On 23 Nov 2012, at 13:18, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno:
At least one objection to UD(1) of mine is this problem:
Buridan's ass is an illustration of a paradox in philosophy in the
conception of free will.
It refers to a hypothetical situation wherein an ass that is equally
hungry and thirsty is placed precisely midway
between a stack of hay and a pail of water. Since the paradox
assumes the ass will always go to whichever is closer,
it will die of both hunger and thirst since it cannot make any
rational decision to choose one over the other.[1]
The paradox is named after the 14th century French philosopher Jean
Buridan, whose philosophy of moral determinism it satirizes.
A common variant of the paradox substitutes two identical piles of
hay for the hay and water; the ass, unable to choose between the
two, dies of hunger.
You lost me completely here, Roger. I don't see the relation with the
UD step 0 or 1. At all.
If you think the Buridan problem is a problem for comp, it means you
think to a very bad implementation. A robot or a sensible being will
just not get hungry if there is some food nearby. he might hesitate a
few second, then make an arbitrary choice, still determinist in the
eyes of God, and free in the mind of the ass.
Competing conflict are easily solve, by using pseudo-random algorithm,
or because the probability that you are exactly divided by alternative
does not make sense.
Buridan ass does not exist, and if it arises, natural selection will
quickly prune it of the species tree.
In fact life is easily cruel with those who decide too much slowly. It
is too much good for the predators.
Bruno
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hi Bruno Marchal
The problem is very basic and concerns at least UD(1).
I would call it the "what's next" problem.
Suppose you say yes, doctor and then wake up after the
transplant of a computer for your brain. Everything feels
fine, there is is no problem to solve, you have no immediate goal,
so what do you do next ?
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/23/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-22, 10:09:27
Subject: Re: isn't comp a pre-established perfect correspondence
Hi Roger,
On 22 Nov 2012, at 13:57, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno
Wouldn't there have to be a pre-established perfect correspondence
between the mind of the human (or the state of the world) with
the computer in order for comp to hold ?
You don't need a "perfect" correspondence. What would that mean?
Even a brain has to make a lot of approximate representations all of
the time, and to correct many error through redundant neuronal
circuitry.
But that would require the computer to know the future.
Hence comp is false.
You seem to be quite quick. I am not sure I see your point at all.
For comp being false, you need to postulate that there are some
activities which are not Turing emulable in the body, but up to now
everything in nature seems to be based on computable (Turing
emulable) laws (except the wave packet reduction, which is itself
quite a speculation).
Have you try to read the UD argument? Are you OK with the definition
of comp, and step 1?
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/22/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
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