Hi Bruno Marchal
Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon
itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive
theory has done. We can replace [1p] by its actions -
those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject: object).
You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective.
That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or
interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations.
Your responses seem to leave out such relations. I cannot find
again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument
for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive
theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize
cognition. While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work
when living breathing humans are concerned.
IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent
computer calculations from emulating the mind.
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12
Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth
On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some actual machines
knows already that, and can justified that If there are machine (and from
outside we can know this to correct) then the 1p-truth is not codable. The 1p
truth are more related to the relation between belief and reality (not
necessarily physical reality, except for observation and sensation).
Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp & p is NOT codable.
Most truth about machine, including some that they can know, are not codable.
Many things true about us is not codable either.
Let me see if I understand that. I think you are saying that p, i.e. that "p"
describes a fact about the world, a meta-level above the coding of a machine.
No, p is for some statement at the base level, like 1+1 = 2.
That the Mars Rover believes it is south of it's landing point is implicit in
its state and might be inferred from its behavior, but there is no part of the
state corresponding to "I *believe* I am south of my landing point."
Then Mars Rover is not L?ian. But I am not even sure that Mars Rover is Turing
universal, or that it exploits its Turing universality.
But PA and ZF can represent "I believe". So we can study the logic of a new
'knowledge" operator defined (at the meta level, for each arithmetical
proposition) by Bp & p. For example if p is "1+1=2", it is
Believe"("1+1=2") & 1+1 = 2.
We cannot define such operator in arithmetic. We would need something like
Believe"("1+1=2") & True("1+1 = 2"), but True, in general cannot defined in
arithmetic. Yet, we can metadefine it and study its logic, which obeys a soprt
of temporal intuionistic logic (interpreting the S4Grz logic obtained).
One could include such second-level states (which one might want to communicate
to Pasadena) but then that state would be just another first-level state. Right?
Not sure I see what you mean. The meta, available by the machine is in the "I
believe". It is the 3-I. The presentation of myself to myself. The 1-I will be
the non definable operator above. We connect the believer to the truth. It is
easy to do for the sound correct machine.
Bruno
Brent
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