Hi Stephen P. King 

No, we can grasp truth by correspondence.

And a transcendent truth could be arithmetic truth or
the truth of necessary logic. 

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/30/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-30, 11:17:12
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm


On 11/30/2012 9:10 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King 

Hintakka's concept of truth is what is called "pragmatic truth",
or "scientific truth". It's the same as Peirce's-- namely, what 
results when you carry out a particular protocol.

Dear Roger,

    Sure, I agree. My point is that such is the only notion of truth that is 
within our ability to grasp. We obtain the transcendent notions of truth by 
abstraction in some infinite limit of the pragmatic truths.



[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/30/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-02, 18:20:11
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm


On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's ideas? I am using his concept 
>> of game theoretic semantics to derive truth valuations.
>
> I read this. yes. I don't see relevant at all.
> I do appreciate his linking of intention and intension, but it is a 
> bit trivial in the comp theory.
>
Dear Bruno,

     Hintikka's idea is to show how truth values can be coherently 
considered to be the result of a process and not necessarily just some a 
priori valuation. This makes Truth an emergent valuation, just as I 
content all definite properties are emergent from mutual agreements 
between entities. Properties, in the absence of the possibility of 
measurement or apprehension of some type, do not exist; they are what 
the 1p project onto existence. Nothing more.

--




-- 
Onward!

Stephen

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