Hi Bruno:
At least one objection to UD(1) of mine is this problem:
Buridan's ass is an illustration of a paradox in philosophy in the conception 
of free will.
It refers to a hypothetical situation wherein an ass that is equally hungry and 
thirsty is placed precisely midway 
between a stack of hay and a pail of water. Since the paradox assumes the ass 
will always go to whichever is closer,
it will die of both hunger and thirst since it cannot make any rational 
decision to choose one over the other.[1] 
The paradox is named after the 14th century French philosopher Jean Buridan, 
whose philosophy of moral determinism it satirizes. 
A common variant of the paradox substitutes two identical piles of hay for the 
hay and water; the ass, unable to choose between the two, dies of hunger.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hi Bruno Marchal 

The problem is very basic and concerns at least UD(1).
I would call it the "what's next" problem. 

Suppose you say yes, doctor and then wake up after the
transplant of a computer for your brain. Everything feels
fine, there is is no problem to solve, you have no immediate goal,
so what do you do next ? 

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/23/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-22, 10:09:27
Subject: Re: isn't comp a pre-established perfect correspondence


Hi Roger, 




On 22 Nov 2012, at 13:57, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno

Wouldn't there have to be a pre-established perfect correspondence
between the mind of the human (or the state of the world) with
the computer in order for comp to hold ?


You don't need a "perfect" correspondence. What would that mean? Even a brain 
has to make a lot of approximate representations all of the time, and to 
correct many error through redundant neuronal circuitry. 











But that would require the computer to know the future.
Hence comp is false. 


You seem to be quite quick. I am not sure I see your point at all.


For comp being false, you need to postulate that there are some activities 
which are not Turing emulable in the body, but up to now everything in nature 
seems to be based on computable (Turing emulable) laws (except the wave packet 
reduction, which is itself quite a speculation).


Have you try to read the UD argument? Are you OK with the definition of comp, 
and step 1? 


Bruno










[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/22/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen



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