Hi Bruno Marchal 

OK, I kept thinking that in comp, the computer calculations
had to do everything.  But you say that comp is not needed for
consciousness to occur.  But that is an assumption.

One would need an additional assumption, that consciousness 
be the mediator in converting input physical sensory signals into 
nonphysical mental sensations such as hotness. And for 
consciousness to achieve the inverse output process, of converting a
nonphysical mental  intention into a nerve signal for action.

Those assumptions are merely that-- assumptions. So thanks,
doctor, but no thanks. Comp requires huge additional assumptions
to be uised in my case for a transplant.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/24/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-24, 07:03:29
Subject: Re: who is in control , you or the computer ?


Hi Roger Clough,


On 23 Nov 2012, at 18:18, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 

I blow hot and cold about comp because I am not
really a theoretical thinker, I have to see how whatever works,
and I' stuck on US(1) as I do not know who is in control:
you or the computer ?. 


You. the computer, or even the brain, is just a tool used by your consciousness 
to manifest yourself in the environment.


Brain and computer cannot, strictly speaking, think. Only person can think and 
take initiative. Comp does not assume a computer can think (if computer denotes 
the material machine), it assumes only that a computer can manifest the complex 
number relations, or programs relations needed for your consciousness to 
manifest itself in some environment.


Feel free to ask any question (perhaps regrouped so as to avoid mailboxes 
panic).


Bruno










[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/23/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-23, 12:34:00
Subject: Re: isn't comp a pre-established perfect correspondence




On 23 Nov 2012, at 13:14, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 

The problem is very basic and concerns at least UD(1).
I would call it the "what's next" problem. 

Suppose you say yes, doctor and then wake up after the
transplant of a computer for your brain. Everything feels
fine, there is is no problem to solve, you have no immediate goal,
so what do you do next ? 


That is a funny question. I do not see at all the point. I guess that what I do 
next will be the usual things. I will pay the doctor bill, and come back to 
work, or take some rest, perhaps. The same question can be asked to someone 
getting an artificial heart, or coming back from hospital for any reason.


UD-1, actually UD-0, is just the definition of comp: the idea that the brain is 
a machine in the quasi-operational sense of accepting the transplant.


Then UD-1 is do you accept that if UD-0 is correct (comp is true), then we can 
in principle use classical teleportation (as described in the paper) as a 
locomotion mean?


Bruno











[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/23/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-22, 10:09:27
Subject: Re: isn't comp a pre-established perfect correspondence


Hi Roger, 




On 22 Nov 2012, at 13:57, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno

Wouldn't there have to be a pre-established perfect correspondence
between the mind of the human (or the state of the world) with
the computer in order for comp to hold ?


You don't need a "perfect" correspondence. What would that mean? Even a brain 
has to make a lot of approximate representations all of the time, and to 
correct many error through redundant neuronal circuitry. 











But that would require the computer to know the future.
Hence comp is false. 


You seem to be quite quick. I am not sure I see your point at all.


For comp being false, you need to postulate that there are some activities 
which are not Turing emulable in the body, but up to now everything in nature 
seems to be based on computable (Turing emulable) laws (except the wave packet 
reduction, which is itself quite a speculation).


Have you try to read the UD argument? Are you OK with the definition of comp, 
and step 1? 


Bruno










[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/22/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen



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