On 12/3/2012 4:42 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi meekerdb
1p is not a fiction. Your 1p is what is reading this page.


Where did I refer to 1p? Where did I call anything a 'fiction' Are you replying to the voices in your head? Don't put words in my mouth.

Brent

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net]>
12/3/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

    ----- Receiving the following content -----
    *From:* meekerdb <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>
    *Receiver:* everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>
    *Time:* 2012-12-02, 18:04:38
    *Subject:* Re: Semantic vs logical truth

    On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
    The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some actual 
machines knows
    already that, and can justified that If there are machine (and from outside 
we can
    know this to correct) then the 1p-truth is not codable.  The 1p truth are 
more
    related to the relation between belief and reality (not necessarily physical
    reality, except for observation and sensation).

    Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp & p is NOT codable.
    Most truth about machine, including some that they can know, are not 
codable.
    Many things true about us is not codable either.

    Let me see if I understand that.  I think you are saying that p, i.e. that 
"p"
    describes a fact about the world, a meta-level above the coding of a 
machine.  That
    the Mars Rover believes it is south of it's landing point is implicit in 
its state
    and might be inferred from its behavior, but there is no part of the state
    corresponding to "I *believe* I am south of my landing point."  One could 
include
    such second-level states (which one might want to communicate to Pasadena) 
but then
    that state would be just another first-level state. Right?

    Brent

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