, but it can be corrected, and it leads to the proposition
> according to whioch:
>
> If I am a machine, then I cannot know which machine I am, and this plays
> some role in the formal part of the study of the first person indeterminacy.
>
> Lucas and Penrose assumes that they are sound, and that they know that
> they are sound, but this is already inconsistent, even if the soundness is
> restricted to arithmetic.
>
> In Conscience & Mechanism, I show how all Löbian machines can refute Lucas
> and Penrose. Basically they confuse []p (3p beliefs) with []p & p (1p
> knowledge)..
>
>
>
>
> It seems to me to be self-evident that
>
> 1p cannot be part of 3p
>
>
>
> But that is good insight of you. For correct machine, this can be proved,
> as the machine cannot prove the true equivalence between []p and []p & p,
> as they don't know that they are correct.
>
> []p can be defined in the language of the universal machine, but []p and p
> cannot. By assuming correctness of some other machine, the Löbian one can
> prove that for simpler machine than themselves, and they can bet on their
> correctness and lift that idea at their own level, with the usual
> theological risk of this (forgetting the "bet" in the process).
>
>
>
>
> Which seems to be a equivalent to Godels's theorm.
>
>
> OK, but invalid when used to pretend that we are not machine, like Godel
> and Lucas did.
>
>
>
>
>  Or the observer can't be part of what is observed.
> Or more generally, the prover cannot be part of the proof.
>
>
> Well, both the observer (3p) and the prover (3p) can do that, without
> necessarily knwoing that they do that.
> But the knower (1p) cannot.
>
> To explain the details of this would need more familiarity in logic, and
> notably Solovay's theorems, which I might explain someday.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] <rclo...@verizon.net]>
> 11/21/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-11-20, 10:05:13
> *Subject:* Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]
>
>
>  On 20 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>  Hi Bruno Marchal
>
>
> Sorry, where are the steps of UD ?
>
>
> You can find them here:
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>
>
> You can download the PDF, and also the unique slide with a diagram for
> each step, as this can help to remember them. For the step 8, the best
> version is in this list in the MGA thread (the Movie Graph Argument). The
> seven first steps already explains the reversal physics---/---number's
> bio-psycho-theo-logy though.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] <rclo...@verizon.net]>
> 11/20/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-11-19, 09:33:19
> *Subject:* Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]
>
>
>  On 19 Nov 2012, at 11:22, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>  Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> I thought that comp is exactly opposite to what you say,
> that computationalism is the belief that we can simulate
> the mind with a computer program-- that the mind is computable.
>
>
> Yes that is correct (if by mind you mean the 3p feature of mind, and not
> consciousness per se).
>
> What I wrote in the quote (below) is that the physical reality is not
> completely Turing emulable, once we assume the mind is.
>
> Comp is just the idea that I can survive with a computer at the place of
> the brain. This does NOT mean that a computer create the consciousness. It
> means only that the consciousness can only be made manifestable through
> relative bodies, but it exists only in Platonia. But then matter too, and
> it relies statistically on all computations going through my current comp
> states, and the math shows that this will include some continuous/analog
> observable.
>
> I am not sure this can be understood without getting a personal
> understanding of at least the first seven step of the UD reasoning.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] <rclo...@verizon.net]>
> 11/19/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-11-18, 07:46:20
> *Subject:* Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]
>
>   On 17 Nov 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > -------- Original Message --------
> >
> >>
> >> More In This Article
> >> * Overview
> >> _Is Quantum Reality Analog after All?_
> >> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
>
> >> )
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Conventional wisdom says that quantum mechanics is a theory of
> >> discreteness, describing a world of irreducible building blocks.
> >> It stands to reason
> >> that computersÿÿwhich process information in discrete
> >> chunksÿÿshould be able
> >> to simulate nature fully, at least in principle. But it turns out
> >> that
> >> certain asymmetries in particle physics cannot be discretized;
> >> they are
> >> irreducibly continuous. In that case, says David Tong, author of
> >> "_Is Quantum
> >> Reality Analog after All?_
> >> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all
>
> >> ) " in the December 2012 issue of
> >> Scientific American, the world can never be fully simulated on a
> >> computer.
>
>
> That would be a nice confirmation of comp. As I have often insisted
> digital physics (the world can be fully be Turing emulated) violated
> the consequence of comp which makes necessary the presence of non
> computable observable, and even non enumerable spectra.
>
> Digital physics is self-contradictory. It implies comp, but comp
> implies the negation of digital physics, so, with or without comp,
> digital physics is contradictory.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> >
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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