On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon
itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive
theory has done.
On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the diary)
the the self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is enough to
understand that physics emerge from the way the "numbers see
themselves".
But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the
incompleteness phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp &
p definition. It is a bit technical.
Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower,
and it plays the key role for consciousness and matter.
We can replace [1p] by its actions -
those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject: object).
You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective.
That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is the
1p, that we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by machines.
I describe the 3p and the 1ps (singular and plural), and indeed their
necessary statistical relation at some level.
That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or
interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations.
Your responses seem to leave out such relations. I cannot find
again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument
for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive
theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize
cognition. While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work
when living breathing humans are concerned.
I use computer and mathematical logic semantic. That's the advantage
of comp. You have computer science.
IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent
computer calculations from emulating the mind.
The 1p is not left out. Eventually comp singles out eight person
points of view. If you think comp left out the person, you miss the
meaning of the comp hope, or the comp fear.
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12
Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth
On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some
actual machines knows already that, and can justified that If
there are machine (and from outside we can know this to correct)
then the 1p-truth is not codable. The 1p truth are more related
to the relation between belief and reality (not necessarily
physical reality, except for observation and sensation).
Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp & p is NOT codable.
Most truth about machine, including some that they can know, are
not codable.
Many things true about us is not codable either.
Let me see if I understand that. I think you are saying that p,
i.e. that "p" describes a fact about the world, a meta-level above
the coding of a machine.
No, p is for some statement at the base level, like 1+1 = 2.
That the Mars Rover believes it is south of it's landing point is
implicit in its state and might be inferred from its behavior, but
there is no part of the state corresponding to "I *believe* I am
south of my landing point."
Then Mars Rover is not L鯾ian. But I am not even sure that Mars
Rover is Turing universal, or that it exploits its Turing
universality.
But PA and ZF can represent "I believe". So we can study the logic
of a new 'knowledge" operator defined (at the meta level, for each
arithmetical proposition) by Bp & p. For example if p is "1+1=2", it
is
Believe"("1+1=2") & 1+1 = 2.
We cannot define such operator in arithmetic. We would need
something like Believe"("1+1=2") & True("1+1 = 2"), but True, in
general cannot defined in arithmetic. Yet, we can metadefine it and
study its logic, which obeys a soprt of temporal intuionistic logic
(interpreting the S4Grz logic obtained).
One could include such second-level states (which one might want to
communicate to Pasadena) but then that state would be just another
first-level state. Right?
Not sure I see what you mean. The meta, available by the machine is
in the "I believe". It is the 3-I. The presentation of myself to
myself. The 1-I will be the non definable operator above. We connect
the believer to the truth. It is easy to do for the sound correct
machine.
Bruno
Brent
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